Posted on

BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF:

European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH), European Democratic Lawyers (EDL), Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD), and Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD)

ON THE APPLICATIONS:

  1. No. 1712/21         K.K. v. Greece
  2. No. 2871/21         I.M. v. Greece,
  3. No. 3104/21         S.K. v. Greece,
  4. No. 3111/21         S.A. v. Greece,
  5. No. 3118/21         L.M. v. Greece,
  6. No. 4034/21         A.D. v. Greece,
  7. No. 4159/21         T.M. v. Greece,
  8. No. 4177/21         H.T. et al. v. Greece   
  9. No. 6923/21         S.G. v. Greece
  10. No. 10258/21       F.C. v. Greece
  11. No. 10692/21       O.M. v. Greece
  12. No. 12807/21       M.A. v. Greece
  13. No. 12926/21       M.E. v. Greece
  14. No. 13134/21       M.S. v. Greece
  15. No. 15067/21       G.R.J. v. Greece
  16. No. 15783/21       A.E. v. Greece
  17. No. 16802/21       S.R. v. Greece
  18. No. 16807/21       A.R. v. Greece
  19. No. 16811/21       M.H. v. Greece
  20. No. 16813/21       M.M. v. Greece
  21. No. 16815/21       M.H. v. Greece
  22. No. 16817/21       A.M. v. Greece
  23. No. 16818/21       A.A. v. Greece
  24. No. 16820/21       H.S. v. Greece
  25. No. 16822/21       S.R. v. Greece
  26. No. 16824/21       U.E. v. Greece
  27. No. 16825/21       W.A. v. Greece
  28. No. 16828/21       W.A. v. Greece
  29. No. 16831/21       S.H. v. Greece
  30. No. 22146/21 S.A.A. et al. v. Greece
  31. No. 24982/21       A.A.J. and H.J. v. Greece
  32. No. 42429/21  M.A. v. Greece

I. INTRODUCTION

  1. The following submissions are made by the European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH), the European Democratic Lawyers (EDL), the Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD), and the Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD) (the “Interveners”) pursuant to the leave granted by of the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court” or the “ECtHR”) on 4 July 2022, in accordance with Rule 44(3) of the Rules of the Court. The 32 above mentioned applications concern the alleged refoulement of the Applicants from Greek territory (land and sea) to Turkey, without prior procedure (“pushbacks”).
  2. In addition to the aspects listed in the request for leave to intervene dated 23 February 2022, after taking the annexes into consideration, and in order to assist the Court effectively, the interveners will also provide the Court with written comments on the risks faced by citizens of Turkey who were pushed back from Greece to Turkey.
  3. Although the Respondent State in the aforementioned applications is Greece, the conditions a person will face upon being pushed back to Turkey are relevant in the present cases due to the expelling state’s obligation to take the treatment into account a person will be subjected to in the receiving state.[1]

II. THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS

  • First and foremost, the Interveners want to highlight the fact that pushbacks are illegal actions carried out by state officials to prevent asylum seekers from getting access to the domestic asylum procedure. While a pushback is not based on a formal decision, the Respondent State is nevertheless bound to its legal obligations under domestic and international law. The Respondent State is bound to the principle of non-refoulement as soon as asylum seekers enter Greek territory, whether on land or at sea.[2]
  • If substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the removal or return to a third country would expose an asylum seeker[3] to treatment contrary to Article 3 – directly in that third country or indirectly, for example, through chain-refoulement – the Court has confirmed the responsibility of the Contracting State not to deport.[4] These duties also include the duty to consider the overall reception conditions for asylum seekers in the receiving state, and the duty to consider the respective person’s situation.[5]
  • Article 86(1) of the Greek Law 4636/2019 (“International Protection Act [IPA]”) defines the criteria for the application of the “Safe Third Country” (“STC”) concept. Even though the criteria are in general consistent with Article 38 EU Directive 2013/32 (“Asylum Procedure Directive”), a serious divergence arises. With IPA, Article 86(1)(f) an additional set of criteria was introduced concerning the relation of an asylum seeker with a “STC” by which a mere transit state, in combination with specific circumstances, can be deemed as “safe”.
  • While the Court so far has never questioned the “STC” concept as such, nor has it commented on whether a given third country was safe or not, the Court is sometimes – as given in the aforementioned applications – “obliged to scrutinise the use of the safe third-country concept against the benchmark of Article 3 and the prohibition of non-refoulement”.[6] In this context, the Court has stated in its case law that the deporting State “has a general procedural obligation to carry out a fair and thorough examination of the conditions in that third country”,[7] including “the accessibility and reliability of its asylum system”.[8] While it rests with the asylum seekers to substantiate their individual circumstances, the Contracting State’s authorities, however, are obliged to conduct an assessment “of the accessibility and functioning of the receiving country’s asylum system and the safeguards it affords in practice”[9] on their own motion. This obligation applies all the more if a general risk of a breach – for example, of Article 3 – in the receiving state is well known.[10]
  • Despite the fact that “Turkey has persistently raised concerns about alleged migrant arrival prevention measures (so-called ‘pushbacks’) enforced by the Greek authorities in the Aegean Sea”,[11] the survivors of these illegal actions from Greek state organs do not receive any protection in Turkey where they are deprived of their fundamental human rights and face a real and genuine fear of refoulement. As will be set out below, Turkey – with regards to its asylum system and its reception conditions – fails to meet the recognized requirements leading to a systematic violation of the rights of asylum seekers as set out in the Convention.

A. Insufficient Access to Protection in Turkey

  • According to the European Commission, the asylum legislation in Turkey is only partially aligned with the EU acquis. “The Law on Foreigners and International Protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation) expressed in the New York Protocol of the 1951 Geneva Convention, according to which the vast majority of persons seeking international protection in Turkey cannot apply for fully-fledged refugee status but for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection only”.[12] In other words, anyone not originally from a European country is excluded from full refugee recognition. In effect, this legislation bars any citizen of a West Asian or African country from the protection as a refugee under the Geneva Convention.[13]
  • However, based on Article 38(1)(c) and (e) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Member States of the European Union may apply the “STC” concept only if the third country concerned respects the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and if the possibility exists to request refugee status in that third country and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection there in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Already under these requirements alone, Turkey fails to meet the conditions necessary to be considered a “STC”.
  • Despite the fact that there is no protection under the Geneva Convention for non-Europeans available in Turkey, Turkey particularly offers to asylum seekers the following permits based on the Law on Foreigners and International Protection No. 6458 (LFIP)[14]: conditional refugee status (Şartlı Mülteci Statüsü), subsidiary protection status (İkincil Koruma Statüsü) and temporary protection status for Syrian nationals (Geçici Koruma Statüsü). However, based on the experience of the Interveners’ members working in the field, one of the main obstacles for asylum seekers in Turkey to obtain a residence permit is insufficient access to the migration system.[15]
  • Temporary protection for Syrian nationals: Since October 2014[16] Syrians can officially obtain Temporary Protection Status (TPS)[17] in Turkey under the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR).[18] TPS is designed for situations of high numbers of refugees entering Turkey, and therefore, “is not defined as a form of international protection but a complementary measure used in situations where individual international protection eligibility processing is deemed impractical”.[19] Although the flow of people from Syria seeking refuge has not ended yet, in practice, it has become extremely difficult to obtain TPS in Turkey due to the fact that cities and neighbourhoods are closing their means of registration (see § 18).[20] According to the European Commission, “NGOs reported considerable challenges with access to registration in the first place, where individuals wishing to lodge an application in PDMMs[21] are referred to other PDMMs, without a formal documentation and referral system. Such de-facto barriers to registration hinder access to all other essential services and put asylum seekers in an irregular situation if apprehended. Effective access to international protection at borders, airports and removal centres remain limited as reported by NGOs and lawyers”.[22]
  • While TPS entitles a person to get health care and education, to apply for a work permit six months after the application for TPS, and to seek social assistance, TPS is tied to the place of registration. If a person moves to another province – e.g. to Istanbul in order to find work – then this person loses all rights attached to this status. Following TPR, Article 33(2)(a), a person under temporary protection is – if not exceptionally permitted otherwise – obligated to stay in the registration province and is not allowed to move to another province. An official transfer is close to impossible.[23] If a person fails to stay in the province of registration and is apprehended elsewhere, this person may face detention in order to be transferred back to the assigned province,[24] but there is also a risk of deportation due to violation of the TPR.[25] Furthermore, if a person fails to stay in the province of residence, they also lose all access to social rights, i.e. education and health care in their new place of residence.[26]
  • Most importantly in the context of pushbacks – based on TPR, Article 12(1) – TPS shall cease where a person leaves Turkey voluntarily, e.g. to try to reach Greece. In other words: If a TPS holder is pushed back from Greece to Turkey, this person’s temporary protection status and ID Card (“kimlik”), if even possessed, will be terminated. In addition, in practice there is no possibility to reobtain a new “kimlik”.[27] Taken the above mentioned together, the protection offered by TPS does not equal the protection provided by the Geneva Convention.
  • International Protection for non-Syrian and non-European citizens: A person who is not eligible for TPS can submit an application for international protection. Conditional refugee status is granted to a non-European citizen[28] who matches the criteria to be recognized as a refugee as set out in the Geneva Convention. However, people with conditional refugee status can not access the social rights guaranteed in the Geneva Convention. Therefore, the protection offered, again, does not equal the protection according to the Geneva Convention. Subsidiary protection, in theory, is provided to people who do not meet the criteria of the refugee definition, but would face, for example, degrading treatment upon return or would be deported to a situation of general violence.[29]
  • Analogous to TPS for Syrian nationals, citizens from other non-European countries first of all need to approach the Provincial Presidency of Migration Management (PPMM) in order to lodge an application for international protection.[30] If an application for international protection is registered, the applicant receives a “kimlik” stating that the person is an international protection applicant, which gives the holder of it the right to access education, health care (temporarily for a year), and, after six months, the right to apply for a work permit. In addition, the PPMM decides the “satellite city”[31] for the applicant and sets a date for an interview. Based on the LFIP, Article 77, international protection applicants are, for example, required to personally prove their presence in the assigned city by signature. If an applicant fails to fulfil this obligation multiple times, their application for international protection will be considered withdrawn.[32] However, the main obstacle, again, is not a theoretical non-availability of a protection status as such, but the practical non-accessibility to registration (see § 18).
  • In addition, the procedure for international protection can take up to several years,[33] and in effect, mostly ends with a negative decision, respectively with a deportation order. Asylum lawyers in Turkey have reported to the Interveners that they know of no examples of clients who, in the end, received conditional refugee status or subsidiary protection.[34] In parallel, a migration rights NGO stated to the Interveners that there are approximately 500,000 Afghans[35] in Turkey, of which 2,700 have received a “humanitarian permit” in 2019, after around five NGOs had lobbied on their behalf. Consistent with the lawyers’ reports cited before, the NGO staff is otherwise unaware of any positive decisions in international protection cases of non-Syrians. In practice, this leads to a situation where most citizens from West Asian or African countries in Turkey do not apply for international protection because they are afraid of deportation.[36] In any case, no protection equivalent to the protection under the Geneva Convention is offered to non-European third country nationals.
  • The Interveners conclude that Turkey offers insufficient protection for asylum seekers. First, the residence permits available do not equal the protection provided by the Geneva Convention. Second, the main obstacle in obtaining actual protection in Turkey is non-accessibility: It has become increasingly challenging for third country nationals to register for a “kimlik” in Turkey. In 2018, the PDMM (now “PPMM”),[37] de facto stopped registering newly arriving Syrians, with the exception of vulnerable cases, in large provinces – such as Istanbul – and provinces with a relatively high refugee population – such as Hatay and Mardin. Since then, there has been an increase in the number of cities ‘closed’ to new applications. As of early 2020, the following cities were closed to all except vulnerable cases: Istanbul, Edirne, Tekirdag, Kirklareli, Kocaeli, Canakkale, Bursa, Balikesir, Izmir, Aydin, Mugla, Antalya, Hatay and Yalova.[38] This situation has remained unchanged, as an estimated 16 provinces were closed to international protection applications in 2021[39] – as to the Intervener’s knowledge, the situation remains unchanged up until today. Due to the prohibition of travelling within Turkey for unregistered third country nationals,[40] individuals affected are, in addition, unable to travel to a place where it might be possible to register.[41] Finally, in the context of the aforementioned applications, it is of most relevance, that – based on FLIP, Article 54(1)(h), and TPR, Article 12(1)(a) and (c) – a “kimlik”, if possessed, is terminated because a person has left Turkey voluntarily, namely to try to reach Greece – and will not be able to re-obtain it. For all these reasons, the Respondent State cannot declare Turkey as generally “safe” for people who have left Turkey voluntarily, seeking international protection in Greece.

