Une délégation d’avocates et avocats d’Europe et des États-Unis observe le procès CHD à Silivri Le procès qui dure déjà depuis 10 ans

En 2013, il y a dix ans, un procès de masse a débuté contre 22 avocates et avocats, tous membres de l’organisation d’avocats Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD, Turquie) et du People’s Law Office (HHB). Depuis, jusqu’à trois audiences ont eu lieu chaque année – d’abord devant la “Cour d’assises spéciale” (la Haute Cour pénale), puis, en 2014, après un changement dans la loi de procédure pénale de la Turquie, devant la Haute Cour penale ordinaire.

Tous les avocats en question ont été condamnés ou font l’objet de poursuites pour leurs activités professionnelles. En violation des Principes de base des Nations unies relatifs au rôle du barreau, ils sont, d’une part, identifiés aux causes de leurs clients et, d’autre part, limités dans leur liberté d’expression, qui inclut le droit de prendre part à des débats publics sur les droits de l’homme.

Plusieurs des accusés, dont le président du ÇHD, Selçuk KOZAGAÇLI, ont déjà été soumis à des années de détention provisoire. L’une des accusées de ce procès, Ebru Timtik, est mort pendant sa grève de la faim pour obtenir des procès équitables devant les tribunaux turcs.

Des avocats d’Europe et d’autres continents ont observé toutes les audiences. Cette semaine, les observateurs internationaux comprennent plus de 60 avocats de huit pays européens et des États-Unis : Autriche, Belgique, France, Allemagne, Grèce, Italie, Pays-Bas, Espagne/Catalogne et États-Unis. Les avocats représentent divers barreaux locaux, des confédérations européennes et internationales de barreaux et d’autres organisations d’avocats.

L’article 10 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme et l’article 14 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques imposent à la Turquie de garantir à tous les prévenus un procès équitable et public devant un tribunal compétent, indépendant et impartial.

Auparavant, en 2021, à l’occasion de la Journée internationale du procès équitable, dédiée la Turquie cette année-là, le jury est arrivé à la conclusion que ces normes internationales pour un procès équitable sont fréquemment violées en Turquie.

Cette semaine, les observateurs internationaux suivent de très près le procès de ÇHD afin de déterminer si le tribunal respectera les normes internationales en matière de procès équitable et si les violations antérieures de ces principes au cours de ce procès seront corrigées par le tribunal.

Les procès contre les avocats de ÇHD s’inscrivent dans un schéma plus large d’attaque contre les avocats en Turquie et d’identification de ceux-ci avec leurs clients. Les avocats sont injustement criminalisés et poursuivis pour avoir rempli leurs obligations professionnelles. Cette situation est intolérable et constitue une violation manifeste du droit international. De plus, les observateurs internationaux ont conclu que les normes internationales du procès équitable n’ont pas été respectées lors des audiences qu’ils ont observées précédemment.

Nous demandons donc la libération immédiate de tous les avocats incarcérés en raison de leur travail sur des affaires politiques. Ce n’est pas un crime d’être un avocat. Nous continuerons d’insister pour mettre fin à la criminalisation du simple exercice de la profession d’avocat et pour faire respecter les principes fondamentaux de l’État de droit, y compris le droit à un procès équitable pour tous, en Turquie et ailleurs dans le monde.

Signataires:

  • European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights, ELDH
  • La Conférence des bâtonniers
  • L’association Défense Sans frontière – Avocats Solidaires (Defense Without Borders – Solidarity Lawyers, France (DSF-AS)
  • Giuristi Democratici – Association nationale des juristes démocrates, Italie
  • UIA-IROL (the Institute for the Rule of Law of the International Association of Lawyers)
  • Lawyers for Lawyers, Pays Bas
  • Le Barreau fédéral allemand
  • Union of Italian Penal Chambers (UCPI)
  • Republikanischer Anwältinnen – und Anwälteverein e.V. (RAV)
  • L’Observatoire International des Avocats en Danger (OIAD)
  • The Center of Research and Elaboration on Democracy/ Legal International Intervention Group
  • L’association catalane pour la Défense de droits de l’homme
  • La commission de défense de l’association du Barreau de Barcelona
  • Le Barreau de New York City
  • The Foundation of the Day of the Endangered Lawyer
  • The Dutch League for Human Rights
  • Avocats Européens Démocrates / European Democratic Lawyers
  • The Association for the Support of Fundamental Rights Athens, Greece
  • L’association du Barreau de Marseille
  • Fair Trial Watch
  • L’association du Barreau de Berlin
  • L’association du Barreau de Bordeaux
  • Conférence Régionale des Bâtonniers de l Ouest
  • L’association du Barreau de Epinal
  • The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)
  • National Union of People’s Lawyers, the Philippines (NULP)
  • Asociación Americana de Juristas
  • Confederation of Lawyers of Asia and the Pacific (COLAP)
  • L’association du Barreau de Bruxelles
  • AVOCATS.BE – l’Ordre des associations des barreaus germanophones et francophones de Belgique
  • Syndicat des Avocats Pour la Démocratie
  • OBFG Association de l’Ordre des avocats germanophones et francophones de Belgique
  • L’association du Barreau de Liège-Huy
  • L’association du Barreau de Montpellier
  • L’association du Barreau de Lyon
  • L’association du Barreau de Amsterdam
  • L’association du Barreau de Hauts-de-Seine
  • L’association du Barreau de Grenoble
  • Institut des Droits de l’homme de Grenoble

Lawyers delegation from Europe and the USA observe the CHD trial in Silivri – The trial which already has lasted for 10 years

In 2013, ten years ago, a mass trial started against 22 lawyers, all of them members of the lawyers organisation Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD, Turkey) and of the Peoples Law Office (HHB). Since then up to three hearings have taken place each year – first before the “Special Assize Court” (the Heavy Penal Court), then, in 2014, after a change in penal procedural law of Turkey, before the ordinary Heavy Penal Court.

All lawyers in question were convicted or face charges for their professional activities. In violation of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, they are, firstly, identified with their clients’ causes, and, secondly, limited in their freedom of expression, which includes the right to take part in public discussions about human rights.

Several of the defendants, among them the ÇHD president Selçuk KOZAGAÇLI, have already been subject to years of pretrial detention. One of the defendants in this trial, Ebru Timtik, died during her hunger strike seeking fair trials in the courts of Turkey.

Lawyers from Europe and other continents have observed all hearings. This week the International Observers include more than 60 lawyers from 8 European countries and the USA: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain/Catalonia, and the US. The lawyers represent various local Bar Associations, European and International Bar confederations, and other lawyers’ organisations.

Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights require Turkey to provide all defendants with a fair and public trial by a competent, independent, and impartial court.

Previously, in 2021, on the occasion of the International Fair Trial Day, which focused on Turkey that year, the jury came to the conclusion that these international standards for a fair trial are frequently violated in Turkey.

This week, the International Observers are monitoring the ÇHD trial very closely to determine whether the court will adhere to international fair trial standards and whether prior violations of these principles in the course of this trial will be remedied by the court.

The trials against the lawyers of ÇHD are part of a larger pattern of attacking lawyers in Turkey and identifying them with their clients. Lawyers are unjustly criminalized and prosecuted for fulfilling their professional duties. This is intolerable and in clear violation of international law. Further, the International Observers have concluded that international fair trial standards have not been respected in the hearings they have previously observed.

Therefore we demand the immediate release of all lawyers incarcerated based on their work on political cases. It is not a crime to be a lawyer. We will continue to insist on ending the criminalization of merely exercising the profession of lawyers and on upholding the fundamental principles of the rule of law, including the right to a fair trial for all people in Turkey and elsewhere throughout the world.

Signatories:

  • European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights, ELDH
  • La Conférence des bâtonniers
  • L’association Défense Sans frontière – Avocats Solidaires (Defense Without Borders – Solidarity Lawyers, France (DSF-AS)
  • Giuristi Democratici – National Association of Democratic Jurists, Italy
  • UIA-IROL (the Institute for the Rule of Law of the International Association of Lawyers)
  • Lawyers for Lawyers, the Netherlands
  • The German Federal Bar
  • Union of Italian Penal Chambers (UCPI)
  • Republikanischer Anwältinnen – und Anwälteverein e.V. (RAV)
  • The International Observatory for Lawyers in Danger (OIAD)
  • The Center of Research and Elaboration on Democracy/ Legal International Intervention Group
  • The Catalan Association for the Defense of Human Rights
  • The Barcelona Bar Association’s Defence Commission
  • The New York City Bar Association
  • The Foundation of the Day of the Endangered Lawyer
  • The Dutch League for Human Rights
  • Avocats Européens Démocrates / European Democratic Lawyer
  • The Association for the Support of Fundamental Rights Athens, Greece
  • Marseille Bar Association
  • Fair Trial Watch
  • Berlin Bar Association
  • Bordeaux Bar Association
  • Conférence Régionale des Bâtonniers de l Ouest
  • Epinal Bar Association
  • The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)
  • National Union of People’s Lawyers, the Philippines (NULP)
  • Asociación Americana de Juristas
  • Confederation of Lawyers of Asia and the Pacific (COLAP)
  • Brussels Bar Associaton
  • AVOCATS.BE – Order of French- and German-speaking bar associations of Belgium
  • Syndicat des Avocats Pour la Démocratie
  • OBFG German and French speaking Bar Association of Belgium
  • Liège-Huy Bar Associaton
  • Bar Association
  • Montpellier Bar Association
  • Lyon Bar Association
  • Amsterdam Bar Association
  • Hauts-de-Seine Bar Association
  • Grenoble Bar Association
  • Institut des Droits de l’homme de Grenoble

“OBJECT WAR CAMPAIGN” LAUNCH : Petition to support Conscientious Objectors and Deserters from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine

On the occasion of the International Day of Peace, 21st September, Connection e.V., the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, the European Office for Conscientious Objection and War Resisters’ International are calling for a signature campaign for deserters and conscientious objectors from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. The #ObjectWarCampaign calls on all citizens from everywhere to join the global effort to ensure protection and asylum to conscientious objectors and deserters from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine involved in the current war in the region. They are our hope to refuse war and let peace prevail!

On April 6, 2022, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, had called on Russian soldiers to desert and promised them protection under refugee law. So far, this promise has not been fulfilled.

Within the scope of #ObjectWarCampaign, a petition has been prepared for everyone to sign in. The petition is addressed to the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Council Charles Michel and the President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola. The petition emphasizes the need to uphold the right to asylum to conscientious objectors and deserters from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine by hosting states. The petition launched on the WeMove.eu website can now be signed in German, English, French, Italian and Greek.

There are an estimated 100,000 Russian military draftees and deserters refusing the war of aggression. An estimated 22,000 Belarusian military draftees have left their country because they don’t want to participate in the war in Ukraine. Everyone who has refused service risks several years of prosecution because of their stand against the war. They are hoping for protection in various countries.

Ukraine suspended the right to conscientious objection and closed the border for men between 18 and 60. Over 100,000 men have evaded war involvement in Ukraine and fled abroad. Currently, Ukrainian citizens have temporary residence in the European Union. The #ObjectWarCampaign petition demands that the right to conscientious objection to military service is fully guaranteed in Ukraine.

The petition signatures  are a crucial sign of support for conscientious objectors and deserters. This campaign highlights the importance of opening borders to those who oppose the war at great personal risk in their countries, and calls on everyone around the world to support those who refuse to fight and kill.

