WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF:
European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH), European Democratic Lawyers (EDL), Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD), and Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD)
ON THE
APPLICATIONS:
- No. 1712/21 K.K. v. Greece
- No. 2871/21 I.M. v. Greece,
- No. 3104/21 S.K. v. Greece,
- No. 3111/21 S.A. v. Greece,
- No. 3118/21 L.M. v. Greece,
- No. 4034/21 A.D. v. Greece,
- No. 4159/21 T.M. v. Greece,
- No. 4177/21 H.T. et al. v. Greece
- No. 6923/21 S.G. v. Greece
- No. 10258/21 F.C. v. Greece
- No. 10692/21 O.M. v. Greece
- No. 12807/21 M.A. v. Greece
- No. 12926/21 M.E. v. Greece
- No. 13134/21 M.S. v. Greece
- No. 15067/21 G.R.J. v. Greece
- No. 15783/21 A.E. v. Greece
- No. 16802/21 S.R. v. Greece
- No. 16807/21 A.R. v. Greece
- No. 16811/21 M.H. v. Greece
- No. 16813/21 M.M. v. Greece
- No. 16815/21 M.H. v. Greece
- No. 16817/21 A.M. v. Greece
- No. 16818/21 A.A. v. Greece
- No. 16820/21 H.S. v. Greece
- No. 16822/21 S.R. v. Greece
- No. 16824/21 U.E. v. Greece
- No. 16825/21 W.A. v. Greece
- No. 16828/21 W.A. v. Greece
- No. 16831/21 S.H. v. Greece
- No. 22146/21 S.A.A. et al. v. Greece
- No. 24982/21 A.A.J. and H.J. v. Greece
- No. 42429/21 M.A. v. Greece
I.
INTRODUCTION
- The following submissions are made
by the European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights
(ELDH), the European Democratic Lawyers (EDL), the Association of Lawyers for
Freedom (ÖHD), and the Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD) (the “Interveners”)
pursuant to the leave granted by of the European Court of Human Rights (the
“Court” or the “ECtHR”) on 4 July 2022, in accordance with Rule 44(3) of the
Rules of the Court. The 32 above mentioned applications concern the alleged
refoulement of the Applicants from Greek territory (land and sea) to Turkey,
without prior procedure (“pushbacks”).
- In addition to the aspects listed in
the request for leave to intervene dated 23 February 2022, after taking the
annexes into consideration, and in order to assist the Court effectively, the
interveners will also provide the Court with written comments on the risks
faced by citizens of Turkey who were pushed back from Greece to Turkey.
- Although the Respondent State in the
aforementioned applications is Greece, the conditions a person will face upon
being pushed back to Turkey are relevant in the present cases due to the
expelling state’s obligation to take the treatment into account a person will
be subjected to in the receiving state.[1]
II.
THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS
- First and foremost, the Interveners
want to highlight the fact that pushbacks are illegal actions carried out by
state officials to prevent asylum seekers from getting access to the domestic
asylum procedure. While a pushback is not based on a formal decision, the
Respondent State is nevertheless bound to its legal obligations under domestic
and international law. The Respondent State is bound to the principle of
non-refoulement as soon as asylum seekers enter Greek territory, whether on
land or at sea.[2]
- If substantial grounds have been
shown for believing that the removal or return to a third country would expose
an asylum seeker[3] to
treatment contrary to Article 3 – directly in that third country or indirectly,
for example, through chain-refoulement – the Court has confirmed the
responsibility of the Contracting State not to deport.[4]
These duties also include the duty to consider the overall reception conditions
for asylum seekers in the receiving state, and the duty to consider the
respective person’s situation.[5]
- Article 86(1) of the Greek Law
4636/2019 (“International Protection Act [IPA]”) defines the criteria for the
application of the “Safe Third Country” (“STC”) concept. Even though the
criteria are in general consistent with Article 38 EU Directive 2013/32
(“Asylum Procedure Directive”), a serious divergence arises. With IPA, Article
86(1)(f) an additional set of criteria was introduced concerning the relation
of an asylum seeker with a “STC” by which a mere transit state, in combination
with specific circumstances, can be deemed as “safe”.
- While the Court so far has never
questioned the “STC” concept as such, nor has it commented on whether a given
third country was safe or not, the Court is sometimes – as given in the
aforementioned applications – “obliged to scrutinise the use of the safe
third-country concept against the benchmark of Article 3 and the prohibition of
non-refoulement”.[6] In this
context, the Court has stated in its case law that the deporting State “has a
general procedural obligation to carry out a fair and thorough examination of
the conditions in that third country”,[7]
including “the accessibility and reliability of its asylum system”.[8] While
it rests with the asylum seekers to substantiate their individual
circumstances, the Contracting State’s authorities, however, are obliged to
conduct an assessment “of the accessibility and functioning of the receiving country’s
asylum system and the safeguards it affords in practice”[9]
on their own motion. This obligation applies all the more if a general risk of
a breach – for example, of Article 3 – in the receiving state is well known.[10]
- Despite the fact that “Turkey has
persistently raised concerns about alleged migrant arrival prevention measures
(so-called ‘pushbacks’) enforced by the Greek authorities in the Aegean Sea”,[11] the
survivors of these illegal actions from Greek state organs do not receive any
protection in Turkey where they are deprived of their fundamental human rights
and face a real and genuine fear of refoulement. As will be set out below,
Turkey – with regards to its asylum system and its reception conditions – fails
to meet the recognized requirements leading to a systematic violation of the
rights of asylum seekers as set out in the Convention.
A.
Insufficient Access to Protection in Turkey
- According to the European
Commission, the asylum legislation in Turkey is only partially aligned with the
EU acquis. “The Law on Foreigners and
International Protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation)
expressed in the New York Protocol of the 1951 Geneva Convention, according to
which the vast majority of persons seeking international protection in Turkey
cannot apply for fully-fledged refugee status but for ‘conditional refugee’
status and subsidiary protection only”.[12]
In other words, anyone not originally from a European country is excluded from
full refugee recognition. In effect, this legislation bars any citizen of a
West Asian or African country from the protection as a refugee under the Geneva
Convention.[13]
- However,
based on Article 38(1)(c) and (e) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Member
States of the European Union may apply the “STC” concept only if the third
country concerned respects the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with
the Geneva Convention, and if the possibility exists to request refugee status
in that third country and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection
there in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Already under these
requirements alone, Turkey fails to meet the conditions necessary to be
considered a “STC”.