B. Systematic Arrests upon Return & Insufficient Conditions of Detention

  1. According to the European Commission, “Turkey needs to further align its practice with European standards in removal centres, in particular with regard to protection of human rights, including access to legal counselling and interpreters and protection of vulnerable groups, in particular children staying with their families”.[42]
  2. Drawing from the experience of the Interveners’ members working in the field, it has been observed that people seeking international protection who were pushed back from Greece to Turkey usually face detention in Turkey.[43] However, the duration varies between a few days and several months. Based on LFIP, Article 57(2), detention for the purpose of removal (“removal detention”) may be ordered to those who, among other reasons, have breached the rules of exit from Turkey. Even during a procedure for international protection, a person may be detained – or kept in detention if removal detention was previously ordered – under LFIP, Article 68. In general, non-European migrants are routinely subject to arbitrary detention in Turkey without legal basis. Namely, persons who are apprehended outside their designated province (see §§ 13 and 16) are at risk of being detained.[44] Based on LFIP, Article 57(3), the maximum duration of the removal detention is six months, yet it may be extended for a maximum of six more months.[45] However, there were cases reported to the Interveners, wherein detainees were released after the maximum duration had been exceeded but were arrested again afterwards.[46]
  3. Furthermore, the Interveners’ members, on several occasions, have received reports of substandard detention conditions in Turkey[47] for pushback survivors, which have even amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Although improvements have been made compared to conditions around 2015,[48] inhuman and degrading conditions still persist today, in particular overcrowding,[49] short periods of daily access to the outdoors,[50] lack of privacy due to detention in mass cells, insufficient food supply with, at times, only two meals a day, insufficient access to clean drinking water, and insufficient medical care.[51]
  4. In addition, accessing legal counsel or representation for people in detention is particularly difficult, even though a Legal Aid System has been implemented step by step in different cities, after the Istanbul Bar Association started these activities in 2014. First, the PPMM is not obliged to inform any legal representative about asylum seekers detained. In addition, detainees usually cannot contact a lawyer, a legal NGO, or the regional bar association from inside the detention centre. Therefore, they have to rely on family, friends, or UNHCR to initiate the contact. Second, the contact between asylum seekers in detention and their legal representation is complicated for practical reasons: While the file has to be consulted at the PPMM, the asylum seeker is held in a remote detention centre where a lawyer has to go and visit their clients. However, before the file can be accessed, a lawyer needs to get a notarized Power of Attorney (POA). Therefore, for one, an employee of a notary needs to accompany a lawyer to a detention centre to get the POA certified. This notarization comes with additional fees. For two, in order for a notary to certify a signature, the asylum seeker in question is required to have a valid “kimlik” or a passport. As survivors of pushbacks get their “kimlik” cancelled and often are deprived of all their belongings during a pushback, in these cases, it is close to impossible to sign a notarized POA. While courts in Turkey have started to accept more informal POAs, the PPMM insists on the certification through a notary. In effect, a lawyer can file an appeal against a deportation order with an informal POA, but will not be granted access to the PPMM file of the client. Third, translation inside detention centres is only allowed through formal interpreters. Therefore, a lawyer cannot be accompanied by friends or family members to facilitate communication with an existing or prospective client. Phone translation is also not possible. Certified interpreters, however, request a fee for their service, for which the detainee or a support network outside detention have to provide. Finally, despite “the increase in the number of lawyers handling cases in removal centres (from 4,187 in 2019 to 7,168 in 2020), access to legal counselling remained low, considering hundreds of thousands of migrants apprehended and placed in removal centres”.[52] Moreover, the Interveners’ members are aware of the systematic and unlawful practice of pressuring detainees to sign forms with which they agree to their “voluntary return” (see §§ 24-26). Apart from this, there have been further reports of ill-treatment, including torture, against detainees by staff. For example, in June 2018, in Antalya, a Syrian national was tortured by officers, transferred to Gaziantep, and continued to suffer physical violence throughout the transfer.[53] Upon an investigation of a suicide case in Gaziantep Oğuzeli Removal Centre in 2019, Gaziantep Governorate’s Commission for Investigation and Evaluation of Human Rights Violations stated that there have been several suicide attempts in the removal centre.[54] Furthermore, on 23 June 2021, a Syrian national – based on a statement of the responsible Governor – set himself on fire and died at Izmir Harmandalı Removal Centre.[55]

C. Insufficient Protection from Refoulement in Turkey

  • In practice, non-European migrants are routinely removed from Turkey or pressured to sign the consent form for a “voluntary return”. Of most relevance for survivors of pushbacks is the regulation under LFIP, Article 54(1)(h), which states that any person who has left Turkey irregularly shall be subject to deportation. Therefore, refugees who have fled Turkey and experienced pushback operations are potentially at risk of deportation upon return because of leaving Turkey irregularly.[56]
  • In recent years, and particularly as of July and August 2019, after the regional elections in Turkey, the scale of illegal expulsions from Turkey to Syria – which constitute refoulement – have increased dramatically.[57] In this regard, it can be observed that Syrian nationals are increasingly pushed, respectively forced to sign declarations for “voluntary return”[58] – a practice that recently has been acknowledged also by the ECtHR.[59] In Akkad v. Turkey,the Court had to decide on the case of a young Syrian national, who was initially granted TPS in Turkey. He was apprehended near the Turkish-Greek land border when travelling with a group of people allegedly trying to enter into Greek territory in June 2018. Subsequently, the Applicant was detained, transferred to the Turkish-Syrian border, and – after he was coerced to sign a preprinted “voluntary return” form – deported to Syria. Here the Court came to the conclusion that Turkey, by its actions, knowingly had exposed the Applicant to a “real risk” of being subjected to treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.[60] In this regard, it should be noted that there are reports of Syrian deportees and returnees – from Turkey and from other neighbouring countries – who were arrested or forcibly disappeared after their return to Syria.[61] In October 2019, Human Rights Watch reported that Turkish authorities in Istanbul and Antakya had arbitrarily detained and deported Syrians to northern Syria, despite active hostilities in the region.[62] These deportations should be read in conjunction with the Turkish authorities’ publicly-stated objective, reported by the European Asylum Support Office: to create “safe zones” in Syria in which to return refugees.[63]
  • The practice of forced “voluntary return” was still widespread during the time period relevant for the aforementioned applications. For example, the İzmir Bar reported that people detained in removal centres have been systematically forced to sign “voluntary repatriation papers”. The people affected are not informed[64] about their legal rights and not allowed to access legal aid.[65] In Hatay, there have been allegations of violence, handcuffing, and pressure to apply for “voluntary return” by guards.[66] Lawyers have also suggested that poor detention conditions in Removal Centres are likely used as a tool to pressure migrants into “voluntary return”.[67] To the knowledge of the Interveners, this practice is still happening today.[68]
  • Furthermore, the practice of forced “voluntary return” is also directed towards non-Syrian nationals, e.g. Afghans.[69] The Human Rights Association has announced that the Afghan refugees are subjected to torture and pressure in the Harmandalı (İzmir) Removal Centre.[70] The Interveners received reports about mass deportations of Afghan citizens to Iran and were told that, in autumn 2021, approximately 30,000 Afghan nationals were being held in removal detention in Turkey.[71]
  • In practice, most non-Syrian nationals never register for a residence permit in Turkey due to the several legislative shortcomings and practical obstacles set out above. Whoever does register – Syrians and non-Syrians alike – are often forced by the socioeconomic reality to move from their allocated city to economic centres – most often Istanbul.[72] Those unable to register for any kind of status are, de facto if not de jure, potentially subject to refoulement.

D. Inadequate Reception Conditions in Turkey

  • While those who manage to obtain a “kimlik” have the right to education and health care and the right to request a work permit[73] in Turkey, in practice, it is extremely difficult to actually exercise these rights. For example, according to the European Commission, “768,839 children with some kind of protection status were enrolled in formal education in Turkey by December 2020. However, more than 400,000 schoolaged refugee children were still out-of-school and did not have any access to education opportunities”.[74] Furthermore, although there are around 3.5 million Syrians registered in Turkey, only 60,000 Syrians have a work permit.[75] Conversely, the vast majority of migrants in Turkey work in the informal labour market,[76] and, thus, are subjected to exploitative labour conditions. Notably, the Interveners have received reports about migrants under the age of 18 being subjected to child labour.[77]
  • There is a broad consensus – both in the ECtHR and at international and European level – that asylum seekers are a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population in need of special protection and that states have a positive obligation to provide material support and accommodation to asylum seekers.[78] However, minors, women, survivors of torture and violence, and LGBTIQ+ people have special reception needs because of their specific additional vulnerabilities which ought to be addressed. Nevertheless, in Turkey, there is a clear lack of such special reception conditions. Gender-based violence against refugee women, for example, persists as a risk.[79]At the same time, survivors of gender-based violence in Turkey face serious challenges, in particular discrimination and language barriers when they approach protection services.[80] Moreover, the capacity of women’s shelters in Turkey is quite low,[81] and receiving access is particularly difficult for refugee women.[82] At the same time, there are no shelters for LGBTIQ+ people, who – according to the domestic law in Turkey – are not even recognised as a vulnerable group.[83] Not least from such systematic shortcomings towards specific groups of refugees stems the Respondents State’s obligation to carefully examine the individual situation of every applicant before returning them to Turkey.
  • Finally, enforced destitution itself constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Those denied access to a residence permit – including through means of international protection – are denied shelter, food, and access to education, and are simultaneously excluded from the right to work and state support. In addition, based on the many reports on how pushbacks are executed the people affected are, in most cases, deprived of all their material belongings, including money, phones, and identification documents.[84] This deprivation further exacerbates the destitution pushback survivors face upon return to Turkey. While in detention, the people affected are provided with shelter and minimal food, and after being released from the detention centre, there is no State assistance offered by the Turkish government.[85] Read in conjunction with the Court’s most recent case law, it needs to be taken into account that the people affected – before being exposed to complete destituton – had already had been in an extremely vulnerable situation: they had been subjected to a violent pushback, and some may even have lost relatives or friends during the pushback. Therefore, they had undoubtedly been in a situation of extreme stress and most likely had already experienced feelings of intense pain and grief.[86]
  • Taken together, survivors of pushbacks face a situation of complete disregard of their human dignity upon return to Turkey. As a result, there are reasons for believing that the removal or return from Greece to Turkey will expose a person to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