Every recruit can be a conscientious objector, every soldier a deserter. Let’s support those who refuse to kill and end war together!

BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF:

European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH), European Democratic Lawyers (EDL), Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD), and Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD)

ON THE APPLICATIONS:

  1. No. 1712/21         K.K. v. Greece
  2. No. 2871/21         I.M. v. Greece,
  3. No. 3104/21         S.K. v. Greece,
  4. No. 3111/21         S.A. v. Greece,
  5. No. 3118/21         L.M. v. Greece,
  6. No. 4034/21         A.D. v. Greece,
  7. No. 4159/21         T.M. v. Greece,
  8. No. 4177/21         H.T. et al. v. Greece   
  9. No. 6923/21         S.G. v. Greece
  10. No. 10258/21       F.C. v. Greece
  11. No. 10692/21       O.M. v. Greece
  12. No. 12807/21       M.A. v. Greece
  13. No. 12926/21       M.E. v. Greece
  14. No. 13134/21       M.S. v. Greece
  15. No. 15067/21       G.R.J. v. Greece
  16. No. 15783/21       A.E. v. Greece
  17. No. 16802/21       S.R. v. Greece
  18. No. 16807/21       A.R. v. Greece
  19. No. 16811/21       M.H. v. Greece
  20. No. 16813/21       M.M. v. Greece
  21. No. 16815/21       M.H. v. Greece
  22. No. 16817/21       A.M. v. Greece
  23. No. 16818/21       A.A. v. Greece
  24. No. 16820/21       H.S. v. Greece
  25. No. 16822/21       S.R. v. Greece
  26. No. 16824/21       U.E. v. Greece
  27. No. 16825/21       W.A. v. Greece
  28. No. 16828/21       W.A. v. Greece
  29. No. 16831/21       S.H. v. Greece
  30. No. 22146/21 S.A.A. et al. v. Greece
  31. No. 24982/21       A.A.J. and H.J. v. Greece
  32. No. 42429/21  M.A. v. Greece

I. INTRODUCTION

  1. The following submissions are made by the European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH), the European Democratic Lawyers (EDL), the Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD), and the Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD) (the “Interveners”) pursuant to the leave granted by of the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court” or the “ECtHR”) on 4 July 2022, in accordance with Rule 44(3) of the Rules of the Court. The 32 above mentioned applications concern the alleged refoulement of the Applicants from Greek territory (land and sea) to Turkey, without prior procedure (“pushbacks”).
  2. In addition to the aspects listed in the request for leave to intervene dated 23 February 2022, after taking the annexes into consideration, and in order to assist the Court effectively, the interveners will also provide the Court with written comments on the risks faced by citizens of Turkey who were pushed back from Greece to Turkey.
  3. Although the Respondent State in the aforementioned applications is Greece, the conditions a person will face upon being pushed back to Turkey are relevant in the present cases due to the expelling state’s obligation to take the treatment into account a person will be subjected to in the receiving state.[1]

II. THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS

  • First and foremost, the Interveners want to highlight the fact that pushbacks are illegal actions carried out by state officials to prevent asylum seekers from getting access to the domestic asylum procedure. While a pushback is not based on a formal decision, the Respondent State is nevertheless bound to its legal obligations under domestic and international law. The Respondent State is bound to the principle of non-refoulement as soon as asylum seekers enter Greek territory, whether on land or at sea.[2]
  • If substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the removal or return to a third country would expose an asylum seeker[3] to treatment contrary to Article 3 – directly in that third country or indirectly, for example, through chain-refoulement – the Court has confirmed the responsibility of the Contracting State not to deport.[4] These duties also include the duty to consider the overall reception conditions for asylum seekers in the receiving state, and the duty to consider the respective person’s situation.[5]
  • Article 86(1) of the Greek Law 4636/2019 (“International Protection Act [IPA]”) defines the criteria for the application of the “Safe Third Country” (“STC”) concept. Even though the criteria are in general consistent with Article 38 EU Directive 2013/32 (“Asylum Procedure Directive”), a serious divergence arises. With IPA, Article 86(1)(f) an additional set of criteria was introduced concerning the relation of an asylum seeker with a “STC” by which a mere transit state, in combination with specific circumstances, can be deemed as “safe”.
  • While the Court so far has never questioned the “STC” concept as such, nor has it commented on whether a given third country was safe or not, the Court is sometimes – as given in the aforementioned applications – “obliged to scrutinise the use of the safe third-country concept against the benchmark of Article 3 and the prohibition of non-refoulement”.[6] In this context, the Court has stated in its case law that the deporting State “has a general procedural obligation to carry out a fair and thorough examination of the conditions in that third country”,[7] including “the accessibility and reliability of its asylum system”.[8] While it rests with the asylum seekers to substantiate their individual circumstances, the Contracting State’s authorities, however, are obliged to conduct an assessment “of the accessibility and functioning of the receiving country’s asylum system and the safeguards it affords in practice”[9] on their own motion. This obligation applies all the more if a general risk of a breach – for example, of Article 3 – in the receiving state is well known.[10]
  • Despite the fact that “Turkey has persistently raised concerns about alleged migrant arrival prevention measures (so-called ‘pushbacks’) enforced by the Greek authorities in the Aegean Sea”,[11] the survivors of these illegal actions from Greek state organs do not receive any protection in Turkey where they are deprived of their fundamental human rights and face a real and genuine fear of refoulement. As will be set out below, Turkey – with regards to its asylum system and its reception conditions – fails to meet the recognized requirements leading to a systematic violation of the rights of asylum seekers as set out in the Convention.

A. Insufficient Access to Protection in Turkey

  • According to the European Commission, the asylum legislation in Turkey is only partially aligned with the EU acquis. “The Law on Foreigners and International Protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation) expressed in the New York Protocol of the 1951 Geneva Convention, according to which the vast majority of persons seeking international protection in Turkey cannot apply for fully-fledged refugee status but for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection only”.[12] In other words, anyone not originally from a European country is excluded from full refugee recognition. In effect, this legislation bars any citizen of a West Asian or African country from the protection as a refugee under the Geneva Convention.[13]
  • However, based on Article 38(1)(c) and (e) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Member States of the European Union may apply the “STC” concept only if the third country concerned respects the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and if the possibility exists to request refugee status in that third country and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection there in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Already under these requirements alone, Turkey fails to meet the conditions necessary to be considered a “STC”.
  • Despite the fact that there is no protection under the Geneva Convention for non-Europeans available in Turkey, Turkey particularly offers to asylum seekers the following permits based on the Law on Foreigners and International Protection No. 6458 (LFIP)[14]: conditional refugee status (Şartlı Mülteci Statüsü), subsidiary protection status (İkincil Koruma Statüsü) and temporary protection status for Syrian nationals (Geçici Koruma Statüsü). However, based on the experience of the Interveners’ members working in the field, one of the main obstacles for asylum seekers in Turkey to obtain a residence permit is insufficient access to the migration system.[15]
  • Temporary protection for Syrian nationals: Since October 2014[16] Syrians can officially obtain Temporary Protection Status (TPS)[17] in Turkey under the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR).[18] TPS is designed for situations of high numbers of refugees entering Turkey, and therefore, “is not defined as a form of international protection but a complementary measure used in situations where individual international protection eligibility processing is deemed impractical”.[19] Although the flow of people from Syria seeking refuge has not ended yet, in practice, it has become extremely difficult to obtain TPS in Turkey due to the fact that cities and neighbourhoods are closing their means of registration (see § 18).[20] According to the European Commission, “NGOs reported considerable challenges with access to registration in the first place, where individuals wishing to lodge an application in PDMMs[21] are referred to other PDMMs, without a formal documentation and referral system. Such de-facto barriers to registration hinder access to all other essential services and put asylum seekers in an irregular situation if apprehended. Effective access to international protection at borders, airports and removal centres remain limited as reported by NGOs and lawyers”.[22]
  • While TPS entitles a person to get health care and education, to apply for a work permit six months after the application for TPS, and to seek social assistance, TPS is tied to the place of registration. If a person moves to another province – e.g. to Istanbul in order to find work – then this person loses all rights attached to this status. Following TPR, Article 33(2)(a), a person under temporary protection is – if not exceptionally permitted otherwise – obligated to stay in the registration province and is not allowed to move to another province. An official transfer is close to impossible.[23] If a person fails to stay in the province of registration and is apprehended elsewhere, this person may face detention in order to be transferred back to the assigned province,[24] but there is also a risk of deportation due to violation of the TPR.[25] Furthermore, if a person fails to stay in the province of residence, they also lose all access to social rights, i.e. education and health care in their new place of residence.[26]
  • Most importantly in the context of pushbacks – based on TPR, Article 12(1) – TPS shall cease where a person leaves Turkey voluntarily, e.g. to try to reach Greece. In other words: If a TPS holder is pushed back from Greece to Turkey, this person’s temporary protection status and ID Card (“kimlik”), if even possessed, will be terminated. In addition, in practice there is no possibility to reobtain a new “kimlik”.[27] Taken the above mentioned together, the protection offered by TPS does not equal the protection provided by the Geneva Convention.
  • International Protection for non-Syrian and non-European citizens: A person who is not eligible for TPS can submit an application for international protection. Conditional refugee status is granted to a non-European citizen[28] who matches the criteria to be recognized as a refugee as set out in the Geneva Convention. However, people with conditional refugee status can not access the social rights guaranteed in the Geneva Convention. Therefore, the protection offered, again, does not equal the protection according to the Geneva Convention. Subsidiary protection, in theory, is provided to people who do not meet the criteria of the refugee definition, but would face, for example, degrading treatment upon return or would be deported to a situation of general violence.[29]
  • Analogous to TPS for Syrian nationals, citizens from other non-European countries first of all need to approach the Provincial Presidency of Migration Management (PPMM) in order to lodge an application for international protection.[30] If an application for international protection is registered, the applicant receives a “kimlik” stating that the person is an international protection applicant, which gives the holder of it the right to access education, health care (temporarily for a year), and, after six months, the right to apply for a work permit. In addition, the PPMM decides the “satellite city”[31] for the applicant and sets a date for an interview. Based on the LFIP, Article 77, international protection applicants are, for example, required to personally prove their presence in the assigned city by signature. If an applicant fails to fulfil this obligation multiple times, their application for international protection will be considered withdrawn.[32] However, the main obstacle, again, is not a theoretical non-availability of a protection status as such, but the practical non-accessibility to registration (see § 18).
  • In addition, the procedure for international protection can take up to several years,[33] and in effect, mostly ends with a negative decision, respectively with a deportation order. Asylum lawyers in Turkey have reported to the Interveners that they know of no examples of clients who, in the end, received conditional refugee status or subsidiary protection.[34] In parallel, a migration rights NGO stated to the Interveners that there are approximately 500,000 Afghans[35] in Turkey, of which 2,700 have received a “humanitarian permit” in 2019, after around five NGOs had lobbied on their behalf. Consistent with the lawyers’ reports cited before, the NGO staff is otherwise unaware of any positive decisions in international protection cases of non-Syrians. In practice, this leads to a situation where most citizens from West Asian or African countries in Turkey do not apply for international protection because they are afraid of deportation.[36] In any case, no protection equivalent to the protection under the Geneva Convention is offered to non-European third country nationals.
  • The Interveners conclude that Turkey offers insufficient protection for asylum seekers. First, the residence permits available do not equal the protection provided by the Geneva Convention. Second, the main obstacle in obtaining actual protection in Turkey is non-accessibility: It has become increasingly challenging for third country nationals to register for a “kimlik” in Turkey. In 2018, the PDMM (now “PPMM”),[37] de facto stopped registering newly arriving Syrians, with the exception of vulnerable cases, in large provinces – such as Istanbul – and provinces with a relatively high refugee population – such as Hatay and Mardin. Since then, there has been an increase in the number of cities ‘closed’ to new applications. As of early 2020, the following cities were closed to all except vulnerable cases: Istanbul, Edirne, Tekirdag, Kirklareli, Kocaeli, Canakkale, Bursa, Balikesir, Izmir, Aydin, Mugla, Antalya, Hatay and Yalova.[38] This situation has remained unchanged, as an estimated 16 provinces were closed to international protection applications in 2021[39] – as to the Intervener’s knowledge, the situation remains unchanged up until today. Due to the prohibition of travelling within Turkey for unregistered third country nationals,[40] individuals affected are, in addition, unable to travel to a place where it might be possible to register.[41] Finally, in the context of the aforementioned applications, it is of most relevance, that – based on FLIP, Article 54(1)(h), and TPR, Article 12(1)(a) and (c) – a “kimlik”, if possessed, is terminated because a person has left Turkey voluntarily, namely to try to reach Greece – and will not be able to re-obtain it. For all these reasons, the Respondent State cannot declare Turkey as generally “safe” for people who have left Turkey voluntarily, seeking international protection in Greece.