- Despite
the fact that there is no protection under the Geneva Convention for
non-Europeans available in Turkey, Turkey particularly offers to asylum seekers
the following permits based on the Law on Foreigners and International
Protection No. 6458 (LFIP)[14]:
conditional refugee status (Şartlı Mülteci Statüsü), subsidiary protection
status (İkincil Koruma Statüsü) and temporary protection status for Syrian
nationals (Geçici Koruma Statüsü). However, based on the experience of the
Interveners’ members working in the field, one of the main obstacles for asylum
seekers in Turkey to obtain a residence permit is insufficient access to the
migration system.[15]
- Temporary
protection for Syrian nationals: Since October
2014[16]
Syrians can officially obtain Temporary Protection Status (TPS)[17] in
Turkey under the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR).[18]
TPS is designed for situations of high numbers of refugees entering Turkey, and
therefore, “is not defined as a form of international protection but a
complementary measure used in situations where individual international
protection eligibility processing is deemed impractical”.[19]
Although the flow of people from Syria seeking refuge has not ended yet, in
practice, it has become extremely difficult to obtain TPS in Turkey due to the
fact that cities and neighbourhoods are closing their means of registration
(see § 18).[20] According
to the European Commission, “NGOs reported considerable challenges with access
to registration in the first place, where individuals wishing to lodge an
application in PDMMs[21] are
referred to other PDMMs, without a formal documentation and referral system.
Such de-facto barriers to registration hinder access to all other essential
services and put asylum seekers in an irregular situation if apprehended.
Effective access to international protection at borders, airports and removal
centres remain limited as reported by NGOs and lawyers”.[22]
- While
TPS entitles a person to get health care and education, to apply for a work
permit six months after the application for TPS, and to seek social assistance,
TPS is tied to the place of registration. If a person moves to another province
– e.g. to Istanbul in order to find work – then this person loses all rights
attached to this status. Following TPR, Article 33(2)(a), a person under
temporary protection is – if not exceptionally permitted otherwise – obligated
to stay in the registration province and is not allowed to move to another
province. An official transfer is close to impossible.[23] If
a person fails to stay in the province of registration and is apprehended
elsewhere, this person may face detention in order to be transferred back to
the assigned province,[24] but
there is also a risk of deportation due to violation of the TPR.[25]
Furthermore, if a person fails to stay in the province of residence, they also
lose all access to social rights, i.e. education and health care in their new
place of residence.[26]
- Most
importantly in the context of pushbacks – based on TPR, Article 12(1) – TPS
shall cease where a person leaves Turkey voluntarily, e.g. to try to reach
Greece. In other words: If a TPS holder is pushed back from Greece to Turkey,
this person’s temporary protection status and ID Card (“kimlik”), if even
possessed, will be terminated. In addition, in practice there is no possibility
to reobtain a new “kimlik”.[27] Taken
the above mentioned together, the protection offered by TPS does not equal the
protection provided by the Geneva Convention.
- International
Protection for non-Syrian and non-European citizens:
A person who is not eligible for TPS can submit an application for
international protection. Conditional refugee status is granted to a
non-European citizen[28] who
matches the criteria to be recognized as a refugee as set out in the Geneva Convention.
However, people with conditional refugee status can not access the social
rights guaranteed in the Geneva Convention. Therefore, the protection offered,
again, does not equal the protection according to the Geneva Convention.
Subsidiary protection, in theory, is provided to people who do not meet the
criteria of the refugee definition, but would face, for example, degrading
treatment upon return or would be deported to a situation of general violence.[29]
- Analogous
to TPS for Syrian nationals, citizens from other non-European countries first
of all need to approach the Provincial Presidency of Migration Management
(PPMM) in order to lodge an application for international protection.[30] If an
application for international protection is registered, the applicant receives
a “kimlik” stating that the person is an international protection applicant,
which gives the holder of it the right to access education, health care
(temporarily for a year), and, after six months, the right to apply for a work
permit. In addition, the PPMM decides the “satellite city”[31]
for the applicant and sets a date for an interview. Based on the LFIP, Article
77, international protection applicants are, for example, required to
personally prove their presence in the assigned city by signature. If an
applicant fails to fulfil this obligation multiple times, their application for
international protection will be considered withdrawn.[32]
However, the main obstacle, again, is not a theoretical non-availability of a
protection status as such, but the practical non-accessibility to registration
(see § 18).
- In
addition, the procedure for international protection can take up to several
years,[33] and in
effect, mostly ends with a negative decision, respectively with a deportation
order. Asylum lawyers in Turkey have reported to the Interveners that they know
of no examples of clients who, in the end, received conditional refugee status
or subsidiary protection.[34] In
parallel, a migration rights NGO stated to the Interveners that there are
approximately 500,000 Afghans[35] in
Turkey, of which 2,700 have received a “humanitarian permit” in 2019, after
around five NGOs had lobbied on their behalf. Consistent with the lawyers’
reports cited before, the NGO staff is otherwise unaware of any positive
decisions in international protection cases of non-Syrians. In practice, this
leads to a situation where most citizens from West Asian or African countries
in Turkey do not apply for international protection because they are afraid of
deportation.[36] In any
case, no protection equivalent to the protection under the Geneva Convention is
offered to non-European third country nationals.
- The
Interveners conclude that Turkey offers insufficient protection for asylum
seekers. First, the residence permits available do not equal the protection
provided by the Geneva Convention. Second, the main obstacle in obtaining
actual protection in Turkey is non-accessibility: It has become increasingly
challenging for third country nationals to register for a “kimlik” in Turkey.