E. Racist Violence, Hate Speech & Increasing Risk of Physical Attacks

  • Over the last years, violent attacks targeting migrants have been increasing in Turkey.[87] This violence can also be observed by following the increasing hate speech on social media platforms which remain unsanctioned.[88] Moreover, in Annex 1, the Interveners submit a nonexhaustive list of attacks and statements of politicians since the end of 2016. The general escalation of racist sentiments should be read in conjunction with this inflammatory political rhetoric targeting refugees and migrants and the severe deterioration of the economic situation in Turkey.[89]
  • Under the scope of Article 2 of the ECHR, the Contracting States have a positive obligation to protect human life.[90] Given the extent of hate speech and physical attacks against migrants in Turkey, the Respondent State needs to take into account that a person fleeing from Turkey might be fleeing from racist violence and also assume that any person returned to Turkey may become an (arbitrary) target of a physical attack. Also from these circumstances, it follows that the Greek authorities are obliged to examine all applications individually.
  • Related to the preceding § 18, it is worth mentioning the violent attacks in Altındağ (Ankara) in 2021. A fight between Syrian and local youngsters triggered the attack of shops and homes belonging to Syrian refugees.[91] Following these events, the Turkish government started a so-called “dilution project”[92] to limit the refugee population to 25% of the total population in every neighbourhood: “Since May 2022, it is against the law for any region or area in Turkey to have a population of foreign nationals that is more than one-quarter of the total population”.[93] Refugees are “encouraged” to relocate to other neighbourhoods which have refugee populations lower than 25%, and it is reported that some refugees could not register their addresses due to this population limitation.[94]

III. CITIZENS OF TURKEY

  • It is well known that since the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, political criticism in Turkey has been heavily persecuted. However, the limited independence of the judiciary and widespread politically motivated criminal charges have always been problems in Turkey. Nevertheless, together with the State of Emergency (“SoE”), the situation has further deteriorated.[95] Due to the recent developments, international legal organisations felt the urge to establish the International Fair Trial Day, and within their initial statement, they underlined the systematic violations of the fair trial principles in Turkey.[96]
  • There is also the risk of severe torture in Turkey. For instance, the People’s Law Office (HHB) reported on Ayten Öztürk who was arrested in Beirut on 9 March 2018, extradited to Turkey on 13 March 2018, and was subsequently held in unofficial detention for 6 months until 28 August 2018. She was subjected to severe torture in Turkey.[97] In recent years, there are several judgments from different countries where the local courts decided in favor of non-extradition due to the severe risk of torture in Turkey.[98]
  • A joint report of Turkey-based human rights organizations, which covers 2019 and the first half of 2020, emphasizes that torture is not limited to police headquarters or demonstrations, but is a common practice in prisons.[99] There are a significant number of reports from other NGOs and rights organisations that support these findings.[100] In addition, it was reported that 45 pushback survivors were severely tortured by the Turkish soldiers upon their return. ÖHD, one of the interveners, lodged a criminal complaint; however, the case file was closed by the prosecutor’s office.[101]
  • Citizens of Turkey with criminal charges who are pushed back to Turkey face serious risk of immediate arrest, detention, and torture

IV. LACK OF INFORMATION

  • The Interveners come to the conclusion that, given the overall circumstances in Turkey, an individual examination of each claim is required to comply with the Respondent State’s obligations under the Convention, namely Article 3. Conversely, if a person – either a citizen of Turkey or a third country national – tries to obtain asylum in Greece, but is prevented from entering or staying in the country, and is therefore stopped from lodging claims for asylum, this denial would expose this person to a risk of ill-treatment and – if a third country national is concerned – even chain-refoulement to their country of origin. If, at the same time, the Greek authorities fail to provide the person who tries to obtain asylum in Greece with any relevant information about the Greek asylum procedures – and access to domestic remedies in Greece is not made available – this constitutes a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.[102]

V. CONCLUSION

  • Considering the overall reception conditions in Turkey, the Interveners come to the conclusion that the Respondent State – from the moment a person enters Greek territory, both by land and sea – is obliged to conduct an in-depth analysis of the individual risks an asylum seeker faces in Turkey. There is reason to believe that the removal or return of an asylum seeker to Turkey would expose this person to treatment contrary to Article 3 due to restricted access to the asylum system in Turkey, which offers only, if at all, insufficient protection; the catastrophic social economic conditions to which migrants are subjected; and the widespread risk of racist violence. Where the Respondent State fails to conduct such an investigation, and even deprives the asylum seeker of the chance to present their claims, by pushing them back illegally, therefore violates its obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.

Finally, the Interveners are grateful for getting the opportunity to intervene in the aforementioned applications and hope to have assisted the Court with the explanations submitted.

Yours sincerely,

Melanie Aebli (on behalf of the Interveners)

Attorney at law

Annex:                           

  1) List of attacks and statements of politicians since the end of 2016

(not submitted by fax)   

2) European Commission, Turkey Report 2021 (see fn. 11)

3) ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ 2021 (see fn. 13)

4) ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ 2019 (fn. 16)

5) Expert Opinion issued by Stiftung ProAsyl (fn. 28)

6) Global Detention Project, Immigration Detention in Turkey (fn. 47)

7) Domestic Law of Turkey: Law on Foreigners and International                                Protection

8) Domestic Law of Turkey: Implementation Regulation for the Law on Foreigners and International Protection            

9) Domestic Law of Turkey: Temporary Protection Regulation

[1] See Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 124-125, ECtHR 2008.

[2] See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, §§ 70-82, ECHR 2012.

[3] In Ilias and Ahemd v. Hungary the Court stated: “it is the duty of the removing State to examine thoroughly the question whether or not there is a real risk of the asylum seeker being denied access, in the receiving third country, to an adequate asylum procedure, protecting him or her against refoulement. If it is established that the existing guarantees in this regard are insufficient, Article 3 implies a duty that the asylum seekers should not be removed to the third country concerned”, Ilias and Ahemd v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 134, Judgement of 21 November 2019.

[4] See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, §§ 342, 343 and 362-68, with the references therein, ECHR 2011.

[5] See Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, § 105, ECHR 2014.

[6] Council of Europe/ECtHR Research Division, ‘Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13, The concept of a “Safe Third Country” in the case-law of the Court’, § 2, 9 February 2018.

[7] Ibid. § 4.

[8] Ilias and Ahemd v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 139, Judgement of 21 November 2019.

[9] Ibid. § 141.

[10] See F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, § 126, ECHR 2016.

[11] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, Doc. Nr. SWD(2021) 290 final/2, 19 October 2021, p. 48, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en (in the Annex).

[12] Ibid., p. 49.

[13] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Türkiye’, published in the Asylum Information Database (AIDA), 2021 Update, p. 20, available at: https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/AIDA-TR_2021update.pdf (in the Annex).

[14] In addition to the permits listed, Turkey offers a Short Term Residence Permit (Articles 31-33 LFIP, and Articles 28 and 29 of the Regulation for Implementation of the LFIP [Implementation Regulations]), a Family Residence Permit (Articles 34-37 LFIP, and Articles 30-34 Implementation Regulations), a Student Residence Permit (Articles 38-41 LFIP, and Articles 35-39 Implementation Regulations), a Long Term Residence Permit (Articles 42-45 LFIP, and Articles 40-43 Implementation Regulations), a Humanitarian Residence Permit (Articles 46 and 47 LFIP, and, Article 44 Implementation Regulations), and a Residence Permit For Victims of Human Trafficking (Articles 48 and 49 LFIP, and Articles 45 and 46 Implementation Regulations). However, these types of residence permits are not of practical relevance in the context discussed here.

[15] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 45.

[16] The legal basis of the 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) is Article 91 LFIP. As a piece of secondary legislation, the TPR must be compliant and consistent with the general normative framework laid down by the LFIP itself. See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’, published in the Asylum Information Database (AIDA), 2019 Update, p. 120, available at: https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/report-download _aida_tr_2019update.pdf (in the Annex).

[17] Temporary Article 1 TPR indicates that Syrian nationals, stateless persons and refugees who came to or crossed Turkey’s borders from Syria due to the events that took place in Syria since April 2011 are taken under “temporary protection”.

[18] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 78.

[19] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 120.

[20] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey Stops Registering Syrian Asylum Seekers’, 16 July 2018, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/turkey-stops-registering-syrian-asylum-seekers.

[21] Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (“PDMM”), today Provincial Presidency of Migration Management (“PPMM”).

[22] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 50.

[23] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[24] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 89.

[25] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey Stops Registering Syrian Asylum Seekers’, fn. 20.

[26] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 70-71, and also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 91-92.

[27] In the file of a person who loses their “kimlik” based on attempting to leave, or leaving Turkey illegally, the code V78 will be registered. This code indicates that no new “kimlik” can be issued. Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[28] For specific information regarding citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan, Chechens, Daghestanis and Tajiks, Somali people and Iranians see ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 79-81; for specific information on citizens of Afghanistan also see Expert Opinion issued by Stiftung ProAsyl, ‘The Situation of Afghan Refugees in Turkey’, March 2021, available at: https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/PA_Expert-Opinion_The-Situation-of-Afghan-Refugees-in-Turkey.pdf (in the Annex).

[29] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[30] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 90.

[31] See ibid, p. 89.

[32] See ibid, p. 91.

[33] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 49.

[34] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[35] For specific information on citizens of Afghanistan see Expert Opinion issued by Stiftung ProAsyl, fn. 28.

[36] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[37] See fn. 21.

[38] See AIDA & ECRE, ‘Registration under Temporary Protection – Turkey’, 30 November 2020, available at: https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/registration-under-temporary-protection.

[39] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 45-46.

[40] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[41] See AIDA & ECRE, fn. 38.

[42] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 17-18.

[43] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 115.

[44] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 87-89, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 117-118.

[45] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 87.

[46] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[47] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also Global Detention Project, ‘Country Report, Immigration Detention in Turkey’, October 2021, available at: https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/immigration-detention-in-turkey -trapped-at-the-crossroad-between-asia-and-europe#:~:text=Numerous%20observers%20have%20reported%20poor,detainees%20access%20to%20legal%20assistance (in the Annex).

[48] See Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), ‘Report to the Turkish Government

on the visit to Turkey carried out by the (CPT) from 16 to 23 June 2015, CPT/Inf (2017) 32, available at: https://rm.coe.int/pdf/ 168075ec0a; this Report was summarised by the Stockholm Centre for Freedom, ‘CPT report highlights problems in Turkey’s immigration detention centers’, 18 October 2017, available at: https://stockholmcf.org/cpt-report-highlights-problems-in-turkeys- immigration-detention-centers/; furthermore, as mentioned in the ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 97, a series of judgments from the Constitutional Court have highlighted the need to provide adequate detention conditions in Turkey.

[49] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[50] For example, clients have reported that access to an outdoor yard was granted in groups, leaving them individually with 10 minutes yard time in the morning and 10 minutes in the evening.

[51] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[52] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11 p. 49.

[53] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 101; see also Global Detention Project, ‘Country Report, Immigration Detention in Turkey’, fn. 47, p. 50.

[54] See Türkiye İnsan Hakları ve Eşitlik Kurumu, Gazi̇antep Geri̇ Gönderme Merkezi̇ Zi̇yareti̇ Raporu (Rapor No: 2019/ 05), February 2019, p. 5, available at: https://www.tihek.gov.tr/upload/file_editor/2019/07/1562585466.pdf; see also sendika.org, ‘HDP’li Toğrul, Antep Geri Gönderme Merkezi’ndeki intihar iddialarını Meclis’e taşıdı’, 3 August 2019, available at: https://sendika.org/2019/08/hdpli-togrul-antep-geri-gonderme-merkezindeki-intihar-iddialarini-meclise-tasidi-556817/.