B. Systematic Arrests upon Return & Insufficient Conditions of Detention

  1. According to the European Commission, “Turkey needs to further align its practice with European standards in removal centres, in particular with regard to protection of human rights, including access to legal counselling and interpreters and protection of vulnerable groups, in particular children staying with their families”.[42]
  2. Drawing from the experience of the Interveners’ members working in the field, it has been observed that people seeking international protection who were pushed back from Greece to Turkey usually face detention in Turkey.[43] However, the duration varies between a few days and several months. Based on LFIP, Article 57(2), detention for the purpose of removal (“removal detention”) may be ordered to those who, among other reasons, have breached the rules of exit from Turkey. Even during a procedure for international protection, a person may be detained – or kept in detention if removal detention was previously ordered – under LFIP, Article 68. In general, non-European migrants are routinely subject to arbitrary detention in Turkey without legal basis. Namely, persons who are apprehended outside their designated province (see §§ 13 and 16) are at risk of being detained.[44] Based on LFIP, Article 57(3), the maximum duration of the removal detention is six months, yet it may be extended for a maximum of six more months.[45] However, there were cases reported to the Interveners, wherein detainees were released after the maximum duration had been exceeded but were arrested again afterwards.[46]
  3. Furthermore, the Interveners’ members, on several occasions, have received reports of substandard detention conditions in Turkey[47] for pushback survivors, which have even amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Although improvements have been made compared to conditions around 2015,[48] inhuman and degrading conditions still persist today, in particular overcrowding,[49] short periods of daily access to the outdoors,[50] lack of privacy due to detention in mass cells, insufficient food supply with, at times, only two meals a day, insufficient access to clean drinking water, and insufficient medical care.[51]
  4. In addition, accessing legal counsel or representation for people in detention is particularly difficult, even though a Legal Aid System has been implemented step by step in different cities, after the Istanbul Bar Association started these activities in 2014. First, the PPMM is not obliged to inform any legal representative about asylum seekers detained. In addition, detainees usually cannot contact a lawyer, a legal NGO, or the regional bar association from inside the detention centre. Therefore, they have to rely on family, friends, or UNHCR to initiate the contact. Second, the contact between asylum seekers in detention and their legal representation is complicated for practical reasons: While the file has to be consulted at the PPMM, the asylum seeker is held in a remote detention centre where a lawyer has to go and visit their clients. However, before the file can be accessed, a lawyer needs to get a notarized Power of Attorney (POA). Therefore, for one, an employee of a notary needs to accompany a lawyer to a detention centre to get the POA certified. This notarization comes with additional fees. For two, in order for a notary to certify a signature, the asylum seeker in question is required to have a valid “kimlik” or a passport. As survivors of pushbacks get their “kimlik” cancelled and often are deprived of all their belongings during a pushback, in these cases, it is close to impossible to sign a notarized POA. While courts in Turkey have started to accept more informal POAs, the PPMM insists on the certification through a notary. In effect, a lawyer can file an appeal against a deportation order with an informal POA, but will not be granted access to the PPMM file of the client. Third, translation inside detention centres is only allowed through formal interpreters. Therefore, a lawyer cannot be accompanied by friends or family members to facilitate communication with an existing or prospective client. Phone translation is also not possible. Certified interpreters, however, request a fee for their service, for which the detainee or a support network outside detention have to provide. Finally, despite “the increase in the number of lawyers handling cases in removal centres (from 4,187 in 2019 to 7,168 in 2020), access to legal counselling remained low, considering hundreds of thousands of migrants apprehended and placed in removal centres”.[52] Moreover, the Interveners’ members are aware of the systematic and unlawful practice of pressuring detainees to sign forms with which they agree to their “voluntary return” (see §§ 24-26). Apart from this, there have been further reports of ill-treatment, including torture, against detainees by staff. For example, in June 2018, in Antalya, a Syrian national was tortured by officers, transferred to Gaziantep, and continued to suffer physical violence throughout the transfer.[53] Upon an investigation of a suicide case in Gaziantep Oğuzeli Removal Centre in 2019, Gaziantep Governorate’s Commission for Investigation and Evaluation of Human Rights Violations stated that there have been several suicide attempts in the removal centre.[54] Furthermore, on 23 June 2021, a Syrian national – based on a statement of the responsible Governor – set himself on fire and died at Izmir Harmandalı Removal Centre.[55]

C. Insufficient Protection from Refoulement in Turkey

  • In practice, non-European migrants are routinely removed from Turkey or pressured to sign the consent form for a “voluntary return”. Of most relevance for survivors of pushbacks is the regulation under LFIP, Article 54(1)(h), which states that any person who has left Turkey irregularly shall be subject to deportation. Therefore, refugees who have fled Turkey and experienced pushback operations are potentially at risk of deportation upon return because of leaving Turkey irregularly.[56]
  • In recent years, and particularly as of July and August 2019, after the regional elections in Turkey, the scale of illegal expulsions from Turkey to Syria – which constitute refoulement – have increased dramatically.[57] In this regard, it can be observed that Syrian nationals are increasingly pushed, respectively forced to sign declarations for “voluntary return”[58] – a practice that recently has been acknowledged also by the ECtHR.[59] In Akkad v. Turkey,the Court had to decide on the case of a young Syrian national, who was initially granted TPS in Turkey. He was apprehended near the Turkish-Greek land border when travelling with a group of people allegedly trying to enter into Greek territory in June 2018. Subsequently, the Applicant was detained, transferred to the Turkish-Syrian border, and – after he was coerced to sign a preprinted “voluntary return” form – deported to Syria. Here the Court came to the conclusion that Turkey, by its actions, knowingly had exposed the Applicant to a “real risk” of being subjected to treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.[60] In this regard, it should be noted that there are reports of Syrian deportees and returnees – from Turkey and from other neighbouring countries – who were arrested or forcibly disappeared after their return to Syria.[61] In October 2019, Human Rights Watch reported that Turkish authorities in Istanbul and Antakya had arbitrarily detained and deported Syrians to northern Syria, despite active hostilities in the region.[62] These deportations should be read in conjunction with the Turkish authorities’ publicly-stated objective, reported by the European Asylum Support Office: to create “safe zones” in Syria in which to return refugees.[63]
  • The practice of forced “voluntary return” was still widespread during the time period relevant for the aforementioned applications. For example, the İzmir Bar reported that people detained in removal centres have been systematically forced to sign “voluntary repatriation papers”. The people affected are not informed[64] about their legal rights and not allowed to access legal aid.[65] In Hatay, there have been allegations of violence, handcuffing, and pressure to apply for “voluntary return” by guards.[66] Lawyers have also suggested that poor detention conditions in Removal Centres are likely used as a tool to pressure migrants into “voluntary return”.[67] To the knowledge of the Interveners, this practice is still happening today.[68]
  • Furthermore, the practice of forced “voluntary return” is also directed towards non-Syrian nationals, e.g. Afghans.[69] The Human Rights Association has announced that the Afghan refugees are subjected to torture and pressure in the Harmandalı (İzmir) Removal Centre.[70] The Interveners received reports about mass deportations of Afghan citizens to Iran and were told that, in autumn 2021, approximately 30,000 Afghan nationals were being held in removal detention in Turkey.[71]
  • In practice, most non-Syrian nationals never register for a residence permit in Turkey due to the several legislative shortcomings and practical obstacles set out above. Whoever does register – Syrians and non-Syrians alike – are often forced by the socioeconomic reality to move from their allocated city to economic centres – most often Istanbul.[72] Those unable to register for any kind of status are, de facto if not de jure, potentially subject to refoulement.

D. Inadequate Reception Conditions in Turkey

  • While those who manage to obtain a “kimlik” have the right to education and health care and the right to request a work permit[73] in Turkey, in practice, it is extremely difficult to actually exercise these rights. For example, according to the European Commission, “768,839 children with some kind of protection status were enrolled in formal education in Turkey by December 2020. However, more than 400,000 schoolaged refugee children were still out-of-school and did not have any access to education opportunities”.[74] Furthermore, although there are around 3.5 million Syrians registered in Turkey, only 60,000 Syrians have a work permit.[75] Conversely, the vast majority of migrants in Turkey work in the informal labour market,[76] and, thus, are subjected to exploitative labour conditions. Notably, the Interveners have received reports about migrants under the age of 18 being subjected to child labour.[77]
  • There is a broad consensus – both in the ECtHR and at international and European level – that asylum seekers are a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population in need of special protection and that states have a positive obligation to provide material support and accommodation to asylum seekers.[78] However, minors, women, survivors of torture and violence, and LGBTIQ+ people have special reception needs because of their specific additional vulnerabilities which ought to be addressed. Nevertheless, in Turkey, there is a clear lack of such special reception conditions. Gender-based violence against refugee women, for example, persists as a risk.[79]At the same time, survivors of gender-based violence in Turkey face serious challenges, in particular discrimination and language barriers when they approach protection services.[80] Moreover, the capacity of women’s shelters in Turkey is quite low,[81] and receiving access is particularly difficult for refugee women.[82] At the same time, there are no shelters for LGBTIQ+ people, who – according to the domestic law in Turkey – are not even recognised as a vulnerable group.[83] Not least from such systematic shortcomings towards specific groups of refugees stems the Respondents State’s obligation to carefully examine the individual situation of every applicant before returning them to Turkey.
  • Finally, enforced destitution itself constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Those denied access to a residence permit – including through means of international protection – are denied shelter, food, and access to education, and are simultaneously excluded from the right to work and state support. In addition, based on the many reports on how pushbacks are executed the people affected are, in most cases, deprived of all their material belongings, including money, phones, and identification documents.[84] This deprivation further exacerbates the destitution pushback survivors face upon return to Turkey. While in detention, the people affected are provided with shelter and minimal food, and after being released from the detention centre, there is no State assistance offered by the Turkish government.[85] Read in conjunction with the Court’s most recent case law, it needs to be taken into account that the people affected – before being exposed to complete destituton – had already had been in an extremely vulnerable situation: they had been subjected to a violent pushback, and some may even have lost relatives or friends during the pushback. Therefore, they had undoubtedly been in a situation of extreme stress and most likely had already experienced feelings of intense pain and grief.[86]
  • Taken together, survivors of pushbacks face a situation of complete disregard of their human dignity upon return to Turkey. As a result, there are reasons for believing that the removal or return from Greece to Turkey will expose a person to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