In 2018, the PDMM (now “PPMM”),[37] de facto stopped registering newly
arriving Syrians, with the exception of vulnerable cases, in large provinces –
such as Istanbul – and provinces with a relatively high refugee population –
such as Hatay and Mardin. Since then, there has been an increase in the number
of cities ‘closed’ to new applications. As of early 2020, the following cities
were closed to all except vulnerable cases: Istanbul, Edirne, Tekirdag,
Kirklareli, Kocaeli, Canakkale, Bursa, Balikesir, Izmir, Aydin, Mugla, Antalya,
Hatay and Yalova.[38] This
situation has remained unchanged, as an estimated 16 provinces were closed to
international protection applications in 2021[39]
– as to the Intervener’s knowledge, the situation remains unchanged up until
today. Due to the prohibition of travelling within Turkey for unregistered
third country nationals,[40]
individuals affected are, in addition, unable to travel to a place where it
might be possible to register.[41]
Finally, in the context of the aforementioned applications, it is of most
relevance, that – based on FLIP, Article 54(1)(h), and TPR, Article 12(1)(a)
and (c) – a “kimlik”, if possessed, is terminated because a person has left
Turkey voluntarily, namely to try to reach Greece – and will not be able to
re-obtain it. For all these reasons, the Respondent State cannot declare Turkey
as generally “safe” for people who have left Turkey voluntarily, seeking
international protection in Greece.
B.
Systematic Arrests upon Return & Insufficient Conditions of Detention
- According
to the European Commission, “Turkey needs to further align its practice with
European standards in removal centres, in particular with regard to protection
of human rights, including access to legal counselling and interpreters and
protection of vulnerable groups, in particular children staying with their
families”.[42]
- Drawing
from the experience of the Interveners’ members working in the field, it has
been observed that people seeking international protection who were pushed back
from Greece to Turkey usually face detention in Turkey.[43]
However, the duration varies between a few days and several months. Based on
LFIP, Article 57(2), detention for the purpose of removal (“removal detention”)
may be ordered to those who, among other reasons, have breached the rules of
exit from Turkey. Even during a procedure for international protection, a
person may be detained – or kept in detention if removal detention was
previously ordered – under LFIP, Article 68. In general, non-European migrants
are routinely subject to arbitrary detention in Turkey without legal basis.
Namely, persons who are apprehended outside their designated province (see §§
13 and 16) are at risk of being detained.[44]
Based on LFIP, Article
57(3), the maximum duration of the removal detention is six months, yet
it may be extended for a maximum of six more months.[45]
However, there were cases reported to the Interveners, wherein detainees were released after the
maximum duration had been exceeded but were arrested again afterwards.[46]
- Furthermore,
the Interveners’ members, on several occasions, have received reports of
substandard detention conditions in Turkey[47]
for pushback survivors, which have even amounted to inhuman and degrading
treatment. Although improvements have been made compared to conditions around
2015,[48]
inhuman and degrading conditions still persist today, in particular
overcrowding,[49] short
periods of daily access to the outdoors,[50]
lack of privacy due to detention in mass cells, insufficient food supply with,
at times, only two meals a day, insufficient access to clean drinking water,
and insufficient medical care.[51]
- In
addition, accessing legal counsel or representation for people in detention is
particularly difficult, even though a Legal Aid System has been implemented
step by step in different cities, after the Istanbul Bar Association started
these activities in 2014. First, the PPMM is not obliged to inform any legal
representative about asylum seekers detained. In addition, detainees usually
cannot contact a lawyer, a legal NGO, or the regional bar association from
inside the detention centre. Therefore, they have to rely on family, friends,
or UNHCR to initiate the contact. Second, the contact between asylum seekers in
detention and their legal representation is complicated for practical reasons:
While the file has to be consulted at the PPMM, the asylum seeker is held in a
remote detention centre where a lawyer has to go and visit their clients.
However, before the file can be accessed, a lawyer needs to get a notarized
Power of Attorney (POA). Therefore, for one, an employee of a notary needs to
accompany a lawyer to a detention centre to get the POA certified. This
notarization comes with additional fees. For two, in order for a notary to
certify a signature, the asylum seeker in question is required to have a valid
“kimlik” or a passport. As survivors of pushbacks get their “kimlik” cancelled
and often are deprived of all their belongings during a pushback, in these
cases, it is close to impossible to sign a notarized POA. While courts in
Turkey have started to accept more informal POAs, the PPMM insists on the
certification through a notary. In effect, a lawyer can file an appeal against
a deportation order with an informal POA, but will not be granted access to the
PPMM file of the client. Third, translation inside detention centres is only
allowed through formal interpreters. Therefore, a lawyer cannot be accompanied
by friends or family members to facilitate communication with an existing or
prospective client. Phone translation is also not possible. Certified
interpreters, however, request a fee for their service, for which the detainee
or a support network outside detention have to provide. Finally, despite “the
increase in the number of lawyers handling cases in removal centres (from 4,187
in 2019 to 7,168 in 2020), access to legal counselling remained low,
considering hundreds of thousands of migrants apprehended and placed in removal
centres”.[52]
Moreover, the Interveners’ members are aware of the systematic and unlawful
practice of pressuring detainees to sign forms with which they agree to their
“voluntary return” (see §§ 24-26). Apart from this, there have been further
reports of ill-treatment, including torture, against detainees by staff. For
example, in June 2018, in Antalya, a Syrian national was tortured by officers,
transferred to Gaziantep, and continued to suffer physical violence throughout
the transfer.[53] Upon
an investigation of a suicide case in Gaziantep Oğuzeli Removal Centre in 2019,
Gaziantep Governorate’s Commission for Investigation and Evaluation of Human
Rights Violations stated that there have been several suicide attempts in the
removal centre.[54]
Furthermore, on 23 June 2021, a Syrian national – based on a statement of the
responsible Governor – set himself on fire and died at Izmir Harmandalı Removal
Centre.[55]
C.