[55] Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘24 June 2021, Daily Report on Human Rights Violations’, available at: https://en.tihv.org.tr/documentation/24-june-2021-hrft-documentation-center-daily-human-rights-report/ i; critical about the detailed statement of the Governor see Statement of the Izmir Bar Association, issued on 6 August 2021, available at: https://www.izmirbarosu. org.tr/HaberDetay/2370/harmandali-geri-gonderme-merkezi-nde-yasamini-yitiren-suriyeli-multeci-ahmed-maslem-anildi.

[56] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[57] See Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘Dangerous Ground: Syrian refugees face an uncertain future’, 2018, available at: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/dangerous-ground—syrias-refugees-face-an-uncertain-future/dangerous-ground—syrian-refugees-face-an-uncertain-future.pdf; Amnesty International, ‘Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian Refugees’, 2019, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4411022019ENGLISH.pdf; Jesse Marks, ‘Pushing Syrian Refugees to Return’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 March 2018, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75684; Refugees International, ‘Insecure future: Deportations and Lack of Legal Work for Refugees in Turkey’, 19 September 2019, available at: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/9/18/insecure-future-deportations-and-lack-of-legal-work-for-refugees-in-turkey.

[58] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also Stockholm Centre for Freedom, ‘Syrian journalist in Turkey forced to sign repatriation document for ‘banana’ video protesting discrimination’, 4 November 2021, available at: https://stockholmcf.org/syrian-journalist-in-turkey-forced-to-sign-repatriation-document-for-banana-video-protesting-discrimination/.

[59] See Akkad v. Turkey, no. 1557/19, Judgement of 21 July 2022.

[60] See ibid., § 75.

[61] See ibid., § 11; see also Syrian Network for Human Rights, ‘The Syrian Regime Continues to Pose a Violent Barbaric Threat and Syrian Refugees Should Never Return to Syria’, 15 August 2019, available at: https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/The_Syrian_regime_ continues_to_pose_a_severe_barbaric_threat_and_Syrian_refugees_should_never_return_to_Syria_en.pdf.

[62] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Syrians Being Deported to Danger’, 24 October 2019, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/24/turkey-syrians-being-deported-danger.

[63] See EASO (today EUAA) Country Guidance: Syria, September 2020, p. 44, available at: https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Syria_2020.pdf.

[64] In connection with insufficient information, the Court, in the case Akkad v. Turkey (fn. 59), identified a violation of Article 13 ECHR.

[65] See İzmir Bar, ‘Final Report of Removal Centres and Administrative Detention from Lawyers’ Sights Workshop’, June 2019, available at: https://www.izmirbarosu.org.tr/Upload/files/geri_gonderme_rapor.pdf.

[66] See Dev Haber, ‘Antep Geri Gönderme Merkezin’de mülteciler ters kelepçeleniyor’, 25 December 2017, available at: http://bit.ly/2ETCOwC.

[67] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2019), fn. 16, p. 101.

[68] For an incident of possible summary return, including physical attacks on lawyers, see: gazeteduvar.com.tr, ‘İzmir Harmandalı GGM’de neler oluyor? Çok sayıda itfaiye ve sağlık ekibi sevk edildi, avukatlar içeri alınmadı’, 24 June 2022, available at: https://www.gazeteduvar. com.tr/izmir-harmandali-ggmde-neler-oluyor-cok-sayida-itfaiye-ve-saglik-ekibi-sevk-edildi-avukatlar-iceri-alinmadi-haber-1570795.

[69] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also a statement of the İzmir Bar Association reported on by biant.org: ‘Refugees from Afghanistan handed over to Taliban by force’, 19 April 2022, available at: https://m.bianet.org/english/migration/260665-turkey-refugees-from-afghanistan-handed-over-to-taliban-by-force.

[70] Announcement of the Human Rights Association reported on by bianet.org: ‘Afghans in İzmir forced to sign “voluntary return papers”’, 22 Apirl 2022, available at: https://m.bianet.org/english/migration/260844-afghans-in-izmir-forced -to-sign-voluntary-return-papers.

[71] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Applying for a work permit is a burdensome, costly procedure, and the responsibility of the employer, and it must be shown that the job cannot be done by a Turkish citizen in order for a permit to be granted. Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[74] European Commission, Turkey Report 2021, fn. 11, p. 17.

[75] IInformation provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also Centre for Global Development, ‘A new policy to better integrate refugees into host-country labor markets’, 22 November 2019, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/new-policy-better-integrate-refugees-host-country-labor-markets.

[76] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners; see also Refugees International, ‘“I am only looking for my rights” Legal employment still inaccessible for refugees in Turkey’, December 2017, available at: https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/ri_report_employmentturkey.pdf.

[77] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[78] See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 250, ECHR 2011.

[79] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 109.

[80] See diken.com.tr, ‘Alo 183’ten şiddet mağduru için yanıt: Ama o kadın değil ki mülteci bayan’, 2 April 2016, available at:

https://www.diken.com.tr/alo-183ten-siddet-magduru-icin-yanit-ama-o-kadin-degil-ki-multeci-bayan/.

[81] Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği, ‘Mülteci̇ Kadinlarin Durumuna İli̇şki̇n Bi̇r Değerlendi̇rme:”Hem Mülteci̇ Hem Kadin: Mülteci̇ Kadinlar Ne Yaşiyor? Ne Yapmali?”’, 9 March 2018, available at: https://multeci.org.tr/2018/03/09/multeci-kadinlarin-durumuna-iliskin- bir-degerlendirmehem-multeci-hem-kadin-multeci-kadinlar-ne-yasiyor-ne-yapmali/.

[82] See GOAL Global, ‘Protection Monitoring Report on Syrian Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Communities in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Adana and Mersin’, 31 August 2021, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/protection-monitoring-report-syrian-nomadic-and-semi- nomadic-communities-gaziantep-0.

[83] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 111; see also Hayriye KARA & Damla ÇALIK, ‘Waiting to be “Safe and Sound”: Turkey as a LGBTI Refugees’ Way Station’, July 2016, available at: https://kaosgldernegi.org/images/library/2016multeci-raporu2016.pdf.

[84] See Border Violence Monitoring Network, ‘The Black Book of Pushbacks – Volumes I & II’, December 2020, available at: https://left.eu/issues/publications/black-book-of-pushbacks-volumes-i-ii/; see also platform on mapping ‘Drift-backs’ in the Aegean Sea, launched by Forensic Architecture in July 2022, available at: https://aegean.forensic-architecture.org/.

[85] İzmir Bar, 2019, “Avukatların Gözünden Geri Gönderme Merkezleri ve İdari Gözetim Alanları Çalıştayı Raporu” available at: https://www.izmirbarosu.org.tr/Upload/files/geri_gonderme_rapor.pdf.

[86] See Safi and Others v. Greece, no. 5418/15, § 196, Judgement of 7 July 2022.

[87] See Amnesty International, ‘Country Report Turkey’. 2021, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and- central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/, see also ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 83.

[88] See ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 83.

[89] Information provided by Asylum Lawyers who are members of the Interveners.

[90] See Osman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 23452/94, § 115, Reports 1998-VIII; and Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia, no. 46598/06, § 50, Judgement of 15 January 2009.

[91] See, for example, swissinfo.ch, Syrian properties in Ankara attacked after youth killed, 12 August 2021, available at: https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/syrian-properties-in-ankara-attacked-after-youth-killed/46862556; and observers.france24.com, ‘’A nightmarish night’: Syrian neighbourhood in Ankara attacked after deadly fight’, 13 August 2021, available at: https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210818-syrian-neighbourhood-ankara-turkey-attacked.

[92] See BirGün, ‘’Seyreltme’ projesinin detayları: 16 il Suriyelilere kapatıldı’, 22. February 2022, available at: https://www.birgun.net/haber/seyreltme-projesinin-detaylari-16-il-suriyelilere-kapatildi-378070

[93] ECRE, ‘Country Report: Turkey’ (2021), fn. 13, p. 83.

[94] See al-monitor.com, ‘Turkey’s quota plan for refugees alarms rights activists’, 23 February 2022, available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/turkeys-quota-plan-refugees-alarms-rights-activists.

[95] See Şerife Ceren Uysal, ‘Power Politics versus the Rule of Law in Turkey: A Case Study’, in: The Rule of Law in Retreat: Challenges to Justice in the United Nations World, ed. Slawomir Redo, London, Lexington Books, 2022, p. 128.

[96] See the statement of the International Fair Trial Day and the Ebru Timtik Award, ELDH, AED and others, 23 February 2021, available at: https://eldh.eu/2021/02/international-fair-trial-day-and-the-ebru-timtik-award-hold-the-date- 14-june-2021/; and the joint statement of the initial International Fair Trial Day and the Ebru Timtik Award, ELDH, AED and others, 14 June 2021,available at: https://eldh.eu/2021/06/joint-statement-international-fair-trial-day-14-june-2021/.

[97] See İşkence Raporu, ‘Lübnan’dan Türkiye’ye iade edilen Ayten Öztürk’e gözaltında ağır işkence’, 30 August 2018, available at: https://iskenceraporu.com/ayten-ozturke-gozaltinda-agir-iskence/

[98] See Kronos 35, ‘İsveç’te Yüksek Mahkeme öğretmenin Türkiye’ye iade talebini reddetti’, 16 July 2022, available at: https://kronos35.news/tr/isvecte-yuksek-mahkeme-ogretmenin-turkiyeye-iadesini-durdurdu/, Uluslararası Af Örgütü (Amnesty Turkey), ‘Malezya: Türkiye’ye iade, gönderilen üç kişi için işkence riski taşıyor’, 12 May 2017, available at: https://www.amnesty.org.tr/icerik/malezya-turkiyeye-iade-gonderilen-uc-kisi-icin-iskence-riski-tasiyor.

[99] See Human Rights Association & and others, ‘Türkiye’de Değişik Boyutlarıyla İşkence Gerçeği’, p. 83, available at: https://hakinisiyatifi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/26-Haziran-2020-Ortak-Bas%C4%B1n-Ac%CC%A7%C4%B1klamas%C4%B1-Eki-Veriler.pdf.

[100] See, for example, Freedom From Torture, ‘Torture in Turkey: past, present and future?’, April 2017, available at: https://www.freedomfromtorture. org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Turkey%20briefing%20FINAL%20170410.pdf; Human Rights Association, ‘ İHD 2019 Report On Human Rights Violations In Turkey’, May 2020, available at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/i_hd_2019_violations_report_and_summary_table-2.pdf; Stockholm Centre For Freedom, ‘Council of Europe’s CPT confirms continued ill-treatment and torture in Turkey’, 5 August 2020, available at: https://stockholmcf.org/council-of-europes-cpt-confirms-continued-ill-treatment-and-torture-in-turkey/.

[101] See evrensel.net, ‘İHD ve Meriç nehrine atılan mültecilerin yakınlarından yetkililere çağrı: Kayıplar bulunsun’, 21 September 2021, available at: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/443210/ihd-ve-meric-nehrine-atilan- multecilerin-yakinlarindan-yetkililere-cagri-kayiplar-bulunsun; gazeteduvar.com.tr, ‘Meriç Nehri’ne atılan mülteciler: Dosyada iki aydır ilerleme yok’, 28 October 2021, available at: https://www.gazeteduvar. com.tr/meric-nehrine-atilan- multeciler-dosyada-iki-aydir-ilerleme-yok-haber-1539868; evrensel.net, ‘Meriç’e atılan sığınmacıların dosyası kapatıldı’, 16 February 2022, available at: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/455202/merice-atilan-siginmacilarin-dosyasi-kapatildi.