E. Racist Violence, Hate Speech & Increasing Risk of Physical Attacks

  • Over the last years, violent attacks targeting migrants have been increasing in Turkey.[87] This violence can also be observed by following the increasing hate speech on social media platforms which remain unsanctioned.[88] Moreover, in Annex 1, the Interveners submit a nonexhaustive list of attacks and statements of politicians since the end of 2016. The general escalation of racist sentiments should be read in conjunction with this inflammatory political rhetoric targeting refugees and migrants and the severe deterioration of the economic situation in Turkey.[89]
  • Under the scope of Article 2 of the ECHR, the Contracting States have a positive obligation to protect human life.[90] Given the extent of hate speech and physical attacks against migrants in Turkey, the Respondent State needs to take into account that a person fleeing from Turkey might be fleeing from racist violence and also assume that any person returned to Turkey may become an (arbitrary) target of a physical attack. Also from these circumstances, it follows that the Greek authorities are obliged to examine all applications individually.
  • Related to the preceding § 18, it is worth mentioning the violent attacks in Altındağ (Ankara) in 2021. A fight between Syrian and local youngsters triggered the attack of shops and homes belonging to Syrian refugees.[91] Following these events, the Turkish government started a so-called “dilution project”[92] to limit the refugee population to 25% of the total population in every neighbourhood: “Since May 2022, it is against the law for any region or area in Turkey to have a population of foreign nationals that is more than one-quarter of the total population”.[93] Refugees are “encouraged” to relocate to other neighbourhoods which have refugee populations lower than 25%, and it is reported that some refugees could not register their addresses due to this population limitation.[94]

III. CITIZENS OF TURKEY

  • It is well known that since the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, political criticism in Turkey has been heavily persecuted. However, the limited independence of the judiciary and widespread politically motivated criminal charges have always been problems in Turkey. Nevertheless, together with the State of Emergency (“SoE”), the situation has further deteriorated.[95] Due to the recent developments, international legal organisations felt the urge to establish the International Fair Trial Day, and within their initial statement, they underlined the systematic violations of the fair trial principles in Turkey.[96]
  • There is also the risk of severe torture in Turkey. For instance, the People’s Law Office (HHB) reported on Ayten Öztürk who was arrested in Beirut on 9 March 2018, extradited to Turkey on 13 March 2018, and was subsequently held in unofficial detention for 6 months until 28 August 2018. She was subjected to severe torture in Turkey.[97] In recent years, there are several judgments from different countries where the local courts decided in favor of non-extradition due to the severe risk of torture in Turkey.[98]
  • A joint report of Turkey-based human rights organizations, which covers 2019 and the first half of 2020, emphasizes that torture is not limited to police headquarters or demonstrations, but is a common practice in prisons.[99] There are a significant number of reports from other NGOs and rights organisations that support these findings.[100] In addition, it was reported that 45 pushback survivors were severely tortured by the Turkish soldiers upon their return. ÖHD, one of the interveners, lodged a criminal complaint; however, the case file was closed by the prosecutor’s office.[101]
  • Citizens of Turkey with criminal charges who are pushed back to Turkey face serious risk of immediate arrest, detention, and torture

IV. LACK OF INFORMATION

  • The Interveners come to the conclusion that, given the overall circumstances in Turkey, an individual examination of each claim is required to comply with the Respondent State’s obligations under the Convention, namely Article 3. Conversely, if a person – either a citizen of Turkey or a third country national – tries to obtain asylum in Greece, but is prevented from entering or staying in the country, and is therefore stopped from lodging claims for asylum, this denial would expose this person to a risk of ill-treatment and – if a third country national is concerned – even chain-refoulement to their country of origin. If, at the same time, the Greek authorities fail to provide the person who tries to obtain asylum in Greece with any relevant information about the Greek asylum procedures – and access to domestic remedies in Greece is not made available – this constitutes a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.[102]

V. CONCLUSION

  • Considering the overall reception conditions in Turkey, the Interveners come to the conclusion that the Respondent State – from the moment a person enters Greek territory, both by land and sea – is obliged to conduct an in-depth analysis of the individual risks an asylum seeker faces in Turkey. There is reason to believe that the removal or return of an asylum seeker to Turkey would expose this person to treatment contrary to Article 3 due to restricted access to the asylum system in Turkey, which offers only, if at all, insufficient protection; the catastrophic social economic conditions to which migrants are subjected; and the widespread risk of racist violence. Where the Respondent State fails to conduct such an investigation, and even deprives the asylum seeker of the chance to present their claims, by pushing them back illegally, therefore violates its obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.

Finally, the Interveners are grateful for getting the opportunity to intervene in the aforementioned applications and hope to have assisted the Court with the explanations submitted.

Yours sincerely,

Melanie Aebli (on behalf of the Interveners)

Attorney at law

Annex:                           

  1) List of attacks and statements of politicians since the end of 2016

(not submitted by fax)   

2) European Commission, Turkey Report 2021 (see fn. 11)

3) ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ 2021 (see fn. 13)

4) ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ 2019 (fn. 16)

5) Expert Opinion issued by Stiftung ProAsyl (fn. 28)

6) Global Detention Project, Immigration Detention in Turkey (fn. 47)

7) Domestic Law of Turkey: Law on Foreigners and International                                Protection

8) Domestic Law of Turkey: Implementation Regulation for the Law on Foreigners and International Protection            

9) Domestic Law of Turkey: Temporary Protection Regulation


[1] See Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 124-125, ECtHR 2008.

[2] See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, §§ 70-82, ECHR 2012.

[3] In Ilias and Ahemd v. Hungary the Court stated: “it is the duty of the removing State to examine thoroughly the question whether or not there is a real risk of the asylum seeker being denied access, in the receiving third country, to an adequate asylum procedure, protecting him or her against refoulement. If it is established that the existing guarantees in this regard are insufficient, Article 3 implies a duty that the asylum seekers should not be removed to the third country concerned”, Ilias and Ahemd v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 134, Judgement of 21 November 2019.

[4] See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, §§ 342, 343 and 362-68, with the references therein, ECHR 2011.

[5] See Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, § 105, ECHR 2014.

[6] Council of Europe/ECtHR Research Division, ‘Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13, The concept of a “Safe Third Country” in the case-law of the Court’, § 2, 9 February 2018.

[7] Ibid. § 4.

[8] Ilias and Ahemd v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 139, Judgement of 21 November 2019.

[9] Ibid. § 141.

[10] See F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, § 126, ECHR 2016.

[11] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, Doc. Nr. SWD(2021) 290 final/2, 19 October 2021, p. 48, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en (in the Annex).

[12] Ibid., p. 49.

[13] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Türkiye’, published in the Asylum Information Database (AIDA), 2021 Update, p. 20, available at: https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/AIDA-TR_2021update.pdf (in the Annex).

[14] In addition to the permits listed, Turkey offers a Short Term Residence Permit (Articles 31-33 LFIP, and Articles 28 and 29 of the Regulation for Implementation of the LFIP [Implementation Regulations]), a Family Residence Permit (Articles 34-37 LFIP, and Articles 30-34 Implementation Regulations), a Student Residence Permit (Articles 38-41 LFIP, and Articles 35-39 Implementation Regulations), a Long Term Residence Permit (Articles 42-45 LFIP, and Articles 40-43 Implementation Regulations), a Humanitarian Residence Permit (Articles 46 and 47 LFIP, and, Article 44 Implementation Regulations), and a Residence Permit For Victims of Human Trafficking (Articles 48 and 49 LFIP, and Articles 45 and 46 Implementation Regulations). However, these types of residence permits are not of practical relevance in the context discussed here.

[15] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 45.

[16] The legal basis of the 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) is Article 91 LFIP. As a piece of secondary legislation, the TPR must be compliant and consistent with the general normative framework laid down by the LFIP itself. See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’, published in the Asylum Information Database (AIDA), 2019 Update, p. 120, available at: https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/report-download _aida_tr_2019update.pdf (in the Annex).

[17] Temporary Article 1 TPR indicates that Syrian nationals, stateless persons and refugees who came to or crossed Turkey’s borders from Syria due to the events that took place in Syria since April 2011 are taken under “temporary protection”.

[18] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 78.

[19] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 120.

[20] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey Stops Registering Syrian Asylum Seekers’, 16 July 2018, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/turkey-stops-registering-syrian-asylum-seekers.

[21] Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (“PDMM”), today Provincial Presidency of Migration Management (“PPMM”).

[22] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 50.

[23] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[24] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 89.

[25] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey Stops Registering Syrian Asylum Seekers’, fn. 20.

[26] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 70-71, and also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 91-92.

[27] In the file of a person who loses their “kimlik” based on attempting to leave, or leaving Turkey illegally, the code V78 will be registered. This code indicates that no new “kimlik” can be issued. Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[28] For specific information regarding citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan, Chechens, Daghestanis and Tajiks, Somali people and Iranians see ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 79-81; for specific information on citizens of Afghanistan also see Expert Opinion issued by Stiftung ProAsyl, ‘The Situation of Afghan Refugees in Turkey’, March 2021, available at: https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/PA_Expert-Opinion_The-Situation-of-Afghan-Refugees-in-Turkey.pdf (in the Annex).

[29] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[30] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 90.

[31] See ibid, p. 89.

[32] See ibid, p. 91.

[33] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 49.

[34] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[35] For specific information on citizens of Afghanistan see Expert Opinion issued by Stiftung ProAsyl, fn. 28.

[36] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[37] See fn. 21.

[38] See AIDA & ECRE, ‘Registration under Temporary Protection – Turkey’, 30 November 2020, available at: https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/registration-under-temporary-protection.

[39] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 45-46.

[40] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[41] See AIDA & ECRE, fn. 38.

[42] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 17-18.

[43] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 115.

[44] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 87-89, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 117-118.

[45] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 87.

[46] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[47] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also Global Detention Project, ‘Country Report, Immigration Detention in Turkey’, October 2021, available at: https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/immigration-detention-in-turkey -trapped-at-the-crossroad-between-asia-and-europe#:~:text=Numerous%20observers%20have%20reported%20poor,detainees%20access%20to%20legal%20assistance (in the Annex).

[48] See Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), ‘Report to the Turkish Government

on the visit to Turkey carried out by the (CPT) from 16 to 23 June 2015, CPT/Inf (2017) 32, available at: https://rm.coe.int/pdf/ 168075ec0a; this Report was summarised by the Stockholm Centre for Freedom, ‘CPT report highlights problems in Turkey’s immigration detention centers’, 18 October 2017, available at: https://stockholmcf.org/cpt-report-highlights-problems-in-turkeys- immigration-detention-centers/; furthermore, as mentioned in the ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 97, a series of judgments from the Constitutional Court have highlighted the need to provide adequate detention conditions in Turkey.