Insufficient Protection from Refoulement in Turkey
- In
practice, non-European migrants are routinely removed from Turkey or pressured
to sign the consent form for a “voluntary return”. Of most relevance for
survivors of pushbacks is the regulation under LFIP, Article 54(1)(h), which
states that any person who has left Turkey irregularly shall be subject to
deportation. Therefore, refugees who have fled Turkey and experienced pushback
operations are potentially at risk of deportation upon return because of
leaving Turkey irregularly.[56]
- In
recent years, and particularly as of July and August 2019, after the regional
elections in Turkey, the scale of illegal expulsions from Turkey to Syria –
which constitute refoulement – have increased dramatically.[57]
In this regard, it can be observed that Syrian nationals are increasingly
pushed, respectively forced to sign declarations for “voluntary return”[58] – a
practice that recently has been acknowledged also by the ECtHR.[59] In Akkad v. Turkey,the Court had to decide on the case of a young Syrian national,
who was initially granted TPS in Turkey. He was apprehended near the
Turkish-Greek land border when travelling with a group of people allegedly
trying to enter into Greek territory in June 2018. Subsequently, the Applicant
was detained, transferred to the Turkish-Syrian border, and – after he was
coerced to sign a preprinted “voluntary return” form – deported to Syria. Here
the Court came to the conclusion that Turkey, by its actions, knowingly had
exposed the Applicant to a “real risk” of being subjected to
treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.[60]
In this regard, it should be noted that there are reports of Syrian deportees
and returnees – from Turkey and from other neighbouring countries – who were
arrested or forcibly disappeared after their return to Syria.[61] In
October 2019, Human Rights Watch reported that Turkish authorities
in Istanbul and Antakya had arbitrarily detained and deported Syrians to
northern Syria,
despite active hostilities in the region.[62]
These deportations should be read in conjunction with the Turkish authorities’
publicly-stated objective, reported by the European Asylum Support Office: to
create “safe zones” in Syria in which to return refugees.[63]
- The
practice of forced “voluntary return” was still widespread during the time
period relevant for the aforementioned applications. For example, the İzmir Bar
reported that people detained in removal centres have been systematically
forced to sign “voluntary repatriation papers”. The people affected are not
informed[64] about
their legal rights and not allowed to access legal aid.[65]
In Hatay, there have been allegations of violence, handcuffing, and pressure to
apply for “voluntary return” by guards.[66]
Lawyers have also suggested that poor detention conditions in Removal Centres
are likely used as a tool to pressure migrants into “voluntary return”.[67] To the
knowledge of the Interveners, this practice is still happening today.[68]
- Furthermore,
the practice of forced “voluntary return” is also directed towards non-Syrian
nationals, e.g. Afghans.[69] The Human
Rights Association has announced that the Afghan refugees are subjected to
torture and pressure in the Harmandalı (İzmir) Removal Centre.[70] The
Interveners received reports about mass deportations of Afghan citizens to Iran
and were told that, in autumn 2021, approximately 30,000 Afghan nationals were
being held in removal detention in Turkey.[71]
- In
practice, most non-Syrian nationals never register for a residence permit in
Turkey due to the several legislative shortcomings and practical obstacles set
out above. Whoever does register – Syrians and non-Syrians alike – are often
forced by the socioeconomic reality to move from their allocated city to
economic centres – most often Istanbul.[72]
Those unable to register for any kind of status are, de facto if not de jure,
potentially subject to refoulement.
D.
Inadequate Reception Conditions in Turkey
- While
those who manage to obtain a “kimlik” have the right to education and health
care and the right to request a work permit[73]
in Turkey, in practice, it is extremely difficult to actually exercise these
rights. For example, according to the European Commission, “768,839 children
with some kind of protection status were enrolled in formal education in Turkey
by December 2020. However, more than 400,000 schoolaged refugee children were
still out-of-school and did not have any access to education opportunities”.[74]
Furthermore, although there are around 3.5 million Syrians registered in
Turkey, only 60,000 Syrians have a work permit.[75]
Conversely, the vast majority of migrants in Turkey work in the informal labour
market,[76] and,
thus, are subjected to exploitative labour conditions. Notably, the Interveners
have received reports about migrants under the age of 18 being subjected to
child labour.[77]
- There
is a broad consensus – both in the ECtHR and at international and European
level – that asylum seekers are a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable
population in need of special protection and that states have a positive
obligation to provide material support and accommodation to asylum seekers.[78]
However, minors, women, survivors of torture and violence, and LGBTIQ+ people
have special reception needs because of their specific additional
vulnerabilities which ought to be addressed. Nevertheless, in Turkey, there is
a clear lack of such special reception conditions. Gender-based violence
against refugee women, for example, persists as a risk.[79]At
the same time, survivors of gender-based violence in Turkey face serious
challenges, in particular discrimination and language barriers when they
approach protection services.[80]
Moreover, the capacity of women’s shelters in Turkey is quite low,[81] and
receiving access is particularly difficult for refugee women.[82] At the
same time, there are no shelters for LGBTIQ+ people, who – according to the
domestic law in Turkey – are not even recognised as a vulnerable group.[83] Not
least from such systematic shortcomings towards specific groups of refugees
stems the Respondents State’s obligation to carefully examine the individual
situation of every applicant before returning them to Turkey.
- Finally,
enforced destitution itself constitutes
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention. Those denied access to a residence permit – including through means
of international protection – are denied shelter, food, and access to
education, and are simultaneously excluded from the right to work and state
support. In addition, based on the many reports on how pushbacks are executed
the people affected are, in most cases, deprived of all their material
belongings, including money, phones, and identification documents.[84] This
deprivation further exacerbates the destitution pushback survivors face upon
return to Turkey. While in detention, the people affected are provided with
shelter and minimal food, and after being released from the detention centre,
there is no State assistance offered by the Turkish government.[85] Read
in conjunction with the Court’s most recent case law, it needs to be taken into
account that the people affected – before being exposed to complete destituton
– had already had been in an extremely vulnerable situation: they had been
subjected to a violent pushback, and some may even have lost relatives or
friends during the pushback. Therefore, they had undoubtedly been in a
situation of extreme stress and most likely had already experienced feelings of
intense pain and grief.[86]
- Taken
together, survivors of pushbacks face a situation of complete disregard of
their human dignity upon return to Turkey. As a result, there are reasons for
believing that the removal or return from Greece to Turkey will expose a person
to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
E.