[102] See Kebe and Others v. Ukraine, no. 12552/12, Judgement of 12 January 2017.

Posted on

Massive Espionage on seven Spanish Lawyers using the Pegasus programme

TO THE OBSERVATOIRE INTERNATIONAL DES AVOCATS EN DANGER (OIAD)

INFORMATION ON MASSIVE ESPIONAGE PERPETRATED ON SEVEN SPANISH LAWYERS USING THE PEGASUS PROGRAM

The indiscriminate ‘hacking’ using the PEGASUS spy program that was carried out on pro-independence politicians, has also affected seven lawyers: Gonzalo Boye Tusset, Josep Costa, Jaume Alonso Cuevillas, Andreu Van den Eyden, Joaquim Jubert, Josep Rius and Jordi Domingo, the first one from the Madrid Bar Assotiation (ICAM) and the remaining six from the Bacelona Bar Assotiation (ICAB). This is confirmed ny the information received through the media, and the judicial investigations that are being carried out in a Barcelona court.

The right to defence, the duty of confidentiality between lawyer and client and, ultimately, professional secrecy, are fundamental pillars not only of our profession, but also of the right to effective judicial protection as a guarantee of the rule of law.

The right to defence of our clients and the right to a trial with all the guarantees depend on the duty of secrecy, confidentiality and, ultimately, professional secrecy. Not in vain has it been defined as a right (of the client) and a duty (of the lawyer), and for this reason it is part of our commitment as lawyers to preserve it and guarantee its integrity against any external interference.

The Spanish Supreme Court has already indicated in its ruling 78/2012, of February 9, 2012 (Garzón case), the following:

“ Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution, provides together with other rights that, although different and independent from each other, constituting a battery of

guarantees aimed at ensuring the real effectiveness of one of them: the right to a trial with guarantees, to a fair trial , in terms of the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights]; ultimately, to a fair trial . So that the legitimate claim of the State regarding the prosecution and punishment of criminal behavior should only be satisfied within the limits imposed on the exercise of power by the rights that correspond to citizens in a rule of law. Nobody seriously disputes in this framework that the search for the truth, even supposing that it is reached, does not justify the use of any means. Justice obtained at any price ends up not being Justice.

The confidentiality of the relationship between the accused and his defence lawyer, which naturally must be governed by trust, is an essential element (ECHR Castravet v. Moldova, March 13, 2007, p. 49; and ECHR Foxley v. United Kingdom , of June 20, 2000, page 43) In the ECHR of October 5, 2006, case Viola against Italy (61), it was stated that “…the right, for the accused, to communicate with his lawyer without being heard by third parties is among the elementary requirements of the fair trial in a democratic society and derives from article 6.3 c) of the Convention. If a lawyer could not meet with his client without such surveillance and receive confidential instructions from him, his assistance would lose much of its usefulness (Judgment S. against Switzerland of November 2, 1991, series A no. 220, pg. 16, app. 48)”.

The events that we are hearing about through the media are especially serious, and require clear explanations about the perpetrators of these acts of espionage, by whom or by whom they were authorized, and whether there has been any type of judicial authorization , or whether this espionage has occurred without any type of control and in a massive and indiscriminate manner.

In this context, the Barcelona Bar Association (ICAB) and the Council of Catalan Bars (CICAC) have issued a joint statement at the end of which they denounced the use of Pegasus against lawyers and requested explanations from the Spanish Government on what could be a serious violation of fundamental rights, the rights of defence and professional secrecy, compromising the rule of law and the peaceful coexistence of society in Spain.

On the other hand, the Madrid Bar Association (ICAM) has not yet reacted and the General Council of Spanish Lawyers (CGAE) only reacted on April 29, 2022, following the request addressed to it to this effect by the Free Lawyers Association (Asociación Libre de Abogadas y Abogados – ALA), in consideration of the seriousness of these acts of espionage against the aforementioned lawyers.

For this reason, and because these are serious facts that directly attack our profession, the right of defence as a fundamental aspect in the functioning of justice and the effective development of the right to a trial with all the

guarantees, we request the Observatoire International des Avocats en Danger (OIAD) to demand all the explanations from the Spanish Government and uncover all the responsibilities regarding these events, acting in defence of this group of lawyers, and to issue a press release to denounce this attack on the rights of the defence, on professional secrecy, as well as on private life; and also afford your protection to these lawyers against future interference in the exercise of their professional activity. You must give your unequivocal support for the Catalan and Madrid lawyers who were victims of the espionage perpetrated by means of the Pegasus software by the Spanish authorities.

Naples, 30th of June 2022

Posted on

Free the Gezi defendants!

Another striking example of the absence of an independent judiciary in Turkey:

The verdict of the Gezi Trial was handed down on 25 April 2022. This trial has been ongoing for years and is one of the most striking examples of the absence of an independent judiciary in Turkey.

The Istanbul 13th Assize Court found Osman Kavala guilty of an alleged attempt to overthrow the government pursuant to Article 312/1 of the Turkish Penal Code. He is a prominent human rights defender who has been unlawfully imprisoned since November 2017. The court ordered his detention pending an appeal in relation to this conviction, while acquitting him of the charge of espionage, and released him -on paper- for the later charge.

All the other defendants who were present before the court were sentenced to 18 years in prison on the charge of aiding the alleged attempt against the government. They include the lawyer Can Atalay, Mücella Yapıcı, Çiğdem Mater, Hakan Altınay, Mine Özerden, Tayfun Kahraman and Yiğit Ali Ekmekçi. The court went on to adopt a harsh and rarely applied order of the arrest and detention of this group of defendants. They were arrested immediately after the hearing. 

This baseless verdict contradicts the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which found that the allegations against Osman Kavala, and the evidence relied upon by the prosecution and the court lacked proper foundation, and was politically motivated. In December 2019 the ECtHR found a violation of Article 5 and Article 18 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 5, and called for Kavala’s immediate release. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers (CoM) has been seeking to enforce the ECtHR’s judgment, with no success. This resulted in the CoM triggering infringement proceedings against Turkey pursuant to Article 46(4) of the Convention, a proceeding used for the  second time in the history of the CoM . The case is currently pending before the ECtHR for determination of Turkey’s compliance with Article 46(1) of the ECHR namely the obligation to implement the ECtHR’s judgments.

The verdict of the Istanbul 13th Assize Court on 22 April 2022 confirms the ongoing nature of the violations of the rights not only of Osman Kavala but also of other defendants tried under the same case file. It once again confirms the lack of independence and impartiality of the judiciary in Turkey which has been criticised by the international community, particularly since the July 2016 coup attempt and the following 2-year state of emergency period.

These systemic violations of fair trial standards in Turkey were condemned in the statement made on the occasion of the 2021 International Fair Trial Day. Turkey was chosen as the focus country of the Day due to the seriousness of the fair trial issues in Turkey. The verdict of the court on 25 April 2022 shows that Turkey is far from complying with  its human rights obligations. It is yet another example showing that the government of Turkey is determined to continue its practices and policies, undermining and systemically violating fundamental rights and freedoms and increasing the pressure on its critics across the country for the upcoming election.

The Gezi Park Protests of 2013 were peaceful protests according to the international human rights community. According to official statements, around 5 million people participated in the Gezi Park protests which lasted for months across the country.   This peaceful resistance showed the longing of a large segment of society in Turkey for a life in which democratic principles and human rights are respected. It is clear that participating in the Gezi Park Protests is protected by the fundamental rights to freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly, and association.

The Gezi Trial is the reaction of the Turkish government against those who took part in the Gezi Park Protests. The lack of legal grounds for the charges brought against the defendants is confirmed by the dissenting opinion of one of the judges of the 13th Assize Court. He stated that there was no evidence in the case file against the defendants other than unlawfully tapped phone communications. While underlining the unlawful nature of these recordings, the judge also stressed that the content of the conversations did not give enough basis to conclude that the alleged offenses were committed and to convict the defendants.

As the undersigned organisations, we share the frustration expressed by a large segment of society in Turkey against this verdict. We urge the Turkish Government to immediately release all human rights defenders who are illegally detained, including our colleague Can Atalay, and Osman Kavala who has been unlawfully deprived of his liberty for around 4.5 years. We also urge the relevant authorities to drop  all baseless charges, and that this cruel harassment through prosecution, conviction and sentencing that is ongoing against them and many others in Turkey is terminated.

We, the undersigned organisations, repeat the call made on the 14th of June 2021 by a number of prominent lawyers and human rights organisations to the authorities to implement the following steps to ensure full protection of the right to a fair trial and to create an environment enabling effective protection of its underlying principles.  We call on the government of Turkey to:

• take necessary legislative and other measures to ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and end all practices constituting direct interference, pressure, or influence with respect to judicial conduct, including those from the executive;

• implement the recommendation of the numerous human rights oversight mechanisms, including the UN Human Rights Council in  its Universal Periodic Review,  and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, to introduce a constitutional amendment to make the Council of Judges and Prosecutors independent of the executive and ensure that their decisions are open to judicial review;

• immediately end the systematic abuse, detention and prosecution of lawyers, judges, other legal professionals, journalists, human rights defenders, opposition politicians, academics and others where there is no cogent evidence of specific criminal misconduct presented in proceedings that comply with international fair trial standards;

• guarantee and respect the principle of presumption of innocence in all criminal investigations and prosecutions;

• stop any practices preventing enjoyment of the rights protected under international human rights treaties such as freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, including using the exercise of such freedoms as grounds for arbitrary prosecutions and lengthy and punitive pretrial detention;

• ensure that the rights to fair trial embodied in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are respected in all criminal prosecutions in Turkey’s criminal courts at all levels;

• end the practice of mass trials of lawyers, judges, journalists, opposition politicians, human rights defenders and others, in particular on fabricated charges, such as the charge of membership in a terrorist organization, aimed at preventing their legitimate activities and silencing them; and

• create an open dialogue with the international oversight mechanisms and national and international NGOs to address and resolve the structural human rights issues in Turkey and, as a first step, promptly to agree to requests by the UN Special Rapporteur on Judges and Lawyers and other special procedures to conduct country visits to Turkey. We call on the international community to respond effectively to the deteriorating state of human rights and rule of law in Turkey and to increase its efforts to effectively address these issues with international stakeholders for increased awareness and attention.

And finally,

Free the Gezi defendants!

Article 19

Asociación Americana de Juristas

Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD)

Baroness Helena Kennedy QC

Défense Sans Frontières – Avocats Solidaires (DSF-AS)

EuroMed Rights

European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH)

European Bar Federation (FBE)

European Bar Federation Human Rights Committee

European Democratic Lawyers (AED)

Fair Trials

Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers

Giuristi Democratici

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

International Bar Association’s Institute of Human Rights (IBahri)

Osservartorio Avvocati Minacciati – UCPI – Italia

Perugia Bar Association, Italy

Pistoia Bar Association, Italy

Progressive Lawyers‘ Association (ÇHD), Turkey

Republikanischer Anwältinnen- und Anwälteverein e. V. (RAV)

The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)

The European Criminal Bar Association

The European Criminal Bar Association Human Rights Committee

The Law Society of England and Wales

The National Association of Democratic Lawyers of South Africa

The National Bar Council of France

The National Lawyers Guild International (US)

The Norwegian Bar Human Rights Committee

Ukrainian Association of Democratic Lawyers

Posted on

TO THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (CPT)

This communication is addressed to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). We respectfully ask the CPT on the Day of the Lawyers in Turkey, to organize a follow-up visit to İmralı Prison and in particular to examine the government’s refusal to permit lawyers to visit their clients who are under isolation in İmralı Prison.