[49] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[50] For example, clients have reported that access to an outdoor yard was granted in groups, leaving them individually with 10 minutes yard time in the morning and 10 minutes in the evening.

[51] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[52] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11 p. 49.

[53] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 101; see also Global Detention Project, ‘Country Report, Immigration Detention in Turkey’, fn. 47, p. 50.

[54] See Türkiye İnsan Hakları ve Eşitlik Kurumu, Gazi̇antep Geri̇ Gönderme Merkezi̇ Zi̇yareti̇ Raporu (Rapor No: 2019/ 05), February 2019, p. 5, available at: https://www.tihek.gov.tr/upload/file_editor/2019/07/1562585466.pdf; see also sendika.org, ‘HDP’li Toğrul, Antep Geri Gönderme Merkezi’ndeki intihar iddialarını Meclis’e taşıdı’, 3 August 2019, available at: https://sendika.org/2019/08/hdpli-togrul-antep-geri-gonderme-merkezindeki-intihar-iddialarini-meclise-tasidi-556817/.

[55] Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘24 June 2021, Daily Report on Human Rights Violations’, available at: https://en.tihv.org.tr/documentation/24-june-2021-hrft-documentation-center-daily-human-rights-report/ i; critical about the detailed statement of the Governor see Statement of the Izmir Bar Association, issued on 6 August 2021, available at: https://www.izmirbarosu. org.tr/HaberDetay/2370/harmandali-geri-gonderme-merkezi-nde-yasamini-yitiren-suriyeli-multeci-ahmed-maslem-anildi.

[56] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[57] See Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘Dangerous Ground: Syrian refugees face an uncertain future’, 2018, available at: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/dangerous-ground—syrias-refugees-face-an-uncertain-future/dangerous-ground—syrian-refugees-face-an-uncertain-future.pdf; Amnesty International, ‘Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian Refugees’, 2019, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4411022019ENGLISH.pdf; Jesse Marks, ‘Pushing Syrian Refugees to Return’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 March 2018, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75684; Refugees International, ‘Insecure future: Deportations and Lack of Legal Work for Refugees in Turkey’, 19 September 2019, available at: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/9/18/insecure-future-deportations-and-lack-of-legal-work-for-refugees-in-turkey.

[58] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also Stockholm Centre for Freedom, ‘Syrian journalist in Turkey forced to sign repatriation document for ‘banana’ video protesting discrimination’, 4 November 2021, available at: https://stockholmcf.org/syrian-journalist-in-turkey-forced-to-sign-repatriation-document-for-banana-video-protesting-discrimination/.

[59] See Akkad v. Turkey, no. 1557/19, Judgement of 21 July 2022.

[60] See ibid., § 75.

[61] See ibid., § 11; see also Syrian Network for Human Rights, ‘The Syrian Regime Continues to Pose a Violent Barbaric Threat and Syrian Refugees Should Never Return to Syria’, 15 August 2019, available at: https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/The_Syrian_regime_ continues_to_pose_a_severe_barbaric_threat_and_Syrian_refugees_should_never_return_to_Syria_en.pdf.

[62] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Syrians Being Deported to Danger’, 24 October 2019, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/24/turkey-syrians-being-deported-danger.

[63] See EASO (today EUAA) Country Guidance: Syria, September 2020, p. 44, available at: https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Syria_2020.pdf.

[64] In connection with insufficient information, the Court, in the case Akkad v. Turkey (fn. 59), identified a violation of Article 13 ECHR.

[65] See İzmir Bar, ‘Final Report of Removal Centres and Administrative Detention from Lawyers’ Sights Workshop’, June 2019, available at: https://www.izmirbarosu.org.tr/Upload/files/geri_gonderme_rapor.pdf.

[66] See Dev Haber, ‘Antep Geri Gönderme Merkezin’de mülteciler ters kelepçeleniyor’, 25 December 2017, available at: http://bit.ly/2ETCOwC.

[67] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 101.

[68] For an incident of possible summary return, including physical attacks on lawyers, see: gazeteduvar.com.tr, ‘İzmir Harmandalı GGM’de neler oluyor? Çok sayıda itfaiye ve sağlık ekibi sevk edildi, avukatlar içeri alınmadı’, 24 June 2022, available at: https://www.gazeteduvar. com.tr/izmir-harmandali-ggmde-neler-oluyor-cok-sayida-itfaiye-ve-saglik-ekibi-sevk-edildi-avukatlar-iceri-alinmadi-haber-1570795.

[69] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also a statement of the İzmir Bar Association reported on by biant.org: ‘Refugees from Afghanistan handed over to Taliban by force’, 19 April 2022, available at: https://m.bianet.org/english/migration/260665-turkey-refugees-from-afghanistan-handed-over-to-taliban-by-force.

[70] Announcement of the Human Rights Association reported on by bianet.org: ‘Afghans in İzmir forced to sign “voluntary return papers”’, 22 Apirl 2022, available at: https://m.bianet.org/english/migration/260844-afghans-in-izmir-forced -to-sign-voluntary-return-papers.

[71] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Applying for a work permit is a burdensome, costly procedure, and the responsibility of the employer, and it must be shown that the job cannot be done by a Turkish citizen in order for a permit to be granted. Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[74] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 17.

[75] IInformation provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also Centre for Global Development, ‘A new policy to better integrate refugees into host-country labor markets’, 22 November 2019, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/new-policy-better-integrate-refugees-host-country-labor-markets.

[76] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also Refugees International, ‘“I am only looking for my rights” Legal employment still inaccessible for refugees in Turkey’, December 2017, available at: https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/ri_report_employmentturkey.pdf.

[77] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[78] See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 250, ECHR 2011.

[79] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 109.

[80] See diken.com.tr, ‘Alo 183’ten şiddet mağduru için yanıt: Ama o kadın değil ki mülteci bayan’, 2 April 2016, available at:

https://www.diken.com.tr/alo-183ten-siddet-magduru-icin-yanit-ama-o-kadin-degil-ki-multeci-bayan/.

[81] Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği, ‘Mülteci̇ Kadinlarin Durumuna İli̇şki̇n Bi̇r Değerlendi̇rme:”Hem Mülteci̇ Hem Kadin: Mülteci̇ Kadinlar Ne Yaşiyor? Ne Yapmali?”’, 9 March 2018, available at: https://multeci.org.tr/2018/03/09/multeci-kadinlarin-durumuna-iliskin- bir-degerlendirmehem-multeci-hem-kadin-multeci-kadinlar-ne-yasiyor-ne-yapmali/.

[82] See GOAL Global, ‘Protection Monitoring Report on Syrian Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Communities in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Adana and Mersin’, 31 August 2021, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/protection-monitoring-report-syrian-nomadic-and-semi- nomadic-communities-gaziantep-0.

[83] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 111; see also Hayriye KARA & Damla ÇALIK, ‘Waiting to be “Safe and Sound”: Turkey as a LGBTI Refugees’ Way Station’, July 2016, available at: https://kaosgldernegi.org/images/library/2016multeci-raporu2016.pdf.

[84] See Border Violence Monitoring Network, ‘The Black Book of Pushbacks – Volumes I & II’, December 2020, available at: https://left.eu/issues/publications/black-book-of-pushbacks-volumes-i-ii/; see also platform on mapping ‘Drift-backs’ in the Aegean Sea, launched by Forensic Architecture in July 2022, available at: https://aegean.forensic-architecture.org/.

[85] İzmir Bar, 2019, “Avukatların Gözünden Geri Gönderme Merkezleri ve İdari Gözetim Alanları Çalıştayı Raporu” available at: https://www.izmirbarosu.org.tr/Upload/files/geri_gonderme_rapor.pdf.

[86] See Safi and Others v. Greece, no. 5418/15, § 196, Judgement of 7 July 2022.

[87] See Amnesty International, ‘Country Report Turkey’. 2021, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and- central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 83.

[88] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 83.

[89] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[90] See Osman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 23452/94, § 115, Reports 1998-VIII; and Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia, no. 46598/06, § 50, Judgement of 15 January 2009.

[91] See, for example, swissinfo.ch, Syrian properties in Ankara attacked after youth killed, 12 August 2021, available at: https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/syrian-properties-in-ankara-attacked-after-youth-killed/46862556; and observers.france24.com, ‘’A nightmarish night’: Syrian neighbourhood in Ankara attacked after deadly fight’, 13 August 2021, available at: https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210818-syrian-neighbourhood-ankara-turkey-attacked.

[92] See BirGün, ‘’Seyreltme’ projesinin detayları: 16 il Suriyelilere kapatıldı’, 22. February 2022, available at: https://www.birgun.net/haber/seyreltme-projesinin-detaylari-16-il-suriyelilere-kapatildi-378070

[93] ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 83.

[94] See al-monitor.com, ‘Turkey’s quota plan for refugees alarms rights activists’, 23 February 2022, available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/turkeys-quota-plan-refugees-alarms-rights-activists.

[95] See Şerife Ceren Uysal, ‘Power Politics versus the Rule of Law in Turkey: A Case Study’, in: The Rule of Law in Retreat: Challenges to Justice in the United Nations World, ed. Slawomir Redo, London, Lexington Books, 2022, p. 128.

[96] See the statement of the International Fair Trial Day and the Ebru Timtik Award, ELDH, AED and others, 23 February 2021, available at: https://eldh.eu/2021/02/international-fair-trial-day-and-the-ebru-timtik-award-hold-the-date- 14-june-2021/; and the joint statement of the initial International Fair Trial Day and the Ebru Timtik Award, ELDH, AED and others, 14 June 2021,available at: https://eldh.eu/2021/06/joint-statement-international-fair-trial-day-14-june-2021/.

[97] See İşkence Raporu, ‘Lübnan’dan Türkiye’ye iade edilen Ayten Öztürk’e gözaltında ağır işkence’, 30 August 2018, available at: https://iskenceraporu.com/ayten-ozturke-gozaltinda-agir-iskence/

[98] See Kronos 35, ‘İsveç’te Yüksek Mahkeme öğretmenin Türkiye’ye iade talebini reddetti’, 16 July 2022, available at: https://kronos35.news/tr/isvecte-yuksek-mahkeme-ogretmenin-turkiyeye-iadesini-durdurdu/, Uluslararası Af Örgütü (Amnesty Turkey), ‘Malezya: Türkiye’ye iade, gönderilen üç kişi için işkence riski taşıyor’, 12 May 2017, available at: https://www.amnesty.org.tr/icerik/malezya-turkiyeye-iade-gonderilen-uc-kisi-icin-iskence-riski-tasiyor.

[99] See Human Rights Association & and others, ‘Türkiye’de Değişik Boyutlarıyla İşkence Gerçeği’, p. 83, available at: https://hakinisiyatifi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/26-Haziran-2020-Ortak-Bas%C4%B1n-Ac%CC%A7%C4%B1klamas%C4%B1-Eki-Veriler.pdf.

[100] See, for example, Freedom From Torture, ‘Torture in Turkey: past, present and future?’, April 2017, available at: https://www.freedomfromtorture. org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Turkey%20briefing%20FINAL%20170410.pdf; Human Rights Association, ‘ İHD 2019 Report On Human Rights Violations In Turkey’, May 2020, available at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/i_hd_2019_violations_report_and_summary_table-2.pdf; Stockholm Centre For Freedom, ‘Council of Europe’s CPT confirms continued ill-treatment and torture in Turkey’, 5 August 2020, available at: https://stockholmcf.org/council-of-europes-cpt-confirms-continued-ill-treatment-and-torture-in-turkey/.