Racist Violence, Hate Speech & Increasing Risk of Physical Attacks
- Over
the last years, violent attacks targeting migrants have been increasing in
Turkey.[87] This
violence can also be observed by following the increasing hate speech on social
media platforms which remain unsanctioned.[88]
Moreover, in Annex 1, the Interveners submit a nonexhaustive list of attacks
and statements of politicians since the end of 2016. The general escalation of
racist sentiments should be read in conjunction with this inflammatory
political rhetoric targeting refugees and migrants and the severe deterioration
of the economic situation in Turkey.[89]
- Under
the scope of Article 2 of the ECHR, the Contracting States have a positive
obligation to protect human life.[90] Given
the extent of hate speech and physical attacks against migrants in Turkey, the
Respondent State needs to take into account that a person fleeing from Turkey
might be fleeing from racist violence and also assume that any person returned
to Turkey may become an (arbitrary) target of a physical attack. Also from
these circumstances, it follows that the Greek authorities are obliged to
examine all applications individually.
- Related
to the preceding § 18, it is worth mentioning the violent attacks in Altındağ
(Ankara) in 2021. A fight between Syrian and local youngsters triggered the
attack of shops and homes belonging to Syrian refugees.[91]
Following these events, the Turkish government started a so-called “dilution
project”[92] to
limit the refugee population to 25% of the total population in every
neighbourhood: “Since May 2022, it is against the law for any region or area in
Turkey to have a population of foreign nationals that is more than one-quarter
of the total population”.[93]
Refugees are “encouraged” to relocate to other neighbourhoods which have
refugee populations lower than 25%, and it is reported that some refugees could
not register their addresses due to this population limitation.[94]
III.
CITIZENS OF TURKEY
- It
is well known that since the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, political
criticism in Turkey has been heavily persecuted. However, the limited
independence of the judiciary and widespread politically motivated criminal
charges have always been problems in Turkey. Nevertheless, together with the State
of Emergency (“SoE”), the situation has further deteriorated.[95] Due to
the recent developments, international legal organisations felt the urge to
establish the International Fair Trial Day, and within their initial statement,
they underlined the systematic violations of the fair trial principles in
Turkey.[96]
- There
is also the risk of severe torture in Turkey. For instance, the People’s Law
Office (HHB) reported on Ayten Öztürk who was arrested in Beirut on 9 March
2018, extradited to Turkey on 13 March 2018, and was subsequently held in
unofficial detention for 6 months until 28 August 2018. She was subjected to
severe torture in Turkey.[97] In
recent years, there are several judgments from different countries where the
local courts decided in favor of non-extradition due to the severe risk of
torture in Turkey.[98]
- A
joint report of Turkey-based human rights organizations, which covers 2019 and
the first half of 2020, emphasizes that torture is not limited to police
headquarters or demonstrations, but is a common practice in prisons.[99] There
are a significant number of reports from other NGOs and rights organisations
that support these findings.[100] In
addition, it was reported that 45 pushback survivors were severely tortured by
the Turkish soldiers upon their return. ÖHD, one of the interveners, lodged a
criminal complaint; however, the case file was closed by the prosecutor’s
office.[101]
- Citizens
of Turkey with criminal charges who are pushed back to Turkey face serious risk
of immediate arrest, detention, and torture
IV.
LACK OF INFORMATION
- The
Interveners come to the conclusion that, given the overall circumstances in
Turkey, an individual examination of each claim is required to comply with the
Respondent State’s obligations under the Convention, namely Article 3.
Conversely, if a person – either a citizen of Turkey or a third country
national – tries to obtain asylum in Greece, but is prevented from entering or
staying in the country, and is therefore stopped from lodging claims for
asylum, this denial would expose this person to a risk of ill-treatment and –
if a third country national is concerned – even chain-refoulement to their
country of origin. If, at the same time, the Greek authorities fail to provide
the person who tries to obtain asylum in Greece with any relevant information
about the Greek asylum procedures – and access to domestic remedies in Greece
is not made available – this constitutes a violation of Article 13 in
conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.[102]
V.
CONCLUSION
- Considering
the overall reception conditions in Turkey, the Interveners come to the
conclusion that the Respondent State – from the moment a person enters Greek
territory, both by land and sea – is obliged to conduct an in-depth analysis of
the individual risks an asylum seeker faces in Turkey. There is reason to
believe that the removal or return of an asylum seeker to Turkey would expose
this person to treatment contrary to Article 3 due to restricted access to the
asylum system in Turkey, which offers only, if at all, insufficient protection;
the catastrophic social economic conditions to which migrants are subjected;
and the widespread risk of racist violence. Where the Respondent State fails to
conduct such an investigation, and even deprives the asylum seeker of the
chance to present their claims, by pushing them back illegally, therefore
violates its obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.
Finally,
the Interveners are grateful for getting the opportunity to intervene in the
aforementioned applications and hope to have assisted the Court with the
explanations submitted.
Yours
sincerely,
Melanie Aebli (on behalf of the
Interveners)
Attorney at law
Annex:
1) List of attacks and statements of politicians since the end of 2016
(not submitted by fax)
2) European Commission, Turkey Report 2021 (see fn. 11)
3) ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ 2021 (see fn. 13)
4) ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ 2019 (fn. 16)
5) Expert Opinion issued by Stiftung ProAsyl (fn. 28)
6) Global Detention Project, Immigration Detention in Turkey (fn. 47)
7) Domestic Law of Turkey: Law on Foreigners and International Protection
8) Domestic Law of Turkey: Implementation Regulation for the Law on Foreigners and International Protection
9) Domestic Law of Turkey: Temporary Protection Regulation
[1] See Saadi v. Italy
[GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 124-125, ECtHR 2008.
[2] See Hirsi Jamaa and
Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, §§ 70-82, ECHR 2012.
[3] In Ilias and Ahemd v.
Hungary the Court stated: “it is the duty of the removing State to examine
thoroughly the question whether or not there is a real risk of the asylum
seeker being denied access, in the receiving third country, to an adequate
asylum procedure, protecting him or her against refoulement. If it is
established that the existing guarantees in this regard are insufficient,
Article 3 implies a duty that the asylum seekers should not be removed to the
third country concerned”, Ilias and Ahemd
v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 134, Judgement of 21 November 2019.