On 26 May 2021 a petition was published, signed by 768 lawyers, including the members and executives of several bar associations, legal organizations, and human rights organizations, highlighting
this situation.


At present the rights of Abdullah Öcalan, Ömer Hayri Konar, Hamili Yıldırım, and Veysi Aktaş, who are currently held in İmralı F-Type High Security Prison to see their lawyers is unlawfully being restricted.


Applications for lawyer visits have not been granted since 7 August 2019 for Abdullah Öcalan, Veysi Aktaş, Hamili Yıldırım, and Ömer Hayri Konar. They have not been allowed to see their lawyers even once since they were transferred to İmralı Island in 2015.


A special and discriminatory form of isolation has been applied in İmralı Prison since 15 February 1999. The ban on lawyer visits was continued for 8 years without any interruption from 27 July 2011 until 2 May 2019. In 2019, 5 lawyer visits took place. After the last lawyer visit on 7 August 2019, the continuous ban resumed.


Since 1999, the CPT has conducted 10 separate visits to İmralı Prison. This severe state of isolation in İmralı Prison was noted in the CPT’s Report on its visit to Turkey between 6-17 May 2019, which was published on 5 August 2020. While pointing out several violations, the report also stated the following with regard to lawyer and family visits:


“The CPT urges the Turkish authorities to take the necessary steps to ensure that all prisoners at İmralı Prison are effectively able, if they so wish, to receive visits from their relatives and
lawyers. To this end, an end should be put to the practice of imposing a ban on family visits for ‘disciplinary’ reasons. Further, the Committee requests the Turkish authorities to provide – on
a monthly basis – an account of the visits which all prisoners held at İmralı Prison have received from their family members and lawyers” (para. 51).

The situation indicated in the CPT’s report continues to this day, in an aggravated manner. While it had been expected that improvements would be made in İmralı Prison in line with the recommendations outlined in the CPT’s report, the prisoners’ lawyers report that new disciplinary penalties and bans –
the latter were issued by the Execution Judgeship – have been imposed on the prisoners.

Allegations and rumors concerning Abdullah Öcalan’s state of health that were widely published on social media on 14 March 2021 caused serious concerns among the public. Although the prisoners were allowed the opportunity to communicate with their families by phone on 25 March 2021 in the face of these concerns, the conversation between Abdullah Öcalan and his brother was interrupted after 4-5 minutes, while Ömer Hayri Konar and Veysi Aktaş could not talk to their families. Abdullah
Öcalan informed the public that before the connection was completely interrupted, Abdullah Öcalan had clearly expressed his wish to see his lawyers.


The banning of lawyer visits to İmralı Prison openly violates the United Nations (UN) Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), updated in 2015, the CPT’s recommendations and the Execution Law of Turkey (Law no. 5275). States have the obligation to guarantee detainees and convicts’ exercise of their rights without any regard for their identity or the quality of their sentence.

Download the document

Posted on

The Ban of the People’s Democratic Party

The undersigned organisations, active in the field of democracy and human rights protection and promotion, are deeply concerned about the ongoing case before the Constitutional Court in Turkey regarding closure of the opposition party Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). HDP was founded on October 15, 2012 and has since been a vital part of political life in Turkey. Our organisations urge the authorities to uphold the right to political representation in Turkey, and to ensure that any proceedings against political parties and their representatives fully comply with international standards for a fair trial, including the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law and defence rights.

Following HDP’s final round of written and oral defences, the Constitutional Court is expected to announce its decision in the coming months. Should the Constitutional Court endorse the Chief Public Prosecutor’s request and rule in favour of its demand to close the HDP permanently or partially, or to completely deprive it of treasury aid, HDP will cease to exist. Its representatives who are allegedly responsible for the facts that – in the Chief Public Prosecutor’s opinion – would warrant the party’s dissolution will also be banned from political activity for 5 years.

The Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals referred its indictment to the Constitutional Court on June 7, 2021. The indictment requested the dissolution of HDP and banning of 451 party members, including HDP Co-Chairs Mithat Sancar and Pervin Buldan, from politics for 5 years. The words and actions of 69 party members are stated to be the main ground of the demand for closure of the political party. No concrete or reliable evidence attributable to the HDP as an institution was presented in the indictment, and no justification was given for the request for the party’s dissolution, which would violate the right to political representation of over 10% of the voters in the last elections.

Following the preliminary defence presented by the HDP in November 2021, the Chief Public Prosecutor presented its views on the merits to the Constitutional Court, which were notified to the HDP on January 20, 2022. The views on the merits repeat the claims and demands contained in the indictment, without any indication that the Prosecutor’s office took notice of the detailed defence presented by the HDP.

The proceeding takes place against the backdrop of severe democratic and rule of law backsliding in Turkey. Despite constitutional amendments introduced as part of the European Union accession process in the 2000s that made party closures – common in the 1990s – more difficult, the Constitutional Court shut down the Party for a Democratic Society (DTP), a political party preceding the HDP, in 2009. Turkey has been repeatedly condemned in recent years by the European Court of Human Rights for violating the convention. This includes cases regarding the DTP’s closure, HDP and its members, where the Court found the procedures initiated against them to be in violation of the complainants’ rights under the Convention. The Turkish government has consistently failed to comply with ECtHR judgements, which warranted the launch of an infringement procedure against Turkey by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on February 2, 2022.

Repeated statements by ruling party AKP and its ally MHP’s spokespersons, calling for HDP’s closure and for its members to be banned from politics also point to an attempt by the government to undermine the ECtHR’s authority and interfere in proceedings before national courts, including the Constitutional Court, in breach of the principle of judicial independence from other State powers.

Our organisations are deeply concerned about the impact that the Constitutional Court’s decision could have on the defendants’ rights and on political democracy in Turkey. We call on the Constitutional Court to ensure that judicial proceedings take place in full compliance with domestic and international fair trial standards, including the principle of judicial independence and impartiality and the rights of the defence. We also urge the Turkish government to respect the independence and impartiality of the judiciary by refraining from directly or indirectly influencing the Court’s decision, and to uphold the rights to political representation and democratic participation, which are a pre-condition for the respect of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Turkey.

  • Asociación Americana de Juristas (AAJ)
  • Associació Catalana per a la Defensa dels Drets Humans (ACDDH) – Catalonia
  • Asociación Libre de Abogadas y Abogados, (ALA), Madrid
  • Association for Monitoring Equal Rights
  • Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD)
  • Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union (BFAWU)
  • Campaign Against Criminalising Communities (CAMPACC)
  • Center of research and elaboration on democracy/Group for international legal intervention (CRED/GIGI)
  • Civic Space Studies Association
  • Confederation of Lawyers of Asia and the Pacific (COLAP)
  • Coordinamento Italiano Sostegno Donne Afghane (CISDA)
  • Democratic Lawyers Association of Bangladesh (DLAB)
  • Demokratische Juristinnen und Juristen Schweiz (DJS)
  • Eskubideak, Basque Country
  • European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights (ELDH)
  • European Democratic Lawyers (AED-EDL)
  • General Federation of Trade Unions (UK)
  • Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers
  • Human Rights Agenda Association
  • Human Rights Association
  • Human Rights Foundation of Turkey
  • International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI)
  • Italian Democratic Lawyers / Giuristi Democratici
  • International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)
  • International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
  • KulturForum TürkeiDeutschland e.V.
  • Legal Team, Italy
  • Life-Memory-Freedom Association (Yaşam Bellek Özgürlük)
  • MAF-DAD e.V (Association for Democracy and International Law )
  • National Lawyers Guild International (USA)
  • National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers, Philippines (NUPL)
  • People’s Law Office / International
  • Progressive Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD)
  • Republikanischer Anwältinnen – und Anwälteverein e.V. (RAV), Germany
  • Rete Jin Italia (Jin Net)
  • Rights Initiative Association
  • Rosa Women’s Association
  • Social Policy, Gender Identity, and Sexual Orientation Studies Association (SPoD)
  • Syndicat des Avocats de France (SAF)
  • Syndicat des Avocats pour la Démocratie, Belgium (le SAD)
  • The Indian Association of lawyers
  • The National Association of Democratic Lawyers, (NADEL), South Africa
  • Transport Salaried Staffs Association
  • Ukrainian Association of Democratic Lawyers
  • Vereinigung Demokratischer Juristinnen und Juristen (VDJ)
  • Vereniging Sociale Rechtshulp Nederland
Posted on

The Invasion of Ukraine

(Français plus en bas)

The AED-EDL denounces the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and wishes to express its solidarity with the Ukrainian lawyers and more generally with the whole population living in Ukraine and all the people suffering the consequences of the conflict.

The military offensive is incompatible with the respect for the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine and is a violation of Articles 2 and 33 of the United Nations Charter, which requires States to settle disputes peacefully, without threat or use of force, in such a way that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

All States and international organisations must respect the obligations, values, freedoms and fundamental principles set out in the UN Charter, the Statute of the Council of Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights and all general principles of public international law and international humanitarian law.

The AED-EDL takes note of the decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to suspend, with immediate effect, the Russian Federation’s right of representation in the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly.

The opening of an investigation by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court into possible abuses committed during the conflict and the consideration by the International Court of Justice of requests for provisional measures submitted by Ukraine are undeniably a major step forward in favour of the rule of law.

AED-EDL hopes that such reactions will continue wherever conflicts break out and states violate international law, humanitarian law and human rights law.

The AED-EDL, in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter calls for the immediate cessation of all acts of war, to protect the populations involved, and the opening of genuine negotiations to find a lasting peace. 

While more than 1.5 million refugees have fled Ukraine in ten days, the activation of the temporary protection mechanism provided for by Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 is an appropriate but insufficient response to this exceptional situation.

However, AED-EDL regrets that this procedure has not been implemented for previous humanitarian crises, even though they were similar. All refugees must be received with dignity, regardless of their country of origin, their skin colour or the reasons for their departure.

AED-EDL condemns the various statements made by European leaders which consist in establishing two categories of refugees: those who “look like us” and for whom everything should be done to welcome them with dignity, and the others, who are clearly not welcome.

AED-EDL condemns the fact that residents from third countries, who are equally affected by the on-going conflict, are facing racist violence and are blocked at the EU border.

As previous conflicts have repeatedly shown that the outbreak of conflict and war increases the exposure of women and girls to war crimes, in particular all forms of gender-based violence, arbitrary executions, rape and trafficking, ACN urges that effective measures be put in place to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, and to ensure full accountability of those responsible for these crimes.

International humanitarian and human rights law must be respected in the context of armed conflict.

L’INVASION DE L’ UKRAINE

L’AED-EDL dénonce l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Fédération de Russie et tient à exprimer sa solidarité avec les avocats ukrainiens et plus généralement avec l’ensemble de la population vivant en Ukraine et toutes les personnes qui subissent les conséquences du conflit.

L’offensive militaire est incompatible avec le respect de l’intégrité territoriale et de l’indépendance de l’Ukraine et constitue une violation des articles 2 et 33 de la Charte des Nations Unies, qui impose aux Etats de régler leurs différends pacifiquement, sans recourir à la menace ou à l’emploi de la force, de telle sorte que la paix et la sécurité internationales ainsi que la justice ne soient pas mises en danger.

Tous les Etats et organisations internationales doivent respecter les obligations, valeurs, libertés et principes fondamentaux énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies, le Statut du Conseil de l’Europe, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et tous les principes généraux du droit international public et du droit international humanitaire.