[101] See evrensel.net, ‘İHD ve Meriç nehrine atılan mültecilerin yakınlarından yetkililere çağrı: Kayıplar bulunsun’, 21 September 2021, available at: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/443210/ihd-ve-meric-nehrine-atilan- multecilerin-yakinlarindan-yetkililere-cagri-kayiplar-bulunsun; gazeteduvar.com.tr, ‘Meriç Nehri’ne atılan mülteciler: Dosyada iki aydır ilerleme yok’, 28 October 2021, available at: https://www.gazeteduvar. com.tr/meric-nehrine-atilan- multeciler-dosyada-iki-aydir-ilerleme-yok-haber-1539868; evrensel.net, ‘Meriç’e atılan sığınmacıların dosyası kapatıldı’, 16 February 2022, available at: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/455202/merice-atilan-siginmacilarin-dosyasi-kapatildi.

[102] See Kebe and Others v. Ukraine, no. 12552/12, Judgement of 12 January 2017.

Massive Espionage on seven Spanish Lawyers using the Pegasus programme

TO THE OBSERVATOIRE INTERNATIONAL DES AVOCATS EN DANGER (OIAD)

INFORMATION ON MASSIVE ESPIONAGE PERPETRATED ON SEVEN SPANISH LAWYERS USING THE PEGASUS PROGRAM

The indiscriminate ‘hacking’ using the PEGASUS spy program that was carried out on pro-independence politicians, has also affected seven lawyers: Gonzalo Boye Tusset, Josep Costa, Jaume Alonso Cuevillas, Andreu Van den Eyden, Joaquim Jubert, Josep Rius and Jordi Domingo, the first one from the Madrid Bar Assotiation (ICAM) and the remaining six from the Bacelona Bar Assotiation (ICAB). This is confirmed ny the information received through the media, and the judicial investigations that are being carried out in a Barcelona court.

The right to defence, the duty of confidentiality between lawyer and client and, ultimately, professional secrecy, are fundamental pillars not only of our profession, but also of the right to effective judicial protection as a guarantee of the rule of law.

The right to defence of our clients and the right to a trial with all the guarantees depend on the duty of secrecy, confidentiality and, ultimately, professional secrecy. Not in vain has it been defined as a right (of the client) and a duty (of the lawyer), and for this reason it is part of our commitment as lawyers to preserve it and guarantee its integrity against any external interference.

The Spanish Supreme Court has already indicated in its ruling 78/2012, of February 9, 2012 (Garzón case), the following:

“ Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution, provides together with other rights that, although different and independent from each other, constituting a battery of

guarantees aimed at ensuring the real effectiveness of one of them: the right to a trial with guarantees, to a fair trial , in terms of the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights]; ultimately, to a fair trial . So that the legitimate claim of the State regarding the prosecution and punishment of criminal behavior should only be satisfied within the limits imposed on the exercise of power by the rights that correspond to citizens in a rule of law. Nobody seriously disputes in this framework that the search for the truth, even supposing that it is reached, does not justify the use of any means. Justice obtained at any price ends up not being Justice.

The confidentiality of the relationship between the accused and his defence lawyer, which naturally must be governed by trust, is an essential element (ECHR Castravet v. Moldova, March 13, 2007, p. 49; and ECHR Foxley v. United Kingdom , of June 20, 2000, page 43) In the ECHR of October 5, 2006, case Viola against Italy (61), it was stated that “…the right, for the accused, to communicate with his lawyer without being heard by third parties is among the elementary requirements of the fair trial in a democratic society and derives from article 6.3 c) of the Convention. If a lawyer could not meet with his client without such surveillance and receive confidential instructions from him, his assistance would lose much of its usefulness (Judgment S. against Switzerland of November 2, 1991, series A no. 220, pg. 16, app. 48)”.

The events that we are hearing about through the media are especially serious, and require clear explanations about the perpetrators of these acts of espionage, by whom or by whom they were authorized, and whether there has been any type of judicial authorization , or whether this espionage has occurred without any type of control and in a massive and indiscriminate manner.

In this context, the Barcelona Bar Association (ICAB) and the Council of Catalan Bars (CICAC) have issued a joint statement at the end of which they denounced the use of Pegasus against lawyers and requested explanations from the Spanish Government on what could be a serious violation of fundamental rights, the rights of defence and professional secrecy, compromising the rule of law and the peaceful coexistence of society in Spain.

On the other hand, the Madrid Bar Association (ICAM) has not yet reacted and the General Council of Spanish Lawyers (CGAE) only reacted on April 29, 2022, following the request addressed to it to this effect by the Free Lawyers Association (Asociación Libre de Abogadas y Abogados – ALA), in consideration of the seriousness of these acts of espionage against the aforementioned lawyers.

For this reason, and because these are serious facts that directly attack our profession, the right of defence as a fundamental aspect in the functioning of justice and the effective development of the right to a trial with all the

guarantees, we request the Observatoire International des Avocats en Danger (OIAD) to demand all the explanations from the Spanish Government and uncover all the responsibilities regarding these events, acting in defence of this group of lawyers, and to issue a press release to denounce this attack on the rights of the defence, on professional secrecy, as well as on private life; and also afford your protection to these lawyers against future interference in the exercise of their professional activity. You must give your unequivocal support for the Catalan and Madrid lawyers who were victims of the espionage perpetrated by means of the Pegasus software by the Spanish authorities.

Naples, 30th of June 2022

Defending Refugees in Europe

Date: 24rd of June 2022, 15h-20h00

Venue: ex-OPG “Je so pazzo”,  Naples

Via Matteo Renato Imbriani, 218 – 80136 (NAPLES) https://commonsnapoli.org/en/the-spaces/ex-opg-je-so-pazzo

Translation:  ITALIAN – ENGLISH

Moderation of the event: Margherita d’Andrea, lawyer: presentation of speakers and thematic thread of the afternoon

15h00 – 15h30

  1. Greetings

1. Thomas Schmidt, Co-Secretary General of ELDH, greetings on behalf of ELDH and AED

2. Antonio Tafuri, Lawyer, President of the Bar Council of Naples

3. Francesco Caia, Lawyer, National Bar Council, President of the “Osservatorio Internazionale Avvocati in pericolo” (OIAD https://protect-lawyers.org/it/)

4. Liana Nesta, lawyer: Introduction to the conference

16h00 – 16h45

  1. Refugee Rights: a European Perspective
  2.  Bill Bowring, (human rights barrister) What can be done for refugees at the European Court of Human Rights, now in crisis.
  3. Yiota Massouridou, (lawyer, Secretary General of AED) The Hot-Spot System and Pushbacks
  4. Danilo Risi, (Laywer, executive Committee of “Associazione Nazionale Giuristi Democratici”):  Ucrainian Refugees and effects of the mission of Giuristi Democratici and Mediterranea NGO from Naples to Poland: the national petition for the right of conscientious objection of Ukrainian men

16h45 – 17h00 Break

17h00 – 18h45

  1. Refugee Rights in Italy

9. Luigi Migliaccio, (Lawyer, member of the Commission on migration law of Bar Council of Naples and Commission of Human Rights Union des Avocats Européens – UAE): Family Reunification, latest jurisdiction

10. Francesco Priore, (Lawyer, Executive Committee of “Associazione Nazionale Avvocato di Strada”):  Complementary protections to the international protection

11. Nicola Canestrini (Lawyer): The Iuventa case

18h45 – 19h30

  1. An activist’s perspective

12. Simona Talamo, activist

13. Abdel El Mir, activist, Movimento Migranti e Rifugiati Napoli

Closing remarks: Hanno Bos, on behalf of AED & ELDH) Refugee Rights in Europe – The Massinflux Directive – Double Standards or a new progressive approach 

19h30 – 20h00 discussion

Free the Gezi defendants!

Another striking example of the absence of an independent judiciary in Turkey:

The verdict of the Gezi Trial was handed down on 25 April 2022. This trial has been ongoing for years and is one of the most striking examples of the absence of an independent judiciary in Turkey.

The Istanbul 13th Assize Court found Osman Kavala guilty of an alleged attempt to overthrow the government pursuant to Article 312/1 of the Turkish Penal Code. He is a prominent human rights defender who has been unlawfully imprisoned since November 2017. The court ordered his detention pending an appeal in relation to this conviction, while acquitting him of the charge of espionage, and released him -on paper- for the later charge.

All the other defendants who were present before the court were sentenced to 18 years in prison on the charge of aiding the alleged attempt against the government. They include the lawyer Can Atalay, Mücella Yapıcı, Çiğdem Mater, Hakan Altınay, Mine Özerden, Tayfun Kahraman and Yiğit Ali Ekmekçi. The court went on to adopt a harsh and rarely applied order of the arrest and detention of this group of defendants. They were arrested immediately after the hearing. 

This baseless verdict contradicts the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which found that the allegations against Osman Kavala, and the evidence relied upon by the prosecution and the court lacked proper foundation, and was politically motivated. In December 2019 the ECtHR found a violation of Article 5 and Article 18 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 5, and called for Kavala’s immediate release. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers (CoM) has been seeking to enforce the ECtHR’s judgment, with no success. This resulted in the CoM triggering infringement proceedings against Turkey pursuant to Article 46(4) of the Convention, a proceeding used for the  second time in the history of the CoM . The case is currently pending before the ECtHR for determination of Turkey’s compliance with Article 46(1) of the ECHR namely the obligation to implement the ECtHR’s judgments.

The verdict of the Istanbul 13th Assize Court on 22 April 2022 confirms the ongoing nature of the violations of the rights not only of Osman Kavala but also of other defendants tried under the same case file. It once again confirms the lack of independence and impartiality of the judiciary in Turkey which has been criticised by the international community, particularly since the July 2016 coup attempt and the following 2-year state of emergency period.

These systemic violations of fair trial standards in Turkey were condemned in the statement made on the occasion of the 2021 International Fair Trial Day. Turkey was chosen as the focus country of the Day due to the seriousness of the fair trial issues in Turkey. The verdict of the court on 25 April 2022 shows that Turkey is far from complying with  its human rights obligations. It is yet another example showing that the government of Turkey is determined to continue its practices and policies, undermining and systemically violating fundamental rights and freedoms and increasing the pressure on its critics across the country for the upcoming election.

The Gezi Park Protests of 2013 were peaceful protests according to the international human rights community. According to official statements, around 5 million people participated in the Gezi Park protests which lasted for months across the country.   This peaceful resistance showed the longing of a large segment of society in Turkey for a life in which democratic principles and human rights are respected. It is clear that participating in the Gezi Park Protests is protected by the fundamental rights to freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly, and association.

The Gezi Trial is the reaction of the Turkish government against those who took part in the Gezi Park Protests. The lack of legal grounds for the charges brought against the defendants is confirmed by the dissenting opinion of one of the judges of the 13th Assize Court. He stated that there was no evidence in the case file against the defendants other than unlawfully tapped phone communications. While underlining the unlawful nature of these recordings, the judge also stressed that the content of the conversations did not give enough basis to conclude that the alleged offenses were committed and to convict the defendants.