[4] See M.S.S. v. Belgium
and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, §§ 342, 343 and 362-68, with the references
therein, ECHR 2011.
[5] See Tarakhel v.
Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, § 105, ECHR 2014.
[6] Council of Europe/ECtHR Research Division, ‘Articles 2, 3,
8 and 13, The concept of a “Safe Third Country” in the case-law of the Court’,
§ 2, 9 February 2018.
[7] Ibid. § 4.
[8] Ilias and Ahemd v.
Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 139, Judgement of 21 November 2019.
[9] Ibid. § 141.
[10] See F.G. v. Sweden
[GC], no. 43611/11, § 126, ECHR 2016.
[11] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, Doc. Nr. SWD(2021)
290 final/2, 19 October 2021, p. 48, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en (in the Annex).
[12] Ibid., p. 49.
[13] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Türkiye’, published in the
Asylum Information Database (AIDA), 2021 Update, p. 20, available at: https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/AIDA-TR_2021update.pdf (in the Annex).
[14] In addition to the permits listed, Turkey offers a Short
Term Residence Permit (Articles 31-33 LFIP, and Articles 28 and 29 of the
Regulation for Implementation of the LFIP [Implementation Regulations]), a
Family Residence Permit (Articles 34-37 LFIP, and Articles 30-34 Implementation
Regulations), a Student Residence Permit (Articles 38-41 LFIP, and Articles
35-39 Implementation Regulations), a Long Term Residence Permit (Articles 42-45
LFIP, and Articles 40-43 Implementation Regulations), a Humanitarian Residence
Permit (Articles 46 and 47 LFIP, and, Article 44 Implementation Regulations),
and a Residence Permit For Victims of Human Trafficking (Articles 48 and 49
LFIP, and Articles 45 and 46 Implementation Regulations). However, these types
of residence permits are not of practical relevance in the context discussed
here.
[15] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 45.
[16] The legal basis of the 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation
(TPR) is Article 91 LFIP. As a piece of secondary legislation, the TPR must be
compliant and consistent with the general normative framework laid down by the
LFIP itself. See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’, published in the Asylum
Information Database (AIDA), 2019 Update, p. 120, available at: https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/report-download
_aida_tr_2019update.pdf
(in the Annex).
[17] Temporary Article 1 TPR indicates that Syrian nationals,
stateless persons and refugees who came to or crossed Turkey’s borders from
Syria due to the events that took place in Syria since April 2011 are taken
under “temporary protection”.
[18] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners; see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 78.
[19] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 120.
[20] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey Stops Registering Syrian
Asylum Seekers’, 16 July 2018, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/turkey-stops-registering-syrian-asylum-seekers.
[21] Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (“PDMM”),
today Provincial Presidency of Migration Management (“PPMM”).
[22] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 50.
[23] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[24] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 89.
[25] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey Stops Registering Syrian
Asylum Seekers’, fn. 20.
[26] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p.
70-71, and also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 91-92.
[27] In the file of a person who loses their “kimlik” based on
attempting to leave, or leaving Turkey illegally, the code V78 will be
registered. This code indicates that no new “kimlik” can be issued. Information
provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.
[28] For specific information regarding citizens of Iraq and
Afghanistan, Chechens, Daghestanis and Tajiks, Somali people and Iranians see
ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 79-81; for specific
information on citizens of Afghanistan also see Expert Opinion issued by
Stiftung ProAsyl, ‘The Situation of Afghan Refugees in Turkey’, March 2021,
available at: https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/PA_Expert-Opinion_The-Situation-of-Afghan-Refugees-in-Turkey.pdf (in the Annex).
[29] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[30] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 90.
[31] See ibid, p. 89.
[32] See ibid, p. 91.
[33] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 49.
[34] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[35] For specific information on citizens of Afghanistan see
Expert Opinion issued by Stiftung ProAsyl, fn. 28.
[36] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[37] See fn. 21.
[38] See AIDA & ECRE, ‘Registration under Temporary
Protection – Turkey’, 30 November 2020, available at: https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/registration-under-temporary-protection.
[39] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p.
45-46.
[40] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[41] See AIDA & ECRE, fn. 38.
[42] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 17-18.
[43] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p.
115.
[44] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p.
87-89, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 117-118.
[45] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners; see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 87.
[46] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[47] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners; see also Global Detention Project, ‘Country Report,
Immigration Detention in Turkey’, October 2021, available at: https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/immigration-detention-in-turkey
-trapped-at-the-crossroad-between-asia-and-europe#:~:text=Numerous%20observers%20have%20reported%20poor,detainees%20access%20to%20legal%20assistance (in the Annex).
[48] See Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT),
‘Report to the Turkish Government
on the visit to Turkey
carried out by the (CPT) from 16 to 23 June 2015, CPT/Inf (2017) 32, available
at: https://rm.coe.int/pdf/
168075ec0a; this Report was summarised by the
Stockholm Centre for Freedom, ‘CPT report highlights problems in Turkey’s
immigration detention centers’, 18
October 2017, available at: https://stockholmcf.org/cpt-report-highlights-problems-in-turkeys- immigration-detention-centers/; furthermore, as mentioned in the ECRE, ‘Country Report:
Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 97, a series of judgments from the Constitutional Court have
highlighted the need to provide adequate detention conditions in Turkey.
[49] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[50] For example, clients
have reported that access to an outdoor yard was granted in groups, leaving
them individually with 10 minutes yard time in the morning and 10 minutes in
the evening.
[51] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[52] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11 p. 49.
[53] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 101;
see also Global Detention Project, ‘Country Report, Immigration Detention in
Turkey’, fn. 47, p. 50.
[54] See Türkiye İnsan Hakları ve Eşitlik Kurumu, Gazi̇antep
Geri̇ Gönderme Merkezi̇ Zi̇yareti̇ Raporu (Rapor No: 2019/ 05), February 2019,
p. 5, available at: https://www.tihek.gov.tr/upload/file_editor/2019/07/1562585466.pdf; see also sendika.org, ‘HDP’li Toğrul, Antep Geri Gönderme
Merkezi’ndeki intihar iddialarını Meclis’e taşıdı’, 3 August 2019, available
at: https://sendika.org/2019/08/hdpli-togrul-antep-geri-gonderme-merkezindeki-intihar-iddialarini-meclise-tasidi-556817/.