L’AED-EDL prend acte la décision du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe de suspendre, avec effet immédiat, le droit de représentation de la Fédération de Russie au Comité des Ministres et à l’Assemblée parlementaire.

L’ouverture d’une enquête par le Procureur de la Cour Pénale Internationale sur les éventuels abus commis pendant le conflit et l’examen par la Cour Internationale de Justice des demandes de mesures conservatoires présentées par l’Ukraine constituent indéniablement une avancée majeure en faveur de l’Etat de droit.

L’AED-EDL espère que de telles réactions se poursuivront partout où des conflits éclatent et où des Etats violent le droit international, le droit humanitaire et les droits de l’homme.

L’AED, conformément à l’esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies, appelle à la cessation immédiate de tout acte de guerre afin de protéger les populations concernées, et à l’ouverture de véritables négociations pour trouver une paix durable. 

Alors que plus de 1,5 million de réfugiés ont fui l’Ukraine en dix jours, l’activation du mécanisme de protection temporaire prévu par la directive 2001/55/CE du Conseil du 20 juillet 2001 est une réponse appropriée mais insuffisante à cette situation exceptionnelle.

Cependant, l’AED-EDL regrette que cette procédure n’ait pas été mise en œuvre lors des précédentes crises humanitaires, pourtant similaires. Tous les réfugiés doivent être accueillis avec dignité, quels que soient leur pays d’origine, leur couleur de peau ou les raisons de leur départ.

L’AED-EDL condamne les différentes déclarations des dirigeants européens qui consistent à établir deux catégories de réfugiés : ceux qui ” nous ressemblent ” et pour lesquels tout doit être fait pour les accueillir dignement, et les autres, qui ne sont clairement pas les bienvenus.

L’AED-EDL condamne le fait que des résidents de pays tiers, qui sont également affectés par le conflit en cours, soient confrontés à des violences racistes et soient bloqués aux frontières de l’UE.

Les conflits précédents ayant montré à maintes reprises que le déclenchement d’un conflit ou d’une guerre augmente l’exposition des femmes et des filles aux crimes de guerre, en particulier à toutes les formes de violence sexiste, aux exécutions arbitraires, au viol et à la traite des êtres humains, ACN demande instamment que des mesures efficaces soient mises en place pour protéger les femmes et les filles de la violence sexiste et pour garantir que les responsables de ces crimes rendent pleinement compte de leurs actes.

Le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l’homme doivent être respectés dans le contexte des conflits armés.

Posted on

Fascist Attack in Rome

On Saturday 9th October, during a demonstration in Rome (Italy) led by exponents of fascist groups, dozens of demonstrators invaded the headquarters of the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), one of the largest confederal trade unions in Italy.

This attack recalls the attacks on the Chambers of Labour by fascist squads in 1920, a prelude to the later dictatorship of Mussolini.

The European Democratic Lawyers express their
solidarity with the Italian workers and trade unions for this vile attack, and strongly condemn the subversive groups that carried out this action, including Forza Nuova, a fascist party.

And we express our suport for CGIL.

We shall be united against fascism!

Posted on

Press release from Istanbul- Communiqué de Presse

En Français plus en bas de la page

Press release issued by the legal Fact Finding Mission of AED-EDL, taking place in Istanbul from the 15th September to the 20th September, to monitor and observe current mass trials against lawyers in Turkey.

Lawyers from AED–EDL have participated in the Fact Finding Mission in Istanbul from the 15th to the 20th September 2021 together with other represented international organizations, Bar Associations and the CCBE. The aim of the mission has been to monitor and observe mass trials against lawyers in Turkey. The Fact Finding Mission participants observed two hearings of the trial against Selçuk Kozağaçlı’s, Barkın Timtik’s and Oya Aslan, they have visited lawyers detained in Edirne, Kandıra and Silivri maximum security prisons, and have held meetings with the president of the Istanbul Bar Association, members of the defense and other lawyers in Turkey.

Currently, several trials against members of the lawyers’ organization Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği (ÇHD), member of AED – EDL, are taking place, in which 28 criminal defense lawyers are accused of being members of a terrorist group, in violation of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. Some of the defendants have already been convicted and sentenced to heavy prison terms, others are still in pretrial detention.

AED criticizes the fact that our colleagues are convicted or face charges stemming from the performance of their professional activities. Lawyers cannot be identified with their clients’ causes. 

AED condemns the fact that the charges used by the prosecution and the court stem from the extra-professional and private life of lawyers. Being a member of a lawyers’ association or a law firm composed by lawyers assuring the defense of political prisoners, social movements, participating in protests or funerals of clients and colleagues, addressing an international support (…) are used as presumed evidence of the participation in terrorist activities by the prosecution.

AED reaffirms that those non-criminal activities are protected by the rights of freedom of expression and association of lawyers.

The members of the AED-EDL mission have clearly witnessed the fact that the defense did not have access to the original documents used by the prosecutor as evidence and was denied the right to interrogate the secret witnesses. The use of this evidence is void as it constitutes a clear violation of the equality of arms, adversarial proceedings and the principle of contradiction, which are guaranteed by article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The refusal of the prosecution to produce the original documents is to be assimilated to a lack of proof and is enough for the immediate release of all lawyers and the waiver of charges.

AED considers that the Turkish authorities are using the judicial power instrumentally to attack the lawyers and restrain their professional freedom.

Istanbul, 20th of September 2021

Communiqué de presse de la mission d’observations de l’AED-EDL, qui a eu lieu à Istanbul du 15 au 20 septembre, afin d’observer les procès de masse en cours contre les avocats en Turquie.

Des avocats de l’AED-EDL ont participé à la mission d’enquête à Istanbul du 15 au 20 septembre 2021 avec des organisations internationales représentatives de la profession d’avocat, des barreaux et le CCBE. L’objectif de la mission était de suivre et d’observer les procès de masse contre des avocats en Turquie. Les participants à la mission d’observation ont assisté à deux audiences du procès contre Selçuk Kozağaçlı, Barkın Timtik et Oya Aslan. Ils ont rendu visite à des avocats détenus dans les prisons de haute sécurité d’Edirne, Kandıra et Silivri, et ont rencontré le président du Barreau d’Istanbul, des avocats de la défense ainsi que d’autres avocats turcs.

Actuellement, plusieurs procès contre des membres de l’organisation d’avocats Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği (ÇHD), membre de l’AED – EDL ont lieu avec 28 avocats de la défense accusés d’être membres d’un groupe terroriste, en violation des Principes de base des Nations unies relatifs au rôle des avocats. Certains des accusés ont déjà été reconnus coupables et condamnés à de lourdes peines de prison, d’autres sont toujours en détention provisoire.

L’AED dénonce le fait que nos confrères soient condamnés ou fassent l’objet de poursuites en raison de leur exercice professionnel. Les avocats ne peuvent pas être assimilés à leurs clients et aux causes qu’ils défendent.

L’AED condamne le fait que le ministère public et le tribunal utilisent la vie extra-professionnelle et privée des avocats comme des éléments à charges. Le fait d’être membre d’une association d’avocats ou d’un cabinet composé d’avocats assurant la défense de prisonniers politiques et des mouvements sociaux, de participer à des manifestations ou d’assister aux funérailles de clients et de confrères, de signer un appel à un soutien international… ne peuvent être utilisés comme des éléments de preuve d’une participation présumée à des activités terroristes.

L’AED réaffirme le fait que ces activités dépourvues de tout caractère délictuel et criminel sont protégées par le droit à la liberté d’expression et d’association des avocats.

Les membres de la mission AED-EDL ont été témoins du fait que la défense n’a pas eu accès aux documents originaux de la procédure dont les copies sont la base des poursuites par le procureur et ont pu constater l’impossibilité de la défense d’interroger les témoins anonymes. L’utilisation de ces preuves entache de nullité la procédure car elle constitue une violation manifeste de l’égalité des armes, du principe du contradictoire et des droits de la défense garantis par l’article 6 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde  des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales.

Le refus par les autorités de poursuite de produire les documents originaux doit être assimilé à une absence de preuve et doit conduire à la libération immédiate de tous les avocats ainsi qu’à l’abandon des charges à l’encontre de nos confrères.

L’AED considère que les autorités turques instrumentalisent le pouvoir judiciaire pour s’attaquer à la profession d’avocat et restreindre la liberté professionnelle des avocats.

Istanbul, 20 Septembre 2021

Posted on

THE PHILIPPINES: ATTACKS AGAINST LAWYERS FURTHER ESCALATING

23June2021–Attacks against lawyers in the Philippines continue to take place and killings have reached a record high since the start of President Duterte’s administration five years ago. We, the undersigned organizations,express our deep concern overthe attacksandtheoppressive working environment lawyersstill facein the Philippines. We call again on the Duterte Government to adequately protect the safety and independence of lawyers and end the culture of impunity in which these attacks occur.

Increased extrajudicial killings and harassment of lawyers

In our previous statement of 17 September 2019, we signalled that the number and intensity of attacks against lawyers had increased significantly since President Duterte took office on 30 June 2016. At least 46 jurists were extra-judicially killed between July 2016 and 5 September 2019. Among them at least 41 lawyers and prosecutors, of which 24 practicing lawyers. Eight jurists survived attacks on their life.

It is now reported that more lawyers have been killed in the five years since President Duterte took office than under any other government in Philippine history. The number of deaths of lawyers since 2016 has risen to 61. According to the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) half of the lawyer killings since 2016 were work-related.The National Union of People’s Lawyers (NUPL) reports that at least 54of the 61 killings are likelyto bework-related. Many other lawyers are facing threats and are afraid that they might be the next victims of attacks.

Lawyers at risk

Lawyers involved in high-profileor human rightscases are especially at risk. These are cases in which they represent victims of human rights violations, government critics, political opposition leaders, human rights defenders,environmental activists, and people who are accused of terrorist-or drug-related crimes.Very often, the rights of the eliteor government policiesare at stake. Examples are cases about land rights of farmers and indigenous peoples, anti-drug operations, and the enforcement of measures to combat the Covid-19 pandemic. Lawyers also face reprisals for participatingin the public debate on legal matters and the protection of human rights.

Culture of Impunity

In a June 2020 report, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) concluded that ‘persistent impunity for human rights violations is stark’ and ‘practical obstacles to accessing justice are almost insurmountable’. The NUPL reached a similar conclusion: ‘almost all of the perpetrators have never been brought to the bar of justice’. According to NUPL, this climate of impunity emboldens perpetrators to commit further attacks.