As the undersigned organisations, we share the frustration expressed by a large segment of society in Turkey against this verdict. We urge the Turkish Government to immediately release all human rights defenders who are illegally detained, including our colleague Can Atalay, and Osman Kavala who has been unlawfully deprived of his liberty for around 4.5 years. We also urge the relevant authorities to drop  all baseless charges, and that this cruel harassment through prosecution, conviction and sentencing that is ongoing against them and many others in Turkey is terminated.

We, the undersigned organisations, repeat the call made on the 14th of June 2021 by a number of prominent lawyers and human rights organisations to the authorities to implement the following steps to ensure full protection of the right to a fair trial and to create an environment enabling effective protection of its underlying principles.  We call on the government of Turkey to:

• take necessary legislative and other measures to ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and end all practices constituting direct interference, pressure, or influence with respect to judicial conduct, including those from the executive;

• implement the recommendation of the numerous human rights oversight mechanisms, including the UN Human Rights Council in  its Universal Periodic Review,  and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, to introduce a constitutional amendment to make the Council of Judges and Prosecutors independent of the executive and ensure that their decisions are open to judicial review;

• immediately end the systematic abuse, detention and prosecution of lawyers, judges, other legal professionals, journalists, human rights defenders, opposition politicians, academics and others where there is no cogent evidence of specific criminal misconduct presented in proceedings that comply with international fair trial standards;

• guarantee and respect the principle of presumption of innocence in all criminal investigations and prosecutions;

• stop any practices preventing enjoyment of the rights protected under international human rights treaties such as freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, including using the exercise of such freedoms as grounds for arbitrary prosecutions and lengthy and punitive pretrial detention;

• ensure that the rights to fair trial embodied in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are respected in all criminal prosecutions in Turkey’s criminal courts at all levels;

• end the practice of mass trials of lawyers, judges, journalists, opposition politicians, human rights defenders and others, in particular on fabricated charges, such as the charge of membership in a terrorist organization, aimed at preventing their legitimate activities and silencing them; and

• create an open dialogue with the international oversight mechanisms and national and international NGOs to address and resolve the structural human rights issues in Turkey and, as a first step, promptly to agree to requests by the UN Special Rapporteur on Judges and Lawyers and other special procedures to conduct country visits to Turkey. We call on the international community to respond effectively to the deteriorating state of human rights and rule of law in Turkey and to increase its efforts to effectively address these issues with international stakeholders for increased awareness and attention.

And finally,

Free the Gezi defendants!

Article 19

Asociación Americana de Juristas

Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD)

Baroness Helena Kennedy QC

Défense Sans Frontières – Avocats Solidaires (DSF-AS)

EuroMed Rights

European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH)

European Bar Federation (FBE)

European Bar Federation Human Rights Committee

European Democratic Lawyers (AED)

Fair Trials

Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers

Giuristi Democratici

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

International Bar Association’s Institute of Human Rights (IBahri)

Osservartorio Avvocati Minacciati – UCPI – Italia

Perugia Bar Association, Italy

Pistoia Bar Association, Italy

Progressive Lawyers‘ Association (ÇHD), Turkey

Republikanischer Anwältinnen- und Anwälteverein e. V. (RAV)

The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)

The European Criminal Bar Association

The European Criminal Bar Association Human Rights Committee

The Law Society of England and Wales

The National Association of Democratic Lawyers of South Africa

The National Bar Council of France

The National Lawyers Guild International (US)

The Norwegian Bar Human Rights Committee

Ukrainian Association of Democratic Lawyers

International Fair Trial Day and the Ebru Timtik Award

Focus Country of 2022: Egypt / Call for Nominations for the Ebru Timtik Award

Hold the Date – 17-18 June 2022, Palermo/Italy

The right to a fair trial has long been recognised by the international community as a fundamental human right. Without a fair trial, every individual risks becoming the victim of a miscarriage of justice, either as an innocent suspect wrongly convicted, or as a victim unable to secure justice for a wrong perpetrated against him or her.

In 2021, an annual International Fair Trial Day was established with a steering group, and the event was supported by more than 100 legal associations. The first conference was held as a virtual event on 14 June 2021 with a focus on fair trial rights in Turkey. It was agreed that in each subsequent year a new focus country where fair trial rights are being challenged would be chosen as the focus country. The Steering Group also decided to establish an Ebru Timtik Award, in recognition of her sacrifice for the right to a fair trial.  This award will be granted every year to an individual and/or an organisation from the focus country chosen for that year for the International Fair Trial Day or to an individual and/or an organisation who has been active in defending and or promoting the right to a fair trial in that specific country. An International Fair Trial Day Alliance was also formed among prominent bar associations and lawyers’ organisations across the world which support the initiative.

After considering several proposals for the focus country of the 2022 International Fair Trial Day, the Steering Group have now decided that the focus country for this year is Egypt.

The decision is based on the following:

  1. Judicial independence is severely eroded in Egypt, which means that the right to an independent and impartial tribunal is violated in most, if not all, cases (especially against human rights lawyers, human rights defenders, journalists, and opposition politicians). Reports confirm a wide range of systemic violations of the right to a fair trial in the country, including arbitrary detention, arrests, or prosecutions of opponents or perceived opponents. There also has been a failure to effectively prosecute and punish crimes committed by state-affiliated forces, such as unlawful or arbitrary killings – including extrajudicial killings -, forced disappearances, torture, and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Whilst this amounts to a violation of the rights of the victims of these crime and does not of itself amount to a violation of fair trial rights, it is further evidence that the police and prosecutors are failing in their duty to carry out effective and independent investigations and uphold the rule of law so that an atmosphere of impunity in relation to the acts of state-affiliated forces exists.[1] This dire picture is recognised in a number of reports from prominent human rights organisations. The country is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House, underlining – under the rule of law ranking – serious fair trial rights issues.[2] Furthermore, the World Justice Project’s 2021 Rule of Law index ranks Egypt at 136 out of 139 countries.[3]
  2. Reports indicate that the executive branch in Egypt exerts influence over the courts, which typically protect the interests of the government, military, and security apparatus and have often disregarded due process and other basic safeguards in cases against the government’s political opponents or where there is perceived dissent. Constitutional amendments made in 2019 further strengthened the Egyptian President’s supervisory powers over the judiciary and undermined its independence. The changes allowed the President to appoint the heads of judicial bodies and authorities, choosing from among several candidates nominated by their governing councils.[4] The President also serves as the veto-wielding head of the Supreme Council for Judicial Bodies and Authorities, which controls appointments and disciplinary matters for the judiciary. The chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court[5] is now chosen by the President from among its most senior members. Since the new provision took effect in June 2019, the Egyptian President has already used it twice to appoint new SCC presidents by decree, in July 2019 and now on February 8, 2022.
  3. Law no 162 of 1958 (“the Emergency Law”) established the institution of the Emergency State Security Court (ESSC) to adjudicate crimes that violate the terms of a “state of emergency”.⁹ In 2017, the Prime Minister transferred “protesting” and “terrorism-related” offences to the jurisdiction of the ESSC, to which was added crimes from first two chapters of the Penal Code, including those relating to ’spreading fake news’ in January 2021.
  4. Many detained government critics and opposition figures have been prosecuted by the ESSC since the state of emergency was declared in 2017; the state of emergency has been repeatedly renewed and remained in effect until late 2021. Decisions of the ESSC are not subject to appeal but instead are subject to executive-branch approval, as the President can suspend any of their rulings and order retrials. Although the constitution limited military trials of civilians to crimes directly involving the military, its personnel, or its property, a 2014 presidential decree placed all “public and vital facilities” under military jurisdiction, resulting in the referral of thousands of civilian defendants to military courts. That expansion of jurisdiction was effectively incorporated into the constitution in 2019.[6]
  5. Additional, restrictive new emergency measures enacted in 2020 were justified as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In May 2020, President Sisi approved and signed into law amendments to Emergency Law no. 162 of 1958 that banned all forms of public gatherings and demonstrations and gave police greater powers to make arrests. It further expanded the jurisdiction of the military judicial system over civilians by giving the President the power to authorize the military to investigate and prosecute crimes that violate the Emergency Law. Authorities also used the COVID-19 pandemic to justify skipping renewal hearings for pretrial detention orders. Although the state of emergency has been lifted since October 2021, there are ongoing trials of dozens of arbitrarily detained human rights defenders, activists, opposition politicians and peaceful protesters by emergency courts where proceedings are inherently unfair. [7]
  6. The extension of military jurisdiction in Egypt is in itself is a violation of the right to a fair trial under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ICCPR, insofar as the necessity of applying such jurisdiction over civilians is almost never justified. This is in addition to other fair trial rights that are routinely violated in Egyptian courts, including military tribunals, such as the right to access counsel and the right to prepare a defence. The hearings at military tribunals are not open to the public.
  7. Other abuses of fair trial rights include the use of the Counter-terrorism Law, the Protest Law, the NGO Law, the Media Law, the Cybercrime Law, and the Penal Code to harass, arrest, and prosecute lawyers and human rights defenders, and there are many examples of arrest, detention, death in custody, and enforced disappearance of lawyers and human rights defenders. The mass trials against protesters is another practice raising fair trial rights issues.
  8. The lack of a fair trial directly affects lawyers and other human rights defenders at risk, many of whom are convicted and sentenced to long prison sentences and sometimes even the death penalty (which is still being imposed and carried out in Egypt). Reports underline an increased use of the death penalty and executions, many handed down following mass trials fundamentally lacking fair trial guarantees. Accordingly, 80 people were executed in only the first 6 months of 2021, ranking Egypt as the third-worst country in numbers of executions worldwide.[8]
  9. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has adopted several resolutions about the situation in Egypt underlining, amongst other issues, the systemic violation of fair trial rights in the country. The calls made to the government, cited below, in a February 2015 resolution provide a strong indication of the seriousness of the issues:

“The Commission:

  • Condemns the Arab Republic of Egypt’s disregard to regional and international fair trial standards, the unlawful imposition of mass death sentences, and the persecution of journalists and human rights defenders;
  • Calls upon the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to comply with the African Charter, the Principles and Guidelines on Fair Trial, the Declaration on Freedom of Expression, and other instruments to which Egypt is a party;
  • Urges the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to put an end to the harassment, arbitrary arrest, detention and sentencing of journalists, human rights defendants, and individuals who express dissenting views regarding the Government’s actions;
  • Strongly urges the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to observe an immediate moratorium on the death sentences and to reflect on the possibility of abolishing capital punishment;
  • Invites the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty; and
  • Calls on the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to investigate all human rights violations perpetrated in the country and prosecute authors of these violations.”

[emphasis added]

[9]

  1. In an October 2021 decision, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights concluded that the Emergency Law of Egypt contravened the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and requested the government to reform domestic laws to prevent recurring human rights violations. Although the decision concerns arrest and detention of an applicant several years ago, the Commission found that the law which is still in force and used as the pretext to justify ongoing systemic violations was not in line with the African Charter.[10]
  2. In July 2021, UN Expert Mary Lawlor pointed out the ongoing violations in Egypt and highlighted a common trend across multiple cases, whereby human rights defenders are often arrested without a warrant and detained incommunicado at an unknown location and subjected to enforced disappearance, before being presented before the Supreme State Security Prosecution. Their pre-trial detention pending investigation is then ordered for alleged acts criminalized under the vague provisions of the Penal Code, Anti-Terror Law and Anti-Cybercrime Law.[11]
  3. In January 2022, a statement was issued by 65 human rights organizations, and it was underlined that the fair trial standards are routinely flouted in trials before ESSCs, including the right to adequate defence and rights to a public hearing. Defence lawyers have been prevented from communicating with their clients in private and prevented from photocopying the casefiles, indictments and verdicts.[12]
  4. Focusing the next International Fair Trial Day on Egypt will help draw more attention to the systemic fair trial violations in the country. It will provide support to many, including lawyers (at least 35 that we know of), human rights defenders, journalists, political opponents or perceived opponents who are still being arbitrarily detained there, often under unacceptable prison conditions and facing trials severely undermining the fair trial principles.