[55] Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘24 June 2021, Daily
Report on Human Rights Violations’, available at: https://en.tihv.org.tr/documentation/24-june-2021-hrft-documentation-center-daily-human-rights-report/ i; critical about the detailed statement of the Governor see
Statement of the Izmir Bar Association, issued on 6 August 2021, available at: https://www.izmirbarosu.
org.tr/HaberDetay/2370/harmandali-geri-gonderme-merkezi-nde-yasamini-yitiren-suriyeli-multeci-ahmed-maslem-anildi.
[56] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[57] See Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘Dangerous Ground: Syrian
refugees face an uncertain future’, 2018, available at: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/dangerous-ground—syrias-refugees-face-an-uncertain-future/dangerous-ground—syrian-refugees-face-an-uncertain-future.pdf; Amnesty International, ‘Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s
illegal deportations of Syrian Refugees’, 2019, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4411022019ENGLISH.pdf; Jesse Marks, ‘Pushing Syrian Refugees to Return’, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1 March 2018, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75684; Refugees International, ‘Insecure future: Deportations and
Lack of Legal Work for Refugees in Turkey’, 19 September 2019, available at: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/9/18/insecure-future-deportations-and-lack-of-legal-work-for-refugees-in-turkey.
[58] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners; see also Stockholm Centre for Freedom, ‘Syrian journalist in
Turkey forced to sign repatriation document for ‘banana’ video protesting
discrimination’, 4 November 2021, available at: https://stockholmcf.org/syrian-journalist-in-turkey-forced-to-sign-repatriation-document-for-banana-video-protesting-discrimination/.
[59] See Akkad v. Turkey,
no. 1557/19, Judgement of 21 July 2022.
[60] See ibid., § 75.
[61] See ibid., § 11; see also Syrian Network for Human Rights,
‘The Syrian Regime Continues to Pose a Violent Barbaric Threat and Syrian
Refugees Should Never Return to Syria’, 15 August 2019, available at: https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/The_Syrian_regime_
continues_to_pose_a_severe_barbaric_threat_and_Syrian_refugees_should_never_return_to_Syria_en.pdf.
[62] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Syrians Being Deported to
Danger’, 24 October 2019, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/24/turkey-syrians-being-deported-danger.
[63] See EASO (today EUAA) Country Guidance: Syria, September
2020, p. 44, available at: https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Syria_2020.pdf.
[64] In connection with insufficient information, the Court, in
the case Akkad v. Turkey (fn. 59), identified
a violation of Article 13 ECHR.
[65] See İzmir Bar, ‘Final Report of Removal Centres and
Administrative Detention from Lawyers’ Sights Workshop’, June 2019, available
at: https://www.izmirbarosu.org.tr/Upload/files/geri_gonderme_rapor.pdf.
[66] See Dev Haber, ‘Antep Geri Gönderme Merkezin’de mülteciler
ters kelepçeleniyor’, 25 December 2017, available at: http://bit.ly/2ETCOwC.
[67] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 101.
[68] For an incident of possible summary return, including
physical attacks on lawyers, see: gazeteduvar.com.tr, ‘İzmir Harmandalı GGM’de
neler oluyor? Çok sayıda itfaiye ve sağlık ekibi sevk edildi, avukatlar içeri
alınmadı’, 24 June 2022, available at: https://www.gazeteduvar.
com.tr/izmir-harmandali-ggmde-neler-oluyor-cok-sayida-itfaiye-ve-saglik-ekibi-sevk-edildi-avukatlar-iceri-alinmadi-haber-1570795.
[69] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners; see also a statement of the İzmir Bar Association reported on
by biant.org: ‘Refugees from Afghanistan handed over to Taliban by force’, 19
April 2022, available at: https://m.bianet.org/english/migration/260665-turkey-refugees-from-afghanistan-handed-over-to-taliban-by-force.
[70] Announcement of the Human Rights Association reported on by
bianet.org: ‘Afghans in İzmir forced to sign “voluntary return papers”’, 22
Apirl 2022, available at: https://m.bianet.org/english/migration/260844-afghans-in-izmir-forced
-to-sign-voluntary-return-papers.
[71] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Applying for a work permit is a burdensome, costly
procedure, and the responsibility of the employer, and it must be shown that
the job cannot be done by a Turkish citizen in order for a permit to be
granted. Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the
Interveners.
[74] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 17.
[75] IInformation provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners; see also Centre for Global Development, ‘A new policy to
better integrate refugees into host-country labor markets’, 22 November 2019,
available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/new-policy-better-integrate-refugees-host-country-labor-markets.
[76] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners; see also Refugees International, ‘“I am only looking for my
rights” Legal employment still inaccessible for refugees in Turkey’, December
2017, available at: https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/ri_report_employmentturkey.pdf.
[77] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of
the Interveners.
[78] See M.S.S. v. Belgium
and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 250, ECHR 2011.
[79] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 109.
[80] See diken.com.tr, ‘Alo 183’ten şiddet mağduru için yanıt:
Ama o kadın değil ki mülteci bayan’, 2 April 2016, available at:
https://www.diken.com.tr/alo-183ten-siddet-magduru-icin-yanit-ama-o-kadin-degil-ki-multeci-bayan/.
[81] Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği, ‘Mülteci̇ Kadinlarin
Durumuna İli̇şki̇n Bi̇r Değerlendi̇rme:”Hem Mülteci̇ Hem Kadin: Mülteci̇
Kadinlar Ne Yaşiyor? Ne Yapmali?”’, 9 March 2018, available at: https://multeci.org.tr/2018/03/09/multeci-kadinlarin-durumuna-iliskin-
bir-degerlendirmehem-multeci-hem-kadin-multeci-kadinlar-ne-yasiyor-ne-yapmali/.
[82] See GOAL Global, ‘Protection Monitoring Report on Syrian
Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Communities in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Adana and
Mersin’, 31 August 2021, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/protection-monitoring-report-syrian-nomadic-and-semi-
nomadic-communities-gaziantep-0.