Grave implications of public labelling and worrying new laws

Prior to being attacked, an increasing number of lawyers was labelled as “communist” or “terrorist” by state agentsand officials. This labelling takesplaceregardless of actual political beliefs or 2affiliationsof the targeted individuals and isaimed at making them legitimate targets. Following earlier fact finding missions conducted by independent lawyers and judges, the combination of labelling or ‘red-tagging’ and a culture of impunitywas already identifiedas one of the main root causes of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. This practice continues unabated. OHCHR noted that alongside the intensified campaign against illegal drugs, the government of the Philippines has scaled up its response forcountering terrorism and conflicts.This also has an acute impact on civil society, including lawyers and judicial actors, “particularly through the phenomenon of “red-tagging”. The OHCHR found that “red-tagging” in de Philippines “has been a persistent and powerful threat to civil societyand freedom of expression”, adding that “[S]uch public labelling has proved extremely dangerous”. OHCHR referred to the example of four human rights defenders, including Attys Benjamin Ramos Jr. and Anthony Trinidad,who appearedon posters and hit lists claiming to depict members of alleged terrorists organizations,and were subsequently murdered. Despite national and international concern, the practice of “red-tagging”continues to take place and has also frequently been used by the Duterte administration itself. In a 7 June 2019 press release, eleven UN human rights experts already expressed their concern over this governmental practice andcalledon the UN Human Rights Council to establish an independentinvestigationinto human rights violations committed in the Philippines. “Instead of [the Government] sending a strong message that these killings and harassment are unacceptable, there is a rising rhetoric against independent voices in the country and ongoing intimidation and attacks against voices who are critical of the government, including independent media, human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists,” the experts said.In a July 2020 report, the Human Rights Commission of the Philippines stated that the ‘[P]president through his pronouncements created a dangerous fiction that it is legitimate to hunt down and commit atrocities against human rights defenders because they are enemies of the State’. All this is strengthened by the recently adopted Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (ATA 2020). Among its provisions is the creation of a government-appointed Anti-Terrorism Council that is given vast powers, including the power to designate individuals and groups as terrorists without due process. Critics and human rights groups have condemned the law for its overbroad definitions, vagueness, and dilution of human rights safeguards, calling it a weapon to target opponents and stifle free speech. A total of 37 petitions were filed to the Supreme Court after the law was enacted. Also lawyers have questioned the law before the Supreme Court, stating that the legislation could be abused to target administration opponents and suppress peaceful dissent. According to the July 2020 reportof the Human Rights Commission of the Philippines, the law “is prone to misuse”. The Commission worries that “the overbroad definition of terrorism gives the government unbridled power to determine who are “suspected terrorists” –which may include ordinary citizens and human rights defenders”. Once people are designated as terrorist they can be arrested and detained without warrants or charges for up to 24 days.

Consequences

The attacks against and extra-judicial killings of lawyers,the impunity shielding perpetrators, the continuous/increasedpractice of ‘red-tagging’, in combination with new laws and amendmentsthat risk eroding constitutional and other legal protections, such as the ATA 2020,impair the ability of lawyers to provide effective legal representation, make lawyersincreasingly waryof working on sensitive cases, and consequently severely undermine the proper functioning of the rule of law and the adequate protection of rights, including the right to remedies and fair trial.

International obligations

According to the United NationsBasic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (Basic Principles)1, States should ensure that all persons within their jurisdiction have effective and equal access to lawyers of their own choosing, and that lawyers are able to perform their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference3. The Basic Principles require that lawyers are adequately protected when their security is threatened because of carrying out their legitimate professional duties, and not be identified with their clients or their clients’ causes. The Basic Principles affirm that lawyers, like other citizens, are entitled to freedom of expression and assembly.6The duty to respect and guarantee these freedoms forms an integral part of the Philippines’ international legal obligations under theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Recommendations

In view of the above, the undersigned organizations and individuals urge the Government of the Philippines to:

  1. Investigate promptly, effectively, thoroughly and independently all extrajudicial killingsand attacks against lawyers, and other jurists, with the aim of identifying those responsible and bringing them to justice in proceedings that respect international fair trial standards;.

2. Take all reasonable measures to guarantee the safety and physical integrity of lawyers, including the provision of adequate protection measures, in consultation with the persons concerned;.

3. Create and fully support an independent, credible and impartial body, i.e. not under the control or the influence of the government, composed of members selected exclusively from nominees from lawyers organizations, civil society, the Church and the like in a transparent way, who are known for their human rights record, independency and integrity; this civilian investigative body must be entrusted with the necessary investigative and prosecutorial powers to investigate promptly, impartially and effectively -under international supervisory mandate -all reports and complaints against state security agents with respect to extrajudicial killings, threats and other forms of harassment; the recommendations of this investigative body should beimmediately followed by the government.

4. Consistently condemn all forms of threats and attacks against lawyers publicly, at all political levels and in strong terms; and,

5. Fully comply with and create awareness about the core values underlying the legal profession, amongst others by bringing the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers to the attention of relevant stakeholders, especially members of the executive, police, and the military.

Signatories(in alphabetical order):

AIJA -International Association of Young Lawyers

Amsterdam Bar Association (Netherlands)

ASESORÍA JURÍDICA BOADA

Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC)

Associació Catalana per a la Defensa dels Drets Humans

Avvocati minacciati

Unione camere penali italiane

Bar HumanRights Committee of England and Wales

Burgas Bar Association

Confederation of Lawyers of Asia and the Pacific (COLAP)

Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)

Deutscher Anwaltverein

European Association of Lawyers for Democracy andWorld Human Rights (ELDH)

European Criminal Bar Association

European Democratic Lawyers

Foundation Day of the Endangered Lawyer

Human Rights Embassy (Moldova)

Indian Association of Lawyers

International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI)

International Commission of Jurists

International Observatory of Lawyers in Danger

Law Council of Australia

Law Society of England and Wales

Lawyers for Lawyers

Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada

Noord-Nederland Bar Association (Netherlands)

Progressive Lawyers Association(Turkey)

Rotterdam Bar Association (Netherlands)

Southern African Human Rights Defenders Network

The Arrested Lawyers Initiative

UIA-IROL (Institute for the Rule of Law of theInternational Association of Lawyers)

Download the full statement

Posted on

Joint Statement – IFTD

Download the statement

Today, 14 June 2021, marks the inaugural International Fair Trial Day (IFTD) which will be observed for the first time worldwide. The focus country of the IFTD this year is Turkey, a country that is and has been suffering for many years, from systemic human rights violations and a serious lack of fair trial standards. On the occasion of the IFTD, drawing attention to the deteriorating situation in the country, the undersigned organisations call upon the Turkish authorities to take the necessary steps urgently to instate the right to a fair trial in Turkey and to create an environment under which these fundamental procedural rights can effectively be protected. The undersigned organisations also call upon the international community to increase their efforts to draw attention to the situation in Turkey with a particular focus on the issues around the fair trial principles.

Background of the IFTD

In response to the serious failure of the judicial system in Turkey to protect and respect fair trial principles, lawyers Ebru Timtik and Aytaç Ünsal began a hunger strike in January 2020. They expressed a common demand of many thousands who were subjected to arbitrary investigations, trials, arrests, detentions, and wrongful convictions. They called on the Turkish government to comply with its obligations to secure and respect the right to a fair trial and to end practices constituting systemic violations of this fundamental right. On 5 April 2020, on Lawyers’ Day in Turkey, they turned their hunger strike into a death fast to underline the vital importance of this demand. Ebru Timtik lost her life on 27 August 2020, the 238th day of her death fast, while Aytaç Ünsal ended his protest on 4 September 2020 following a temporary release order by the Supreme Court which was later withdrawn. He was returned to prison on 10 December 2020.

Fundamental rights and freedoms and principles of the rule of law are under attack not only in Turkey but globally. In many countries, including European countries, there are reports documenting governmental oppression and practices undermining international human rights obligations. Thus, those who carry out activities to condemn, draw attention to and criticise these practices are under constant pressure from the state apparatus, including pressure from the judiciary, whose independence and impartiality is being seriously undermined. Attempts are being made to silence lawyers, human rights defenders, journalists, opposition politicians, academics and many others raising their voices against such policies through baseless

accusations against them, e.g. under anti-terror legislation, a practice that has been referred to as ‘judicial harassment’.

The International Fair Trial Day was established along with the Ebru Timtik Award to advocate for the re-establishment of fair trial rights in those countries where fair trial rights are under serious threat. The occasion will be used by the international community to focus on the situation in the country chosen for that year as the focus country and to draw attention to the fair trial issues faced there. Also, an annual Ebru Timtik Award will be granted to an individual and/or an organisation from the focus country that has been active in defending and or promoting the right to a fair trial in that specific country.

Taking into account the background of the IFTD and the continuing deterioration of the situation in the country, Turkey was chosen this year as the focus country. In future years other countries will be chosen to reflect the challenges to the right to fair trial being experienced in those respective jurisdictions.

Call to Action on Turkey

The state of human rights and rule of law in Turkey have been declining particularly since the Gezi Park protests in 2013 which were followed by the collapse of the peace talks in 2015 and the state of emergency declared after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt which remained in place for 2 years until July 2018. The mistreatment of lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders, opposition politicians, academics, and others who are critical of the current situation reflects a far wider practice in the country of failing to respect fair trial rights, among other fundamental rights and freedoms, especially since the attempted coup of July 2016.

The rapid deterioration seen in human rights has been widely reported and reflected on by the international community, including the UN and Council of Europe organs, each of which has identified serious issues ranging from the lack of independence of the judiciary to the collapse of the main pillars of a democratic system, including separation of powers. Criticisms from these international bodies and from the international community generally have been far ranging from undue interference in fundamental rights and freedoms for political purposes to serious violation of political participation rights of the minority groups such as Kurds.1

Reflecting on the issues identified in these reports, we the undersigned organisations, call on the Turkish authorities to implement the following steps to ensure full protection of the right to a

1 See e.g. the Working Group on the United Nations Universal Periodic Review, adopted on 29 September 2020 at the 45th session of the Human Rights Council of the UN; Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey, Report | Doc. 15272 | 21 April 2021, https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref- XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=29155&lang=en ; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2020, https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2020

fair trial in the country and to create an environment enabling effective protection of its underlying principles:

  • take necessary legislative and other measures to ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and end all practices constituting direct interference, pressure or influence with respect to judicial conduct, including those from the executive;
  • implement the recommendation of the numerous human rights oversight mechanisms, including of the Human Rights Council in the UN Universal Periodic Review2 and Venice Commission,3 to introduce a constitutional amendment to make the Council of Judges and Prosecutors independent of the executive and ensure that its decisions are open to judicial review;
  • amend the relevant articles of the Turkish Penal Code and the Law No. 3713 on Prevention of Terrorism, that are found to be broad, vague and arbitrarily applied against critical voices, to meet the requirements of clarity and foreseeability and the principles of legal certainty and no punishment without law;
  • immediately end the systematic abuse, detention and prosecution of lawyers, judges, other legal professionals, journalists, human rights defenders, opposition politicians, academics and others where there is no cogent evidence of specific criminal misconduct presented in proceedings that comply with international fair trial standards;
  • guarantee and respect the principle of presumption of innocence in all criminal investigations and prosecutions;
  • stop any practices preventing enjoyment of the rights protected under international human rights treaties such as freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly, including by way of using the exercise of such freedoms as grounds for arbitrary prosecutions and lengthy and punitive pretrial detention;
  • ensure that the rights to fair trial embodied in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are respected in all criminal prosecutions in Turkey’s criminal courts at all levels;
  • repeal state of emergency amendments passed into law, which amendments seek to enable the dismissal of judges and prosecutors without a fair hearing and which seek to limit the rights of lawyers to discharge their professional duties, the rights of suspects to legal counsel, and the right of lawyer-client communications, as well as to impose other 2 Ibid.
    3 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Draft Opinion on dhe Draft Law on Judges and Prosecutors of Turkey, 8 March 2011, opinion no 610/2011, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2011)003-e

limitations on the justice system, as outlined in the report of Human Rights Watch published in April 20194;

  • end the practice of mass trials of lawyers, judges, journalists, opposition politicians, human rights defenders and others, in particular on bogus charges, such as the charge of membership in a terrorist organization, aimed at preventing their legitimate activities and silencing them; and
  • create an open dialogue with the international oversight mechanisms and national and international NGOs to address and resolve the structural human right issues in the country and, as a first step, promptly agree to requests by the UN Special Rapporteur on Judges and Lawyers and other special procedures to conduct country visits to Turkey. We call on the international community to respond effectively to the deteriorating state of human rights and rule of law in Turkey and to increase its efforts to effectively address these issues with international stakeholders for increased awareness and attention.