We are writing at this stage to advise you of this initiative and to invite your organisation to support International Fair Trial Day and attend the conference which will be hosted by Palermo Bar Association and held in Palermo, Italy between 17-18 June 2022. Further details of the programme and of the speakers who will address the conference will follow over the next few months. For now, we would ask you to hold the date.

Call for nominations for the Ebru Timtik Award

We also would like to invite you to nominate one or more individual(s) or an organisation for the Ebru Timtik Award among those who have demonstrated outstanding commitment and sacrifice in upholding fundamental values related to the right to a fair trial in Egypt. The individual(s) or organisation nominated for the award must be or have been active in defending and or promoting the right to a fair trial in Egypt through either his/her/its recent outstanding piece of work in relation to this fundamental right or his/her/its distinguished long-term involvement in fair trial issues. The deadline for nominations is 16 May 2022. To nominate, please send your nominations to nominationsetaward@gmail.com and kindly include: (1) the candidate’s detailed bio, (2) a letter signed by the nominating organisation/group of individuals explaining the reasons why they/it consider(s) that the candidate should be granted the Award, and (3) one recommendation/supporting letter from an unrelated, external organisation, if the application is submitted by a group of individuals.

For the details of the award criteria and process please see the attached “Selection criteria for the grant of the Ebru Timtik Fair Trial Award”. After the deadline, a jury composed of independent individuals who are experienced with the right to a fair trial, including one or more from the focus country, will determine the nominations and reach a decision.


[1] https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/egypt/ and https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/egypt

[2] https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2021

[3] https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2021/Egypt%2C%20Arab%20Rep./; https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-INDEX-21.pdf

[4] https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2021

[5] https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/460767/Egypt/Politics-/Sisi-names-first-Christian-as-president-of-Egypt;s.aspx

[6] https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2021

[7] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/10/egypt-stop-trials-by-emergency-courts/

[8] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/egypt

[9] https://www.achpr.org/sessions/resolutions?id=146

[10] https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/5d96ebd8-1a3e-4bca-afb3-8ed4683896ec/african-commission_el-sharkawi-v.-arab-republic-of-egypt_022021.pdf

[11] https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27314&LangID=E

[12] https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/5570-egypt-quash-verdicts-and-stop-unfair-trials-by-emergency-courts

TO THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (CPT)

This communication is addressed to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). We respectfully ask the CPT on the Day of the Lawyers in Turkey, to organize a follow-up visit to İmralı Prison and in particular to examine the government’s refusal to permit lawyers to visit their clients who are under isolation in İmralı Prison.


On 26 May 2021 a petition was published, signed by 768 lawyers, including the members and executives of several bar associations, legal organizations, and human rights organizations, highlighting
this situation.


At present the rights of Abdullah Öcalan, Ömer Hayri Konar, Hamili Yıldırım, and Veysi Aktaş, who are currently held in İmralı F-Type High Security Prison to see their lawyers is unlawfully being restricted.


Applications for lawyer visits have not been granted since 7 August 2019 for Abdullah Öcalan, Veysi Aktaş, Hamili Yıldırım, and Ömer Hayri Konar. They have not been allowed to see their lawyers even once since they were transferred to İmralı Island in 2015.


A special and discriminatory form of isolation has been applied in İmralı Prison since 15 February 1999. The ban on lawyer visits was continued for 8 years without any interruption from 27 July 2011 until 2 May 2019. In 2019, 5 lawyer visits took place. After the last lawyer visit on 7 August 2019, the continuous ban resumed.


Since 1999, the CPT has conducted 10 separate visits to İmralı Prison. This severe state of isolation in İmralı Prison was noted in the CPT’s Report on its visit to Turkey between 6-17 May 2019, which was published on 5 August 2020. While pointing out several violations, the report also stated the following with regard to lawyer and family visits:


“The CPT urges the Turkish authorities to take the necessary steps to ensure that all prisoners at İmralı Prison are effectively able, if they so wish, to receive visits from their relatives and
lawyers. To this end, an end should be put to the practice of imposing a ban on family visits for ‘disciplinary’ reasons. Further, the Committee requests the Turkish authorities to provide – on
a monthly basis – an account of the visits which all prisoners held at İmralı Prison have received from their family members and lawyers” (para. 51).

The situation indicated in the CPT’s report continues to this day, in an aggravated manner. While it had been expected that improvements would be made in İmralı Prison in line with the recommendations outlined in the CPT’s report, the prisoners’ lawyers report that new disciplinary penalties and bans –
the latter were issued by the Execution Judgeship – have been imposed on the prisoners.

Allegations and rumors concerning Abdullah Öcalan’s state of health that were widely published on social media on 14 March 2021 caused serious concerns among the public. Although the prisoners were allowed the opportunity to communicate with their families by phone on 25 March 2021 in the face of these concerns, the conversation between Abdullah Öcalan and his brother was interrupted after 4-5 minutes, while Ömer Hayri Konar and Veysi Aktaş could not talk to their families. Abdullah
Öcalan informed the public that before the connection was completely interrupted, Abdullah Öcalan had clearly expressed his wish to see his lawyers.


The banning of lawyer visits to İmralı Prison openly violates the United Nations (UN) Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), updated in 2015, the CPT’s recommendations and the Execution Law of Turkey (Law no. 5275). States have the obligation to guarantee detainees and convicts’ exercise of their rights without any regard for their identity or the quality of their sentence.

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The Ban of the People’s Democratic Party

The undersigned organisations, active in the field of democracy and human rights protection and promotion, are deeply concerned about the ongoing case before the Constitutional Court in Turkey regarding closure of the opposition party Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). HDP was founded on October 15, 2012 and has since been a vital part of political life in Turkey. Our organisations urge the authorities to uphold the right to political representation in Turkey, and to ensure that any proceedings against political parties and their representatives fully comply with international standards for a fair trial, including the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law and defence rights.

Following HDP’s final round of written and oral defences, the Constitutional Court is expected to announce its decision in the coming months. Should the Constitutional Court endorse the Chief Public Prosecutor’s request and rule in favour of its demand to close the HDP permanently or partially, or to completely deprive it of treasury aid, HDP will cease to exist. Its representatives who are allegedly responsible for the facts that – in the Chief Public Prosecutor’s opinion – would warrant the party’s dissolution will also be banned from political activity for 5 years.

The Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals referred its indictment to the Constitutional Court on June 7, 2021. The indictment requested the dissolution of HDP and banning of 451 party members, including HDP Co-Chairs Mithat Sancar and Pervin Buldan, from politics for 5 years. The words and actions of 69 party members are stated to be the main ground of the demand for closure of the political party. No concrete or reliable evidence attributable to the HDP as an institution was presented in the indictment, and no justification was given for the request for the party’s dissolution, which would violate the right to political representation of over 10% of the voters in the last elections.

Following the preliminary defence presented by the HDP in November 2021, the Chief Public Prosecutor presented its views on the merits to the Constitutional Court, which were notified to the HDP on January 20, 2022. The views on the merits repeat the claims and demands contained in the indictment, without any indication that the Prosecutor’s office took notice of the detailed defence presented by the HDP.

The proceeding takes place against the backdrop of severe democratic and rule of law backsliding in Turkey. Despite constitutional amendments introduced as part of the European Union accession process in the 2000s that made party closures – common in the 1990s – more difficult, the Constitutional Court shut down the Party for a Democratic Society (DTP), a political party preceding the HDP, in 2009. Turkey has been repeatedly condemned in recent years by the European Court of Human Rights for violating the convention. This includes cases regarding the DTP’s closure, HDP and its members, where the Court found the procedures initiated against them to be in violation of the complainants’ rights under the Convention. The Turkish government has consistently failed to comply with ECtHR judgements, which warranted the launch of an infringement procedure against Turkey by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on February 2, 2022.

Repeated statements by ruling party AKP and its ally MHP’s spokespersons, calling for HDP’s closure and for its members to be banned from politics also point to an attempt by the government to undermine the ECtHR’s authority and interfere in proceedings before national courts, including the Constitutional Court, in breach of the principle of judicial independence from other State powers.

Our organisations are deeply concerned about the impact that the Constitutional Court’s decision could have on the defendants’ rights and on political democracy in Turkey. We call on the Constitutional Court to ensure that judicial proceedings take place in full compliance with domestic and international fair trial standards, including the principle of judicial independence and impartiality and the rights of the defence. We also urge the Turkish government to respect the independence and impartiality of the judiciary by refraining from directly or indirectly influencing the Court’s decision, and to uphold the rights to political representation and democratic participation, which are a pre-condition for the respect of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Turkey.

  • Asociación Americana de Juristas (AAJ)
  • Associació Catalana per a la Defensa dels Drets Humans (ACDDH) – Catalonia
  • Asociación Libre de Abogadas y Abogados, (ALA), Madrid
  • Association for Monitoring Equal Rights
  • Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD)
  • Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union (BFAWU)
  • Campaign Against Criminalising Communities (CAMPACC)
  • Center of research and elaboration on democracy/Group for international legal intervention (CRED/GIGI)
  • Civic Space Studies Association
  • Confederation of Lawyers of Asia and the Pacific (COLAP)
  • Coordinamento Italiano Sostegno Donne Afghane (CISDA)
  • Democratic Lawyers Association of Bangladesh (DLAB)
  • Demokratische Juristinnen und Juristen Schweiz (DJS)
  • Eskubideak, Basque Country
  • European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH)
  • European Democratic Lawyers (AED-EDL)
  • General Federation of Trade Unions (UK)
  • Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers
  • Human Rights Agenda Association
  • Human Rights Association
  • Human Rights Foundation of Turkey
  • International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI)
  • Italian Democratic Lawyers / Giuristi Democratici
  • International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)
  • International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
  • KulturForum TürkeiDeutschland e.V.
  • Legal Team, Italy
  • Life-Memory-Freedom Association (Yaşam Bellek Özgürlük)
  • MAF-DAD e.V (Association for Democracy and International Law )
  • National Lawyers Guild International (USA)
  • National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers, Philippines (NUPL)
  • People’s Law Office / International
  • Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD)
  • Republikanischer Anwältinnen – und Anwälteverein e.V. (RAV), Germany
  • Rete Jin Italia (Jin Net)
  • Rights Initiative Association
  • Rosa Women’s Association
  • Social Policy, Gender Identity, and Sexual Orientation Studies Association (SPoD)
  • Syndicat des Avocats de France (SAF)
  • Syndicat des Avocats pour la Démocratie, Belgium (le SAD)
  • The Indian Association of lawyers
  • The National Association of Democratic Lawyers, (NADEL), South Africa
  • Transport Salaried Staffs Association
  • Ukrainian Association of Democratic Lawyers
  • Vereinigung Demokratischer Juristinnen und Juristen (VDJ)
  • Vereniging Sociale Rechtshulp Nederland