[83] See
ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 111; see also Hayriye KARA
& Damla ÇALIK, ‘Waiting to be “Safe and Sound”: Turkey as a LGBTI
Refugees’ Way Station’, July 2016, available at: https://kaosgldernegi.org/images/library/2016multeci-raporu2016.pdf.
[84] See Border Violence Monitoring Network, ‘The Black Book of
Pushbacks – Volumes I & II’, December 2020, available at: https://left.eu/issues/publications/black-book-of-pushbacks-volumes-i-ii/; see also platform on mapping
‘Drift-backs’ in the Aegean Sea, launched by Forensic Architecture in July
2022, available at: https://aegean.forensic-architecture.org/.
[85] İzmir Bar, 2019, “Avukatların Gözünden Geri Gönderme
Merkezleri ve İdari Gözetim Alanları Çalıştayı Raporu” available at: https://www.izmirbarosu.org.tr/Upload/files/geri_gonderme_rapor.pdf.
[86] See Safi and Others
v. Greece, no. 5418/15, § 196, Judgement of 7 July 2022.
[87] See Amnesty International, ‘Country Report Turkey’. 2021,
available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-
central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p.
83.
[88] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 83.
[89] Information
provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.
[90] See Osman v. the
United Kingdom [GC], no. 23452/94, § 115, Reports 1998-VIII; and Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia,
no. 46598/06, § 50, Judgement of 15 January 2009.
[91] See, for example, swissinfo.ch, Syrian properties in Ankara
attacked after youth killed, 12 August 2021, available at: https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/syrian-properties-in-ankara-attacked-after-youth-killed/46862556; and observers.france24.com, ‘’A nightmarish night’: Syrian
neighbourhood in Ankara attacked after deadly fight’, 13 August 2021, available
at: https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210818-syrian-neighbourhood-ankara-turkey-attacked.
[92] See BirGün, ‘’Seyreltme’ projesinin detayları: 16 il
Suriyelilere kapatıldı’, 22. February 2022, available at: https://www.birgun.net/haber/seyreltme-projesinin-detaylari-16-il-suriyelilere-kapatildi-378070
[93] ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 83.
[94] See al-monitor.com, ‘Turkey’s quota plan for refugees
alarms rights activists’, 23 February 2022, available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/turkeys-quota-plan-refugees-alarms-rights-activists.
[95] See Şerife Ceren Uysal, ‘Power Politics versus the Rule of
Law in Turkey: A Case Study’, in: The Rule of Law in Retreat: Challenges to
Justice in the United Nations World, ed.
Slawomir Redo, London, Lexington Books, 2022, p. 128.
[96] See the statement of the International Fair Trial Day and
the Ebru Timtik Award, ELDH, AED and others, 23 February 2021, available at: https://eldh.eu/2021/02/international-fair-trial-day-and-the-ebru-timtik-award-hold-the-date-
14-june-2021/; and
the joint statement of the initial International Fair Trial Day and the Ebru
Timtik Award, ELDH, AED and others, 14 June 2021,available at: https://eldh.eu/2021/06/joint-statement-international-fair-trial-day-14-june-2021/.
[97] See İşkence Raporu, ‘Lübnan’dan Türkiye’ye iade edilen
Ayten Öztürk’e gözaltında ağır işkence’, 30 August 2018, available at: https://iskenceraporu.com/ayten-ozturke-gozaltinda-agir-iskence/
[98] See Kronos 35, ‘İsveç’te Yüksek Mahkeme öğretmenin
Türkiye’ye iade talebini reddetti’, 16 July 2022, available at: https://kronos35.news/tr/isvecte-yuksek-mahkeme-ogretmenin-turkiyeye-iadesini-durdurdu/, Uluslararası Af Örgütü (Amnesty Turkey), ‘Malezya:
Türkiye’ye iade, gönderilen üç kişi için işkence riski taşıyor’, 12 May 2017,
available at: https://www.amnesty.org.tr/icerik/malezya-turkiyeye-iade-gonderilen-uc-kisi-icin-iskence-riski-tasiyor.
[99] See Human Rights Association & and others, ‘Türkiye’de
Değişik Boyutlarıyla İşkence Gerçeği’, p. 83, available at: https://hakinisiyatifi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/26-Haziran-2020-Ortak-Bas%C4%B1n-Ac%CC%A7%C4%B1klamas%C4%B1-Eki-Veriler.pdf.
[100] See, for example, Freedom From Torture, ‘Torture in Turkey:
past, present and future?’, April 2017, available at: https://www.freedomfromtorture.
org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Turkey%20briefing%20FINAL%20170410.pdf; Human Rights Association, ‘ İHD 2019 Report On Human
Rights Violations In Turkey’, May 2020, available at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/i_hd_2019_violations_report_and_summary_table-2.pdf; Stockholm Centre For Freedom, ‘Council of Europe’s CPT
confirms continued ill-treatment and torture in Turkey’, 5 August 2020,
available at: https://stockholmcf.org/council-of-europes-cpt-confirms-continued-ill-treatment-and-torture-in-turkey/.
[101] See evrensel.net, ‘İHD ve Meriç nehrine atılan mültecilerin
yakınlarından yetkililere çağrı: Kayıplar bulunsun’, 21 September 2021,
available at: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/443210/ihd-ve-meric-nehrine-atilan-
multecilerin-yakinlarindan-yetkililere-cagri-kayiplar-bulunsun; gazeteduvar.com.tr, ‘Meriç Nehri’ne atılan mülteciler:
Dosyada iki aydır ilerleme yok’, 28 October 2021, available at: https://www.gazeteduvar.
com.tr/meric-nehrine-atilan- multeciler-dosyada-iki-aydir-ilerleme-yok-haber-1539868; evrensel.net, ‘Meriç’e atılan sığınmacıların dosyası
kapatıldı’, 16 February 2022, available at: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/455202/merice-atilan-siginmacilarin-dosyasi-kapatildi.
[102] See Kebe and Others
v. Ukraine, no. 12552/12, Judgement of 12 January 2017.
